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Abstract 
 Despite the constant influx of visual information, observers are nonetheless able to 
segment this input into discrete objects and events. The perceptual system does so on the 
basis of spatial and temporal properties, thus allowing one to keep track of visual objects 
as they move to different locations across time. This process of object individuation is 
integral for visual awareness; when it is disrupted, stimuli are no longer perceived. 
Behavioural studies that have investigated object individuation in temporal and spatial 
domains converge on the idea that object individuation is a capacity-limited process that 
gates which items proceed for further analysis. Although there has been considerable 
theoretical and behavioural work on object individuation, we know relatively little about its 
neural substrates. The experiments in this thesis investigate the brain regions that support 
object individuation across multiple episodic contexts and processing stages, characterise 
its capacity limits and relationship to identification, and isolate the stage of processing at 
which individuation arises. 
 Chapter 2 describes a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that 
isolated the neural bases of temporal individuation during perception, and the 
consequences that arise when its processing limit is reached (repetition blindness, RB). 
RB is a rapid serial visual presentation phenomenon characterised by reduced 
performance on trials with a target repetition compared with those in which the two targets 
have different identities (non-repetition trials). This failure of perceptual consciousness is 
thought to reflect a capacity limit of temporal individuation. I first verified that my RB 
paradigm elicited the standard behavioural effect (Experiment 1) and was specific to the 
temporal limits of individuation, rather than identification (Experiment 2). Using fMRI 
(Experiment 3), I found that multivariate patterns of blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
activity across a large number of occipital, parietal and frontal regions could discriminate 
between trials in which a repetition was correctly reported (a demanding individuation 
scenario), compared with correct non-repetition trials (a relatively easy individuation 
scenario). Consistent with current models of consciousness, and contrary to existing work 
on spatial individuation at the level of memory encoding, these findings suggest that 
temporal individuation is supported by a distributed set of brain regions. In terms of RB 
itself, I found greater activity in the left premotor cortex for incorrect versus correct 
repetition trials. This result suggests that the left premotor region is critical for the 
processing limitations that give rise to RB. 
 In Chapter 3, I tested whether object individuation and identification can be 
dissociated in the brain at the level of visual short-term memory (VSTM) encoding and 
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beyond, as proposed in the neural object file theory. Participants completed a delayed 
VSTM task in which they had to remember the identity and spatial locations of one object, 
four identical objects or four different objects. To isolate object individuation regions, BOLD 
activity was compared between one object and four identical objects. By contrast, to 
identify object identification regions, BOLD activity was contrasted between four identical 
objects and four different objects. Across univariate and multivariate analyses, I found 
brain regions that were specific to individuation or identification processes, and others that 
were common between the two. These findings challenge the neural object file theory, and 
instead suggest that object individuation and identification processes have distributed and 
overlapping neural substrates. 
 The aim of the experiments reported in Chapter 4 was to characterise the 
timecourse of object individuation for attended and unattended objects, and determine the 
extent to which this operation draws on early sensory cortices. Previous event-related 
potential (ERP) studies were unable to show definitive evidence of object individuation at 
early perceptual stages of analysis, because the paradigms in these studies confounded 
manipulations of individuation load (i.e., number of targets) with low-level visual features 
(e.g., luminance). I first developed a novel enumeration paradigm involving items defined 
by illusory contours, which held all physical properties constant across conditions 
(Experiment 1), and then used electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the 
timecourse of object individuation for attended and unattended stimuli (Experiment 2). 
Both P1 (100-140 ms) and N2 (185-250 ms) amplitudes increased with the number of 
attended targets, but the number of unattended non-targets only modulated the N2. An 
fMRI study (Experiment 3) showed that early visual cortex (including V2) was sensitive to 
individuation load, which I hypothesised might underpin the observed P1 effect. These 
findings demonstrated that task-relevant individuation occurs at a relatively early stage of 
visual information processing, and voluntary spatial attention modulates the timecourse of 
this operation. 
 Taken together, the experiments reported in this thesis offer novel insights into our 
understanding of the neural underpinnings of object individuation across various stages of 
processing. These findings have implications for current theoretical accounts of object 
individuation and its associated processes in the brain, and contribute to models of how 
individuation should be operationalised as a construct. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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The ability to separately encode information about an object’s spatiotemporal location and 
its features is vital for visual perception (Marr, 1982). Schneider (1969) was the first to 
make this distinction between ‘what’ and ‘where’ processing in vision, and it has been 
maintained even if the original neural mechanisms he proposed for these operations have 
not. If one fails to register the correct position of a particular feature, severe perceptual 
errors can arise (e.g., misjudging the location of a hazard when crossing the street). Such 
misperceptions are apparent in illusory conjunctions, where a specific feature of a stimulus 
(e.g., its colour) is mistakenly paired with another feature (e.g., its shape) that is not 
present in the current stimulus, but is part of another item at a different location (Treisman 
& Gelade, 1980). For example, in a display containing a red ‘X’ and a green ‘O,’ the items 
could be incorrectly perceived as a green ‘X’ and a red ‘O’ (Treisman & Schmidt, 1982; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Observers can also show impairments in their ability to assign 
the same attribute to separate stimuli that appear in different points in time or space 
(Kanwisher, 1987; Mozer, 1989; Park & Kanwisher, 1994). The idea that object features 
are bound to a specific spatial location or time point is only useful in the case of static 
stimuli, however, because otherwise a new object would be perceived each time the 
stimulus moves or is momentarily occluded in the visual scene. Instead, the visual system 
must rely on some sort of mechanism to index, or individuate, an object as a distinct, 
continuous representation across changes in time and space. 
In this chapter, I outline recent theoretical and empirical work on two processes that 
are critical for the encoding of spatiotemporal and identity information about visual objects, 
namely, object individuation and object identification. I also discuss accounts concerning 
how this information is linked to create integrated representations. In addition, I present 
cognitive-neuroscientific models that have been introduced to characterise how the human 
brain differentially processes information about what an object is and where/when it 
appears. Finally, I outline several outstanding questions in the field. For example, how is 
the ability to individuate objects across time reflected in the brain? What neural 
consequences arise when this process reaches its capacity limit? Do individuation and 
identification processes overlap in the brain? Does object individuation draw on selective 
attention mechanisms? And, at what stage of information processing does individuation 
take place? In the following chapters, I present empirical investigations that employ a 
range of behavioural and neurophysiological approaches to address these questions. 
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Processing What, Where and When in Vision 
 Several theoretical models have proposed that visual attributes are organised into 
abstract object representations that are independent of where the object appears. In his 
FINST (or ‘fingers of instantiation’) theory of visual indexing, Pylyshyn (1989, 1994; 2001) 
argued for a pre-attentive mechanism that allows the visual system to individuate a 
particular object as a perceptual entity that is distinct from other objects. The notion of 
FINSTs is analogous to pointing at an object in the external environment with one’s finger. 
In this scenario, one is able to register the presence of an object and update its specific 
spatial location if it moves, but one cannot glean any information about the object’s 
attributes. In this sense, FINSTs can be described as ‘sticky’; they allow an observer to 
track an object, and recognise when the same object persists in a visual scene, even if it 
changes its spatial and, therefore, retinal location (Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988). Pylyshyn 
proposed that individuating an object occurs prior to, and without the need for, the 
extraction of featural information that is necessary to identify the object. A limited set of 
FINSTs can be created in parallel for multiple specific features of an object – or to a cluster 
of features – and this assignment is likely to be driven by bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
features caused by a sudden onset (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Remington, Johnston, & 
Yantis, 1992) or shape change (Miller, 1989; Theeuwes, 1991). FINSTs can also act as a 
pointer for guiding top-down processes like focal attention (Pylyshyn, 1989; Pylyshyn, 
2001).  
 Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) provided an empirical demonstration of the FINST 
mechanism. They reasoned that, if FINSTs are indexed independently of any analysis of 
identity information, observers should be able to track a subset of items even if they are 
identical to non-tracked items. Specifically, Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) tested whether 
observers could track several moving targets embedded in a display with distractor items, 
where all items were identical in appearance (see Figure 1). To complete this task, 
observers had to track the targets over time, but could not rely purely on identity 
information (as this was constant across all items) or the specific memory of a prior spatial 
location (unless this was updated at a sufficient frequency). In the experiment, a static 
display consisting of ten items was initially presented, in which one to five of the items 
flashed. The flashing items denoted the targets observers were to keep track of, and the 
remaining stimuli were distractors. All stimuli then began moving around the visual display 
in random directions, during which time a solid white square would briefly replace one of 
the target or distractor items (there were four flashes in total with only a single target 
event). Observers were required to make a speeded button press when the flash occurred 
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over a target item (this paradigm is now know as multiple object tracking; Scholl, Pylyshyn, 
& Feldman, 2001). Although performance declined with increasing number of targets, 
observers were still able to track up to four or five items with a high level of accuracy 
(approximately 85%). This finding suggests observers are able to simultaneously 
individuate and track multiple objects on the basis of their spatiotemporal properties, rather 
than their identity, and that this process is resource-limited. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of a standard multiple object tracking paradigm. 
Each trial begins with a static display of items (t1), some of which flash (t2), and these 
items are defined as targets (flashing items are denoted here by a circular dotted line). All 
items then begin moving around the display in a random fashion (t3). During this period, a 
given item can briefly change to a solid white square (shown in black here), and if this item 
is a target, participants are instructed to make a speeded button press (t4). This figure was 
reproduced from Pylyshyn (2001) with permission from Elsevier Limited. 
 
 The notion of a pre-attentive mechanism that individuates and indexes multiple 
objects in a visual scene was also a key component of the object file framework introduced 
by Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992). This theory accounts for how objects are 
initially selected and then processed up to awareness. The term object files refers to a 
temporary episodic representation (token), which is distinct from stored long-term memory 
representations that are used to determine an object’s identity (type; Kahneman & 
Treisman, 1984). Each object file contains information about the object’s spatial location at 
a particular time point and any additional sensory information that has been acquired 
about that object. The contents of the object file may include featural information, but an 
object file is created and maintained predominantly on the basis of its spatiotemporal 
properties. Object files can be created for groups of objects (e.g., a bowl of fruit) or a 
single object (e.g., an apple), and the level at which objects are defined depends on top-
+ ++ +
t1 t2 t3 t4
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down factors, such as attention (LaBerge, 1983; Navon, 1977), or bottom-up factors, such 
as grouping (Baylis & Driver, 1992). To recognise an object, sensory information contained 
in the object file is compared against that stored in long-term memory. If there is a match 
between the current object file and a stored representation, recognition occurs and 
relevant identity information and its associated characteristics (e.g., the appropriate 
behavioural response) are added to the object file.  
The contents of an object file are updated whenever its sensory characteristics 
change, such as when the object moves to a different spatial location. If the new sensory 
information cannot be matched to an existing file, a new one is created. Kahneman, 
Treisman, and Gibbs (1992) refer to three separate operations that are necessary for 
maintaining an object file. First, a correspondence operation determines whether an object 
is new or is a previously seen object that has changed location. Second, a reviewing 
process occurs in which previous sensory information about an object that is no longer 
visible is retrieved. Third, in the impletion operation, both current and reviewed information 
are used to create a percept that links the two. When the current and reviewed information 
from the reviewing phase match, the two objects are seen as corresponding to the same 
object at two separate points in time. If there is no match, there will be no correspondence 
between the two objects and the information associated with each will be assigned to 
separate object files.  
 Kahneman et al. (1992) introduced the object reviewing paradigm to demonstrate 
the role of object files in maintaining the percept of a single object across changes in time 
and space (see Figure 2). In the preview phase of this task, two or more letters are 
presented in separate placeholder boxes that appear at distinct locations. Then, during the 
target phase, only a single letter appears in one of the placeholders. The target letter is 
manipulated to be the letter that appeared in that same box at preview, in a different box at 
preview, or a novel letter that did not appear in either of the preview boxes. Observers are 
typically faster to identify the target letter when it is the same letter that appeared in the 
corresponding box at preview than when it was presented in a different box, or was absent 
from the display. This object-specific preview advantage effect is thought to indicate that 
the target is processed more efficiently when its stimulus information is retrieved from the 
same object file created at preview than when an entirely new object file must be created 
or substantially updated. Object files are therefore another potential mechanism by which 
stimuli can be individuated in a visual scene and maintained across changes in time, 
space and appearance. Although there are differences in the types of theoretical problems 
they aim to address (for a discussion, see Kahneman et al., 1992), both FINSTs and 
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object files nevertheless assume a stage of processing in which an object can be 
individuated as a distinct entity, and that this phase can proceed independently of any sort 
of featural analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of a standard object reviewing paradigm. 
A preview display first appears with a series of placeholders, two of which contain sample 
items (t1). Participants’ task is to remember the identities and locations of these items. 
Following a linking phase (t2), a single target item appears in one of the placeholders (t3). 
The target item matches the identity and location of one of the preview items (same 
object), matches the identity of the other preview item that appeared at a different location 
(different object), or matches neither of the previewed items (no match). This figure was 
reproduced from Kahneman et al. (1992) with permission from Elsevier Limited. 
 
Processing What, Where and When in the Brain 
The theoretical accounts and behavioural evidence discussed thus far support the 
notion of separate individuation and identification processes in visual perception. A similar 
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distinction has been made in the terms of how, what, where and when information is 
represented and processed in the brain. Based on electrophysiological, anatomical and 
behavioural evidence, Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) proposed that two anatomically 
distinct neural pathways are responsible for many aspects of visual perception: An 
occipitotemporal (‘ventral’) pathway responsible for object identification, or processing 
‘what’ information, and an occipitoparietal (‘dorsal’) pathway that underpins spatial 
perception, or the analysis of ‘where’ information. These two streams receive independent 
outputs from the striate cortex. Information for the ventral stream is projected to the 
inferotemporal cortex, whereas the dorsal stream projects to the posterior parietal cortex. 
The key evidence in support of these two functionally distinct pathways comes from lesion 
studies (e.g., Gross, 1973; Mishkin, 1966; Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982; Pohl, 1973). 
Mishkin (1966) found that monkeys with a lesion to the striate cortex in one hemisphere 
and an inferotemporal lesion in the opposite hemisphere could still perform well on a 
pattern discrimination task. If the corpus callosum was severed to disrupt the single 
remaining striatal-inferotemporal connection, however, task performance dropped to 
chance, implicating this pathway in object perception. An analogous cross-lesion 
dissection study was conducted by Mishkin and Ungerleider (1982) to explore the 
functional role of striatal-parietal connections. These authors found decrements in 
performance on a landmark discrimination task following an initial lesion to a single 
contralateral striatal-parietal connection and the subsequent lesion to the connecting 
corpus callosum region, suggesting that this cortical pathway is necessary for spatial 
perception.  
Human lesion studies provided converging evidence for the functional dissociation 
between ventral and dorsal visual processing pathways for identity and location 
information, respectively. For instance, patients who develop visual agnosia as a result of 
damage to areas including the occipitotemporal region, struggle to recognise or 
discriminate a range of simple visual stimuli (e.g., objects, faces, body parts, geometric 
shapes), but have preserved spatial navigation abilities (Farah, 1990). This finding further 
supports the causal relationship between the ventral pathway and object identification. On 
the other hand, patients with optic ataxia, who have lesions of the posterior parietal cortex, 
have difficulty reaching toward visual objects even through they can recognise them 
(Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). These patients therefore seem capable of identifying what the 
object is, even if they cannot register where it is in space, providing further evidence for 
the role of the dorsal pathway in spatial perception. This combination of animal and human 
neurophysiological evidence provides strong support for Ungerleider and Mishkin’s (1982) 
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hypothesis that the ventral occipitotemporal pathway plays a key role in object perception, 
but not spatial perception, whereas the dorsal occipitoparietal pathway is specialised for 
spatial perception, but not object recognition. 
 Goodale and Milner (1992; see also, Goodale, 2008; Goodale, 2013) make a 
similar distinction between ventral and dorsal visual processing streams, but argue that the 
functional role of the dorsal stream is not specific to spatial perception. Instead, they 
propose the dorsal stream is responsible for processing visual information in the service of 
goal-directed action (a ‘how’ stream). For example, while patients with optic ataxia who 
have dorsal stream lesions show deficits in their ability to reach toward the correct object 
location, their reaching behaviour is also slow and uncoordinated, and they have difficulty 
adjusting their hand to suit the appropriate orientation, or the width of their grasp to match 
an object’s size (Perenin & Vighetto, 1988). Similar deficits in visually guided grasping with 
preserved object recognition abilities have been noted in patients who have recovered 
from Balint’s syndrome – an impairment which also arises from parietal lobe damage 
(Gross, 1973). These studies therefore suggest that parietal lobe damage does not just 
lead to deficits in spatial vision, but also in action-related reaching and grasping (Goodale 
& Milner, 1992). By contrast, patients with visual agnosia who have damage to the ventral 
stream show the opposite pattern of behaviour: They can display appropriate grasping 
behaviours, but have trouble identifying the size, shape or orientation of visual targets 
(Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner et al., 1991). Based on this 
neurophysiological work, Goodale and Milner (1992; see also, Goodale, 2008; Goodale, 
2013) propose that visual cortex projections to the parietal lobe are responsible for the 
processing of action-related information about an object, in addition to its spatial location 
(as initially suggested by Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), whereas projections to the 
temporal lobe provide information needed for the perceptual experience of an visual object 
and its attributes. 
 While these two-system accounts provide broad frameworks for understanding how 
the brain perceives the features and spatiotemporal properties of an object, and generates 
an appropriate action plan to interact with it, neither of these neural pathways map directly 
onto the cognitive mechanisms proposed by Pylyshyn (1989, 1994; 2001) and Kahneman 
et al. (1992). Put differently, it is unclear how representations generated from individuating 
an object and identifying its featural attributes are reflected in the brain. To address this 
question, Xu and Chun (2009) put forward their neural object file theory, which implicates  
a specific set of occipital and parietal brain regions in object individuation and 
identification. Specifically, Xu and Chun define object individuation as the ability to select 
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up to four objects based on their spatial locations, and to create a set of object files 
representing these stimuli (Kahneman et al., 1992). Individuation involves more than just 
indexing an object (i.e., beyond the initial assignment of FINSTs; Pylyshyn, 1989), such 
that the representations generated during this operation are stable perceptual units that 
can maintain consistency over time and space (Rensink, 2000). Object representations 
during individuation have a coarse resolution and contain very little, if any, information 
relating to the featural properties of the associated stimuli. In object identification, on the 
other hand, attributes from a subset of individuated objects are analysed and integrated 
(i.e., the contents of the corresponding object files; Kahneman et al., 1992), and there is 
sufficient information available to recognise an object as familiar or novel. Importantly, the 
number and precision of object features encoded depends on the complexity of the task 
demands, such that fewer features can be encoded under higher task demands (Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006). 
 The neural object file theory was initially based on the findings of a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigation by Xu and Chun (2006). This study 
aimed to resolve the debate as to whether visual short-term memory (VSTM) capacity 
depends on the complexity of the task or stimulus demands (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Xu, 2002), or instead reflects the number of unified object ‘slots’ that are filled, 
independent of complexity (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008). In this experiment, 
observers were briefly presented a sample display containing one to four, or six black, 
elongated shapes that they had to remember over a short delay (see Figure 3). A single 
test item then appeared. Observers had to either detect whether there had been a simple 
feature change (detect the presence/absence of a gap in the centre of the test shape) or a 
complex feature change (detect whether the shape outline changed). Blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) activity, measured with fMRI, in the superior intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) 
and lateral occipital complex (LOC) increased with the number of items held in VSTM for 
simple, but not complex, shape features. Conversely, activity in the inferior IPS tracked the 
number of objects held in VSTM, regardless of task complexity. In addition, in a follow-up 
experiment where all objects were presented sequentially at a central location, rather than 
at peripheral locations, activity increased with set size up to VSTM capacity in the superior 
IPS and LOC, but not in the inferior IPS (as the spatial locations did not differ across set 
sizes). These findings were taken as evidence that the inferior IPS reflects an indexing 
mechanism that is capable of selecting a fixed number of objects based on spatial 
locations, regardless of their featural properties (object individuation). On the other hand, 
the superior IPS and LOC are involved in identification and feature extraction, and 
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consequently are sensitive to a fixed amount of featural information, rather than the 
physical number of objects present (object identification). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of a visual short-term memory paradigm. 
Each trial begins with a sample display consisting of one to four or six black shapes. 
Participants’ task is to remember the featural properties of these shapes over a short 
retention interval. A single test item then appears, and this item either matches one of the 
previous sample items or not. If there is a featural change at test, it could either be a 
simple change (i.e., the presence or absence of a gap) or a relatively complex change 
(i.e., a change in the shape outline). This figure was reproduced from Xu and Chun (2006) 
with permission from Nature Publishing Group. 
 
 A follow-up study by Xu (2009) investigated the apparent dissociation between the 
neural substrates associated with object individuation (inferior IPS) and identification 
(superior IPS and LOC) by testing the effect of object repetition. Based on the neural 
object file theory, Xu predicted that because object individuation relies on information 
about location but not identity, brain areas involved in individuation should treat four 
identical objects in the same way as four different objects (as these two conditions have 
the same number of objects). On the other hand, brain areas that support object 
identification would respond differently to four identical and four different objects, but 
should treat four identical objects the same as a single instance of the same object (as 
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these two conditions contain the same amount of identity information). Xu (2009) used a 
similar VSTM paradigm to Xu and Chun (2006; see Figure 3), except now the sample 
display could consist of one shape, four identical shapes or four different shapes. BOLD 
activity in the inferior IPS was reduced for one-object displays relative to both of the four-
object displays, which did not differ from each other. However, the superior IPS and LOC 
showed a greater response for four-different-object displays compared with both the four-
identical-object and one-object displays. Thus, consistent with the predictions of the neural 
object file theory, Xu (2009) found that the inferior IPS tracked the spatial locations of 
objects (individuation), whereas the superior IPS and LOC were sensitive to the number of 
object features (identification). Interestingly, these findings contradict the traditional 
distinction between ‘what’ and ‘where’ visual pathways in the brain (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 
1982), and instead suggest that these two types of object information are represented 
within the parietal cortex (Xu, 2009). 
 
Neural Bases of Individuation Across Time 
 The research discussed thus far illustrates important aspects of the processes 
associated with multiple object encoding, but there are still key questions that remain 
unanswered. In particular, we currently do not have a clear understanding of the systems-
level neural substrates associated with representing stimuli as distinct perceptual events 
(i.e., the process of individuation). An important issue concerns how objects are 
individuated across time (temporal individuation). The paradigms that have typically been 
used to investigate object individuation manipulate either the number of spatial locations 
that contain an object (e.g., VSTM paradigms by Xu and colleagues; object reviewing 
paradigms by Kahneman and colleagues), or vary spatial and temporal properties 
concurrently (e.g., multiple object tracking tasks by Pylyshyn and Storm). As a result, it is 
currently unknown how purely temporal information contributes to object individuation, and 
particularly, how this process is represented in the brain. The single neural substrate 
implicated in object individuation (inferior IPS) has only been studied in a spatial episodic 
context (Xu, 2009), meaning that we do not know whether this region – or indeed other 
brain areas – are also involved when an observer must only rely on temporal cues to 
register distinct stimuli. 
Repetition blindness (RB) is a behavioural phenomenon that could be employed to 
address this issue, as it is thought to provide an index of the temporal capacity limits of 
object individuation (Kanwisher & Potter, 1989; Mozer, 1989; Park & Kanwisher, 1994). In 
Kanwisher’s pioneering experiments, observers were presented with a rapid serial visual 
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presentation (RSVP) stream of words that formed a sentence, one at a time, and their task 
was to report the full sentence at the end of the stream. There were two key 
manipulations: The identity of the two critical items in the stream and the number of 
distractor words (lags) between the two critical items. Specifically, the critical items could 
either share the same identity (repeated items) or have different identities (non-repeated 
items). Temporal lag was varied such that the two critical items appeared relatively close 
in time (e.g., 200 ms) or further apart (e.g., 600 ms). The classic RB finding was that when 
the two critical items appeared in close temporal proximity, observers were poorer at 
reporting the second item if it had the same (versus a different) identity to the first critical 
item. RB has now been demonstrated for a wide range of stimuli including alphanumeric 
items (Chun, 1997), colours (Kanwisher, 1991) and objects (Harris & Dux, 2005a, 2005b), 
and can even occur for words that are non-identical, yet orthographically similar (e.g., 
"reach" and "react"; Bavelier, 1994). Moreover, equivalent performance decrements for 
repeated targets are seen when participants are asked to detect, rather than identify, the 
target items (e.g., Coltheart & Langdon, 2003; Johnston, Hochhaus, & Ruthruff, 2002; 
Kanwisher, 1987), suggesting that RB reflects, at least to some extent, a perceptual 
processing limitation.  
 A prominent theoretical account proposed by Kanwisher (1987; also see, Chun, 
1997; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009) suggests that RB reflects a failure of type-
token binding, and draws on a similar distinction to that proposed by Kahneman and 
Treisman (1984). Kanwisher predicts that as each item appears in the RSVP stream, its 
type is activated and a token is created to register it as a distinct episodic event. These 
two representations are linked together through the process of token individuation, in 
which the activated type is bound to the corresponding token. Once a type has been 
bound to a specific token, there is a refractory period during which that same type cannot 
be linked with another token. It is this inhibition of the second repeated item’s token 
individuation that gives rise to RB. That is, the observer can successfully individuate the 
first occurrence of the repeated item, but due to the refractory period, they cannot link the 
token for the second occurrence with its type and thus, they only perceive a single item. 
Importantly, activation of the type representation for the second repeated item is 
unaffected, as shown by enhanced performance on repeated trials (repetition priming) 
when observers are only required to report the second target (Kanwisher & Potter, 1990; 
Shapiro, Driver, Ward, & Sorensen, 1997; but also see, Luo & Caramazza, 1995). Further, 
RB is reduced under conditions that enhance the episodic distinctiveness between two 
targets – such as presenting targets in a different colour to distractors (Chun, 1997; Dux & 
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Coltheart, 2008) or cueing attention to targets with an irrelevant sound (Chen & Yeh, 2008) 
– which make it easier to mark each occurrence. 
 Although Kanwisher’s account argues for a perceptual locus for RB, other models 
propose that this deficit arises at a later stage of information processing. These accounts 
instead argue that RB reflects a memory retrieval bias or failure. This suggestion is based 
on findings that observers can be blind to the second retrieved repeated item, rather than 
the second seen repeated item (Fagot & Pashler, 1995), and that this deficit does not 
occur if the second critical item is cued at the end of the stream (Armstrong & Mewhort, 
1995). It is difficult to interpret these results, however, as the paradigms used in these 
experiments differ from standard RB tasks (Neill, Neely, Hutchison, Kahan, & VerWys, 
2002), and they typically result in performance that is close to floor (Johnston et al., 2002). 
In addition, direct evidence against such memory retrieval accounts comes from 
paradigms that have low memory demands or require online responses, but still yield RB 
(Anderson & Neill, 2002; Dux & Marois, 2007; Johnston et al., 2002).  
 RB has been studied almost exclusively using behavioural methods (but also see, 
for electrophysiological studies, Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008; Schendan, Kanwisher, & 
Kutas, 1997). Consequently, the neural substrates of this deficit and related individuation 
processes are currently unknown. However, there has been extensive research into 
related RSVP phenomena, such as the attentional blink. Like RB, the attentional blink 
reflects a failure of perceptual awareness associated with identifying the second of two 
targets when they appear in close together in an RSVP stream (e.g., 200-500 ms; Chun & 
Potter, 1995; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). The attentional blink, however, occurs 
when the two targets have different identities and therefore reflects the temporal capacity 
limits of object identification (Chun, 1997). Importantly, Chun (1997) demonstrated a 
double dissociation between RB and the attentional blink, where the former, but not the 
latter, deficit was reduced when targets were presented in different colours (which 
enhanced their episodic distinctiveness); the converse was true when targets and 
distractors were highly discriminable (which enhanced target identification). 
A common approach to studying RSVP deficits in the brain is to contrast BOLD 
activity between trials where the observer correctly reports the second target (hits) with 
trials in which they fail to report the second target (misses). Using this comparison, 
neuroimaging studies have localised the attentional blink bottleneck to regions of the 
lateral frontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex (Marois, Yi, & Chun, 2004), with several 
other studies also implicating ventral occipitotemporal areas (Kranczioch, Debener, 
Schwarzbach, Goebel, & Engel, 2005; Marcantoni, Lepage, Beaudoin, Bourgouin, & 
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Richer, 2003). The discrepant results concerning the role of occipitotemporal areas in the 
attentional blink appear to be driven by subtle paradigm differences, implicating the role of 
task difficulty in how this deficit is reflected in brain activity (Johnston, Shapiro, Vogels, & 
Roberts, 2007; Shapiro, Johnston, Vogels, Zaman, & Roberts, 2007). In Chapter 2, I 
present an fMRI study that employed an RB approach to explore the brain regions that are 
recruited during individuation of stimuli across time and those that are active when 
temporal individuation fails (i.e., the neural locus of RB). 
 
Relationship Between Object Individuation and Identification 
A second outstanding question concerns the nature of object individuation and 
identification in the brain: Are these two processes dissociable or do they share common 
neural substrates? A key tenet of the neural object file theory is that object individuation 
and identification are supported by distinct brain areas (Xu & Chun, 2009), whereby 
individuation is underpinned by the inferior IPS and identification is subserved by the 
superior IPS and LOC. As Xu and Chun only analysed activity in these three 
occipitoparietal areas, we do not know the extent to which object individuation and 
identification might be represented in other brain regions. It is possible that these 
processes manifest in a broader set of brain regions and that there is overlap between the 
two beyond the focal neural substrates implicated in the neural object file theory. 
The neural object file theory is based on studies that used memory tasks to 
investigate individuation and identification processes. The RB paradigm used to explore 
the temporal individuation in Chapter 2, however, likely tapped this process at an earlier 
perceptual stage of processing. In order to test the specific neural dissociation proposed 
by Xu and Chun (2009), I adopted a similar approach and looked at the relationship 
between object individuation and identification during encoding, storage and retrieval 
stages of VSTM. Of interest, Baars and Franklin (2003) have argued that the contents of 
working memory represent the information that reaches awareness and is available for 
conscious report. Given the suggested links between memory processes and 
consciousness (e.g., Andrade, 2001; Baddeley, 1992), current models of consciousness 
might provide alternative insights into how individuation and identification processes might 
be reflected in the brain.  
The global workspace model is a dominant theory of consciousness. It suggests 
that processes that contribute to visual awareness – including potentially individuation and 
identification – operate across a widespread neural network. Specifically, this model 
predicts that the human brain contains two computational spaces that give rise to 
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perceptual awareness (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). The first is a set of specialised modules dedicated to 
processing information for a given mental or sensory operation. These specialised hubs 
cannot communicate with each other directly, but instead do so via a second 
computational space. This global workspace consists of a set of neurons that are 
distributed across the brain, and this workspace facilitates the exchange of information 
between specialised modules via long-range reciprocal connections. Top-down attentional 
mechanisms control which modules provide input to the global workspace, and thus reach 
consciousness. The workspace is therefore not fixed to a specific set of brain areas, but 
dynamically changes as workspace neurons in different brain circuits are temporarily 
activated, and deactivated, at distinct points in time. Because object individuation and 
identification are both crucial for encoding visual objects for conscious report, it is possible 
that they may operate across a distributed neural network. In Chapter 3, I present an fMRI 
study that aimed to test the apparent dissociation between object individuation and 
identification proposed by Xu and Chun (Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009), with a particular 
focus on analysing activity across a large set of frontal, parietal and occipital regions. 
 
Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis 
The questions introduced above are directed toward understanding the neural 
substrates of object individuation. There are several approaches that can be employed 
when analysing fMRI data in order to map a particular cognitive function to a specific brain 
region. Neuroimaging studies on object individuation and identification to date have relied 
solely on conventional univariate analyses (e.g., Xu, 2007; Xu, 2008, 2009; Xu & Chun, 
2006). Such univariate approaches contrast BOLD activity between separate conditions to 
identify individual voxels in which the BOLD signal is greater under one condition than 
another. To increase the sensitivity of this analysis, activity is averaged across all 
significant voxels in a given region to determine whether there is an overall amplitude 
difference between conditions. A consequence of this type of approach is that it ignores 
the contribution of other non-significant voxels that might still contain information about the 
different conditions, yet do not show a great enough amplitude difference to reach 
significance (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). 
An alternative approach is multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA; also referred to as 
decoding; for reviews, see Norman et al., 2006; Tong & Pratte, 2012). Unlike conventional 
approaches, MVPA assesses whether the pattern of activity recorded across a group of 
voxels, in a given region of interest, differs systematically between conditions. As this 
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analysis is only concerned with absolute, rather than relative, changes in activity between 
conditions, it has the potential to distinguish between conditions that do not differ in overall 
BOLD amplitude. MVPA relies on a classifier algorithm that is trained to discriminate 
between the activity patterns across a group of voxels, where it attempts to develop a 
decision boundary that best separates the voxel responses corresponding to each 
condition. The classifier is then tested on its ability to distinguish between novel activity 
patterns associated with each condition. If the classifier can reliably discriminate between 
the patterns of activity observed across the conditions at test, one can infer that the voxels 
corresponding to that brain region code for the information contained in those conditions. 
In one of the first uses of this technique, Kamitani and Tong (2005; see also, 
Haynes & Rees, 2005) analysed activity in early visual areas in response to grating stimuli 
presented at different orientations. Orientation-selective cortical columns were first 
described in primary visual cortex in monkeys and cats using single-unit electrophysiology 
measures (e.g., Blasdel, 1992; Hubel & Wiesel, 1962), but it had been found that these 
columns were to fine grained to be detected using the typical resolution of human fMRI 
and univariate analysis methods (Kim, Duong, & Kim, 2000). Kamitani and Tong 
hypothesised that each individual fMRI voxel should nevertheless show a weak, but true, 
bias toward its preferred orientation. Specifically, they reasoned that if they pooled activity 
across a group of weakly tuned voxels, they might be able to detect a systematic change 
in activity with orientation in the human visual system. Consistent with this prediction, 
Kamitani and Tong found that the ensemble patterns of activity in early visual cortex could 
discriminate between different visual orientations. When voxel activity was analysed using 
the conventional univariate approach, however, no difference was found in the overall 
amplitude to each orientation. This study demonstrates how MVPA can be very sensitive 
to small but reliable changes in BOLD activity that may be missed in univariate analyses. 
The advantage of MVPA over conventional univariate analyses has also been 
demonstrated beyond the perception of basic visual features. Vickery, Chun and Lee 
(2011) used MVPA to explore the extent to which reward signals are represented 
throughout the brain. Traditionally, reward-related processes had been associated with 
discrete parts of the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate and inferior parietal cortex (Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007; Kahnt, Heinzle, Park, & Haynes, 2010; Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & 
Hommer, 2003; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Vickery & Jiang, 2009). Vickery et al. had 
participants play a matching-pennies game against a computer opponent. MVPA revealed 
that wins (trials in which the participant’s choice matched the computer’s choice) could be 
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reliably discriminated from losses (trials where the participant’s choice did not match the 
computer’s choice) in a large number of cortical regions (37 out of 43 regions of interest). 
This coverage greatly exceeded that shown in the univariate analysis (7-9 regions). These 
findings demonstrate how MVPA is more sensitive at detecting distributed signals 
associated with higher-level cognitive processes, compared with univariate analyses. 
Because the present work into object individuation and identification has relied solely on 
univariate techniques, it is possible that these findings might underestimate the extent to 
which these processes are reflected in brain activity. In the fMRI studies reported in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I analysed BOLD activity using MVPA (as well as conventional 
univariate analyses in Chapters 2 and 3) to better characterise the extent to which 
individuation and identification processes are represented in the brain. 
Despite its obvious advantages, MVPA also has some important limitations. As 
MVPA only looks for a difference in BOLD activity, rather than the direction of the effect 
(as in univariate analyses), confounds that would usually have been ruled out due to 
averaging procedures can sometimes remain (Todd, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013). Reaction 
time is often pointed out as a possible alternative source of differences in activity patterns, 
and is taken as a proxy for general task factors such as difficulty, mental effort and time on 
task. In an empirical demonstration of this potential problem, Todd et al. (2013) used data 
from an fMRI study by Woolgar, Thompson, Bor, and Duncan (2011) that looked at how 
task rules are represented in the brain. Todd et al. found that when reaction time was 
regressed out, there were no longer any differences in the patterns of activity 
corresponding to the task rules. This finding suggests that the observed differences in the 
MVPA results were driven by reaction time, rather than the manipulated task rules (for a 
counter commentary, see, Woolgar, Golland, & Bode, 2014). Reaction time is not always 
an ideal measure of general task effects, however, as removing reaction time differences 
would also remove some of the variability evoked by the conditions themselves. 
Nonetheless, one can alleviate doubts about the influence of factors like reaction time in 
MVPA by comparing two conditions that produce similar reaction times but still differ on 
the critical variable of interest. 
 
Timecourse of Object Individuation 
The final outstanding question of this thesis concerns the stage of information 
processing at which object individuation occurs. Due to the sluggish nature of the BOLD 
signal, standard event-related and blocked fMRI designs lack the temporal resolution to 
delineate the timecourse of cognitive processes (an exception is time-resolved fMRI 
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designs; Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006). Electroencephalography (EEG), on the 
other hand, can detect rapid changes in neural activity within the time range of 
milliseconds, making it an ideal technique for investigating how object individuation and 
identification processes manifest in the brain over time. For example, Vogel, Luck, and 
Shapiro (1998) used EEG to isolate the temporal locus of the attentional blink. These 
authors found that the amplitude of the P3 component in response to the second target 
was reduced during the blink time window, suggesting that this deficit occurs before (or 
perhaps at the same time that) the representation is encoded into working memory 
(Donchin & Coles, 1988).  
There has been a wealth of studies conducted into the encoding and storage of 
object identities into working memory using VSTM tasks and EEG (e.g., Gao et al., 2011; 
Ikkai, McCollough, & Vogel, 2010; McCollough, Machizawa, & Vogel, 2007; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004; Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). For example, Vogel and 
Machizawa (2004) briefly presented sample displays that contained one to ten coloured 
squares in each hemifield, and observers were asked to remember the colours in one of 
the hemifields. After a short delay, a test display containing the same number of items 
appeared. Participants had to indicate whether the sample and test displays were identical 
or different. Behaviourally, participants could perform this task well for arrays containing 
four or fewer items, at which point performance declined dramatically with further set size 
increases (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). These authors analysed 
the contralateralised delay activity (CDA; also known as sustained posterior contralateral 
negativity) in response to each set size by subtracting activity recorded over posterior 
occipitoparietal electrodes ipsilateral to the attended hemifield from activity at the 
corresponding contralateral electrodes. This event-related potential (ERP) component is 
characterised by a negative-going waveform that begins approximately 200-300 ms after 
stimulus onset (Woodman & Luck, 1999). Vogel and Machizawa (2004) found CDA 
amplitude increased with set sizes up to four items and then plateaued for larger set sizes. 
These findings suggest that the CDA component reflects the number of identities that can 
be successfully encoded into working memory. 
To directly test whether the CDA component reflects the amount of identity 
information present in the display, rather than the number of spatial locations, Gao et al. 
(2011) adopted a similar approach to Xu (2009). The idea here was that if the CDA 
specifically tracks identity information, there should be a difference in amplitude between 
four-identical-object and four-different-object displays (which only differ in the number of 
object identities), but no difference between one-object and four-identical-object displays 
 35 
(since identity information is held constant across these two display types). Consistent with 
this prediction, Gao et al. found CDA amplitude was reduced for four-different-object 
displays, relative to both four-identical-object and one-object displays, which did not differ 
from each other. The source of this amplitude difference was further localised to the 
superior IPS, which is line with this region’s claimed role in object identification in short-
term memory (Xu, 2007, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009). These results are supported by 
converging evidence showing that CDA amplitude is equivalent for objects when they are 
presented simultaneously at different locations or sequentially at a central location (Ikkai et 
al., 2010). Together, these studies suggest that the CDA component tracks the number of 
identities held in working memory, independent of the number of distinct spatial locations 
at which they appear. 
Similar efforts have been made to isolate the temporal locus of object individuation 
using a range of experimental paradigms that likely tap different perceptual processing 
stages. The results of ERP studies on RB are not as clear, but suggest that correctly 
identified, repeated targets, compared with missed repetitions, evoke greater positivity 
over posterior temporal electrodes between 150 and 400 ms after stimulus onset (Koivisto 
& Revonsuo, 2008; Schendan et al., 1997). Other studies have used paradigms such as 
multiple object tracking (Drew & Vogel, 2008), enumeration (Ester, Drew, Vogel, & Awh, 
2012; Pagano & Mazza, 2012), visual search (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2013a) and 
change detection (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2013b), and 
found the number of objects to be individuated modulates the amplitude of a negative-
going potential referred to as the N2pc component (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2014). Like 
the CDA, the N2pc reflects a difference waveform between activity measured over 
posterior electrode sites contralateral, compared with ipsilateral, to the attended stimulus, 
that peaks around 200-300 ms after stimulus onset (Luck & Hillyard, 1994). This N2pc 
component has also been associated with the selection of targets among distractors in 
visual search (Jolicœur, Brisson, & Robitaille, 2008; Luck & Hillyard, 1994) and the 
involuntary capture of attention by salient distractors (Hickey, McDonald, & Theeuwes, 
2006). 
In one of these studies, Ester et al. (2012) used the N2pc to investigate 
enumeration – one’s ability to rapidly determine the numerosity of a group of visual stimuli 
without the need to count them individually (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949) –
as an index of object individuation. Typically, observers are able to accurately report the 
number of items that appear in set sizes up to approximately four items (a process referred 
to as subitizing), and errors increase dramatically for larger set sizes (Piazza, Fumarola, 
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Chinello, & Melcher, 2011; Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008; Trick & 
Pylyshyn, 1993; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). These behavioural studies suggest that 
subitizing is underpinned by one’s ability to simultaneously individuate items in a display, 
and that it is constrained by a capacity limit. Ester et al. (2012) presented observers with a 
spatial cue, followed by a set of black squares in both hemifields where a subset of items 
was presented in the target/non-target colour (blue and green, or vice versa). There were 
one to twelve target items on each trial, with the same number of non-target items in the 
unattended hemifield. Critically, N2pc amplitude increased linearly with target set size up 
until about three items, at which point it plateaued (the same point at which behavioural 
performance starts to deteriorate). These findings provide direct evidence that the N2pc 
component reflects the ability to individuate small sets of target items and is fixed to the 
capacity limit of this process.  
What is less clear is whether there is also evidence of object individuation at time 
points prior to the onset of the N2pc component. There is some evidence that a negative 
component that peaks around ~120-180 ms (N1) is modulated by the number of targets 
when they appear alone, but not when they appear with distractors (i.e., which equates the 
total number of items across set sizes; Mazza, Pagano, & Caramazza, 2013). This finding 
suggests that this component might instead reflect the amount of visual information 
presented, rather than the process of individuation (also see, Hyde & Spelke, 2009, 2012). 
The paradigms used in these prior ERP studies are potentially problematic as they 
confound manipulations of object individuation (e.g., the number of distinct coloured 
targets among distractors), with low-level visual differences (e.g., hue, luminosity, 
eccentricity). In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I report an EEG/fMRI project employing a novel 
enumeration paradigm that removed these low-level visual confounds. I explored the 
timecourse of object individuation to determine whether there is evidence of this process 
at early perceptual stages of processing, and in the BOLD response of early sensory brain 
regions. In addition, I assessed how selective spatial attention modulates the timecourse 
of individuation by examining individuation processes for target and distractor stimuli. 
 
Summary 
 Object individuation is vital for the accurate perception of an object as a distinct 
entity and for encoding it into a durable form that can be maintained over spatiotemporal 
changes. Despite the theoretical and empirical interest in this process over several 
decades, it is still not clear how object individuation occurs in the human brain, how it 
relates to other processes like identification, or what the temporal dynamics of this process 
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are. These are the questions I address in this thesis. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate the role 
of a distributed set of occipital, frontal and parietal brain regions in temporal individuation 
during perception. Not only does this study provide the first evidence for the neural 
substrates that support the temporal aspects of early object individuation, but the 
widespread neural involvement also dramatically contrasts with the single neural correlate 
of individuation that is currently proposed by the neural object file theory (Xu & Chun, 
2009). This study also isolates the individuation bottleneck that underpins RB to a higher-
level premotor area. 
Given the widespread nature of temporal individuation in the brain, the fMRI study 
reported in Chapter 3 aimed to test the proposed neural dissociation between object 
individuation and identification in VSTM (Xu & Chun, 2009) using distributed regions of 
interest and a more sensitive MVPA approach. Contrary to what is proposed in the neural 
object file theory, I found object individuation and identification are underpinned by 
distributed and overlapping neural substrates, and the specific brain regions that support 
each process vary across distinct processing stages in VSTM. In the final study of this 
thesis (Chapter 4), I used EEG to explore the temporal dynamics of object individuation 
and the extent to which this is influenced by selective attention. I found evidence of object 
individuation at an early perceptual ERP component (100-140 ms after stimulus onset) – a 
time window that precedes the N2pc, which has previously been associated with this 
operation. Moreover, I observed distinct timecourses for targets and distractors, 
suggesting a key role of attention in the registration of stimuli. In a subsequent fMRI 
experiment, I also demonstrated that individuation draws on early visual sensory areas, 
which are potential sources of this ERP effect. Together, this package of work advances 
our understanding of how object individuation is implemented in the human brain. 
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Abstract 
Individuation refers to individuals’ use of spatial and temporal properties to register an 
object as a distinct perceptual event relative to other stimuli. Although behavioural studies 
have examined both spatial and temporal individuation, neuroimaging investigations of 
individuation have been restricted to the spatial domain, and at relatively late stages of 
information processing. Here we used univariate and multi-voxel pattern analyses of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging data to identify brain regions involved in 
individuating temporally distinct visual items, and the neural consequences that arise when 
this process reaches its capacity limit (Repetition Blindness [RB]). First, we found that 
regional patterns of blood oxygen level dependent activity in a large group brain regions, 
which are involved in ‘lower-level’ perceptual and ‘higher-level’ attentional/executive 
processing, discriminated between instances where repeated and non-repeated stimuli 
were successfully individuated – conditions that placed differential demands on temporal 
individuation. These results could not be attributed to repetition suppression, stimulus or 
response factors, task difficulty, regional activation differences, other capacity-limited 
processes or artifacts in the data or analyses. Consistent with the global workplace model 
of consciousness, this finding suggests that temporal individuation is supported by a 
distributed set of brain regions, rather than a single neural correlate. Second, conditions 
that reflect the capacity limit of individuation – instances of RB – modulated the amplitude, 
rather than spatial pattern, of activity in the left hemisphere premotor cortex. This finding 
could not be attributed to response conflict/ambiguity and likely reflects a candidate brain 
region underlying the capacity-limited process that gives rise to RB. 
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Behaviour is shaped by how individuals perceive their external environment. As our 
environment provides far too much sensory information for all of it to be processed up to 
awareness, we rely on selective attention mechanisms to reduce the overwhelming 
amount of available information to a manageable set of relevant items and/or sources 
(Pashler, 1998). Merely attending to sensory information, however, does not guarantee 
that it will reach awareness or impact behaviour; such information needs to be encoded in 
relation to the observer’s pre-existing rules, goals and knowledge (Cohen, Cavanagh, 
Chun, & Nakayama, 2012).  
In vision, a key operation implicated in successful object encoding is individuation, 
the process by which observers use spatial and temporal episodic cues to determine 
where and when an object appeared (e.g., Chun, 1997; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992; Mitroff, Scholl, & Noles, 2007; Pylyshyn, 1989, 1994; Xu & Chun, 2009). This 
process is crucial for registering individual items as distinct perceptual events and is 
thought to underlie observers’ impaired ability at discriminating between separate 
occurrences of objects with the same identity, relative to those with different identities 
(Kanwisher, 1987). Although observers show capacity limits associated with individuating 
items across both time and space (e.g., Kanwisher, 1991; Kanwisher & Potter, 1989; Luo 
& Caramazza, 1995, 1996), and previous studies have begun to identify the neural 
correlates of spatial individuation (e.g., Jeong & Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006; Xu 
& Chun, 2007), no study has identified the neural substrates underlying temporal 
individuation. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate 
the brain regions and mechanisms that are involved in the successful individuation of 
temporally distinct objects during encoding, and how disruptions to this process are 
represented in the brain.  
Initial fMRI investigations into individuation have identified a candidate brain area 
that might store individuated object representations in visual short-term memory (Jeong & 
Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006, 2007). Specifically, Xu (2009) found that activity in 
the inferior intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) was sensitive to the number of previously 
individuated items, regardless of the overall number of perceptual features. This finding 
suggested that the inferior IPS is involved in storing spatially individuated items, and 
activity in this region could be dissociated from other regions involved in storing object 
identities. Based on their findings, Xu and Chun (2009) proposed the neural object file 
account, which argues that object individuation is supported by the inferior IPS. 
Although Xu and colleagues’ investigations suggest a neural basis for spatial 
individuation, their work focused on a few posterior brain regions and did not explore the 
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contributions of other ‘higher-level’ brain areas. As recent models of consciousness 
propose that awareness involves a distributed set of psychological processes and neural 
substrates (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Sergent & 
Dehaene, 2004), individuation could be underpinned by a more diffuse group of regions. In 
addition, the inferior IPS appears to store individuated representations, yet storage reflects 
the consequences of individuation rather than the generation of such representations. We 
are interested in the brain regions that are involved in actively individuating an object 
during encoding. To address this issue, we directly compared (1) conditions that place 
high or low demands on temporal individuation processes during encoding, and (2) 
conditions of successful versus unsuccessful registration of identical stimuli. To explore 
the possible role of a more diverse set of regions, our analyses compared changes in 
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity across a wide set of cortical areas. 
We employed the Repetition Blindness (RB) phenomenon to investigate temporal 
individuation. RB refers to the finding that observers are poorer at reporting two targets 
embedded in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) if they have the same identity, 
relative to different identities (Kanwisher, 1987; Park & Kanwisher, 1994). Kanwisher’s 
(1987) prominent account of RB argues that token information (spatio-temporal properties 
of an object) for the second target cannot be bound to its type representation (featural and 
conceptual properties of an object) when it activates the same type as the first target within 
a short space of time. RB does not reflect a failure to create a type or token for a repeated 
item, but rather reflects a limitation associated with binding these two representations for 
conscious report. This deficit is thought to reflect a capacity limit of individuation because it 
is strongest when the two targets appear within close temporal or spatial proximity (e.g., 
Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, 1987). Kanwisher’s account views RB as a perceptual 
phenomenon, yet other models propose that RB has a later locus, reflecting a retrieval 
bias or failure (Fagot & Pashler, 1995; Whittlesea & Masson, 2005). However, because RB 
has been observed in tasks that have very low memory demands or require immediate 
responses, there appears to be a strong perceptual component to the effect (e.g., 
Anderson & Neill, 2002; Dux & Marois, 2007; Johnston, Hochhaus, & Ruthruff, 2002).  
We therefore used a RB paradigm to vary the trial-level demands of successfully 
individuating two sequentially presented stimuli as distinct items by manipulating whether 
the critical items had the same or different identities. This approach allowed us to 
investigate two novel questions: First, can temporal individuation be localized to a single 
brain region (see, Jeong & Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006, 2007), or does this 
process arise from widespread encoding throughout the brain as suggested by recent 
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models of consciousness (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene et al., 2003; Sergent & 
Dehaene, 2004)? We expected that activity in brain regions involved in temporal 
individuation would be modulated by the demands placed on this process, whereby it is 
more demanding to successfully individuate repeated stimuli than non-repeated stimuli. 
Second, what neural consequences arise when demands exceed the capacity limit of the 
individuation process, as reflected by the behavioural RB deficit? We predicted the brain 
areas that underpin capacity limits that lead to RB would respond differently under 
conditions where two repeated stimuli were successfully detected compared to when they 
were not. 
 
Materials and Methods  
 
Participants 
 We recruited 16 volunteers for two behavioural experiments (N = 6 and 10, 
respectively; 2 males in each) and 28 volunteers for an fMRI experiment (12 males). The 
mean ages for participants in the three experiments were 26.0 (SD = 5.2), 18.8 (SD = 1.0) 
and 23.8 (SD = 3.7) years, respectively. Participants were compensated for their time with 
course credit or payment. Data from five participants were excluded from the fMRI 
experiment due to excessive head motion (motion greater than 4 mm/degrees in any 
translational direction or rotation, respectively; henceforth N = 23). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Four participants from the first behavioural 
experiment also participated in the fMRI experiment. The University of Queensland Ethics 
Committee approved the protocol for all the experiments. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimulus set used in all the experiments consisted of 56 indoor and 56 outdoor 
scenes and scrambled versions of each scene (Marois, Yi, & Chun, 2004). All stimuli were 
presented in grey-scale and subtended 11.8° x 11.8° of visual angle at the viewing 
distance of 57 cm outside the scanner (scene stimuli measured 6.5° x 6.5° of visual angle 
inside the scanner, viewed from a distance of 90 cm). In the fMRI experiment, we also 
used 18 photographs of faces from the NimStim face database (Tottenham et al., 2009) 
for the localiser task. Face stimuli were presented in grey-scale and subtended 5.2° x 6.5° 
of visual angle inside the scanner. Experiments were programmed in MATLAB with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
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Behavioural Experiments 
 Long inter-trial interval (ITI) RB experiment. We first developed an RB paradigm 
optimised for fMRI (see Figure 1). This paradigm was based on similar studies that have 
used pictures or novel objects as stimuli (e.g., Coltheart, Mondy, & Coltheart, 2005; Harris 
& Dux, 2005a, 2005b). The purpose of the first behavioural experiment was to assess 
whether our protocol could elicit the standard RB behavioural effect. Each trial began with 
a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by an RSVP stream consisting of a forward scrambled 
scene mask, three sequentially presented intact scenes (first critical scene [C1], distractor 
scene, second critical scene [C2]) and a backward scrambled scene mask (100 ms/item). 
We manipulated ‘Scene Repetition’ within participants, such that both critical scenes either 
had the same identity (repeat) or different identities (non-repeat). Participants were 
informed that the distractor scene would never be the same as C1 or C2.  
At the end of the RSVP stream, a blank response screen was presented for 3 s, 
followed by an 8 s ITI (i.e., a slow event-related fMRI protocol). Participants’ task was to 
report one of three response options during the post-trial 3 s window: They could report 
that a scene was repeated, no scene was repeated or only two scenes were presented 
(catch trial response, see below). Only response accuracy was emphasised. We also ran a 
behavioural experiment using this RB paradigm without the long ITI (the next trial began 
immediately after participants made an untimed response), and the pattern of results were 
comparable to the present experiment (reported below). We chose to use a paradigm in 
which participants had to detect the presence of a repetition, rather than identify the critical 
items, as this was more appropriate for studying RB in the scanner with scene stimuli (i.e., 
responses were forced-choice and could be made using a button-box). It should be noted 
that both detection and identification approaches have been used to study RB previously 
(e.g., Hochhaus & Johnston, 1996; Kanwisher, Kim, & Wickens, 1996; Park & Kanwisher, 
1994) and are considered to tap the same individuation processes. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the repetition blindness paradigm. 
On repeat/non-repeat trials, participants were presented with a rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) stream consisting of a forward scrambled scene mask, three intact 
scenes (first critical scene, distractor scene, second critical scene), and a backward 
scrambled scene mask. The two critical scenes were either identical (repeat trial) or 
different (non-repeat trial). Only two different intact scenes were presented in the RSVP 
stream on catch trials. Participants reported whether they saw a scene repeated, no scene 
repeated or only two scenes during the response window. Stimuli are reproduced from 
Marois et al. (2004) with permission from Elsevier Limited. 
 
As is standard in behavioural investigations of RB, catch trials were included on 
20% of trials to reduce the likelihood of participants guessing ‘repeat’ on trials where they 
missed the second repeated scene (Dux & Coltheart, 2008; Harris & Dux, 2005a, 2005b). 
These trials only contained two different intact scenes in the RSVP stream. To ensure 
catch trials lasted for the same duration as repeat and non-repeat trials (12 s), we included 
an additional fixation screen for 100 ms between the response window and ITI (see Figure 
1). 
Participants were provided with an instruction sheet outlining the task and response 
keys and completed 20 practice trials before testing. There were 6 blocks of 25 test trials 
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with an equal number of repeat and non-repeat trials. The order of the trial types was 
random. Behavioural experiments were completed on a 20-inch Dell Trinitron CRT monitor 
with a refresh rate of 100 Hz using a Mac mini computer. 
 Lag RB experiment. We conducted a second behavioural experiment to ensure 
that our RB paradigm specifically tapped the temporal capacity limits of individuation. The 
attentional blink (AB) is a similar deficit to RB as it too occurs under dual-target RSVP 
conditions, is characterised by poorer identification of a second target at short inter-target 
intervals (e.g., 200-500 ms), and is thought to reflect a failure of perceptual awareness 
(Chun & Potter, 1995; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). The AB, however, occurs under 
conditions where the two targets have different identities. Thus, in contrast to RB, the AB 
reflects the temporal capacity limits of object identification, rather than individuation (Chun, 
1997; see also, Dux & Marois, 2009). In an additional behavioural experiment, we 
confirmed that the observed differences in detection accuracy on repeat and non-repeat 
trials in the Long ITI RB experiment reflected the temporal capacity limits of individuation, 
rather than identification. 
 This Lag RB experiment was similar to the first behavioural experiment, except we 
also manipulated the temporal ‘Lag’ between C1 and C2 (2, 3, 5 or 7 items). Each RSVP 
stream consisted of three intact scenes (C1, distractor, C2) and twelve scrambled scenes. 
C1 and the distractor scene always appeared at the sixth and seventh serial positions, 
respectively. C2 would appear immediately following the distractor scene (Lag 2), or after 
one (Lag 3), three (Lag 5) or five (Lag 7) intervening items. The Lag 2 condition had the 
same temporal gap between C1 and C2 that was used in the Long ITI RB experiment and 
reflects the condition in which the RB deficit is most severe (e.g., Kanwisher, 1987; Park & 
Kanwisher, 1994). All scrambled scenes were different. Catch trials were identical to 
repeat and non-repeat trials, except C2 was replaced with a scrambled scene, meaning 
that only two intact scenes were presented. As this version of the RB paradigm was not 
used with fMRI, we removed the timed response window and long ITI. Participants 
responded when prompted at the end of the stream. There were 12 practice trials and 6 
blocks of 50 test trials. 
 
fMRI Experiment 
 In the fMRI experiment, we used the Long ITI RB paradigm to manipulate the 
conditions under which temporal individuation occurred. BOLD activity in response to this 
task was measured across the whole brain, with a focus on a set of lower- and higher-level 
a priori regions of interest (ROIs; see below). This paradigm included 200 trials split over 8 
 56 
event-related runs, with 80 repeat, 80 non-repeat and 40 catch trials. Each run consisted 
of a 20 s fixation period, followed by 25 RB trials and then a 12 s fixation period. 
Participants responded by pressing one of two buttons on a button box in their right hand 
for repeat and non-repeat responses, and one button with their left hand for catch 
responses. The order of trial types was random and the number of trials for each condition 
was equal across runs. 
Localiser task. After the RB runs, participants completed the localiser task. Here, 
participants were presented with separate 20 s blocks of fixation, face and scene stimuli. 
At the beginning of each stimulus block, a visual cue was presented for 2 s to indicate the 
block type. Each block included nine trials in which an intact scene or face was presented 
for 1 s, followed by a 1 s ITI. On half the scene and face blocks, participants were cued to 
passively view the stimuli (Passive Scene and Passive Face). On the remaining blocks, 
participants were cued to classify the scenes as indoor or outdoor scenes (Task Scene) or 
the faces as male or female (Task Face). This response was speeded and was made 
using one of two buttons on a response box in their left or right hand, respectively. 
There were two localiser runs where each consisted of four blocks of fixation and 
three blocks of each of the stimulus block types. The order of the stimulus blocks was 
random without replacement and a fixation block was presented after every four stimulus 
blocks. An additional 8 s fixation period was presented at the start and end of each 
localiser run. 
Data acquisition. Images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner 
(Erlangen, Germany). Participants lay supine in the scanner and viewed the visual display 
via rear-projection onto a mirror mounted on a 12-channel head coil. A T1-weighted 
anatomical image was collected in the middle of the scanning session using an MPRAGE 
sequence (TR = 1.9 s, TE = 2.32 ms, flip angle = 9º, FOV = 192 x 230 x 256, resolution = 
1 mm3). Functional T2*-weighted images were acquired parallel to the AC-PC plane using 
a GRE EPI sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 90º, FOV = 192 x 192, matrix = 
64 x 64, in-plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm). Each volume consisted of 33 slices (thickness = 
3 mm, inter-slice gap = 0.3 mm), providing whole-brain coverage. We synchronised the 
stimulus presentation with the acquisition of functional volumes. There were 166 and 168 
volumes (including 4 dummy volumes) acquired for each of the event-related and localiser 
runs, respectively.  
Data analyses. We analysed our data using Brain Voyager QX software (Brain 
Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands) and custom MATLAB code. 
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Preprocessing. Data preprocessing included 3D motion correction (where each 
functional image was aligned to the first run), slice-scan time correction and high-pass 
temporal filtering (3 cycles per run). All functional images were co-registered to the 
anatomical scan and transformed into standardised space (Talairach & Tourmoux, 1988). 
No spatial smoothing was applied to preserve fine-grained spatial information for the multi-
voxel pattern analyses (MVPA; see below). 
Regions of interest. We first isolated a group of 20 ROIs (see Table 1). These 
regions consisted of perceptual areas involved in processing scenes (parahippocampal 
place area, PPA; Epstein, Graham, & Downing, 2003) and objects (lateral occipital 
complex, LOC; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001), regions previously implicated in object 
individuation and identification (see, Xu, 2009), and higher-level attentional/executive 
areas associated with capacity limits of information processing (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & 
Marois, 2006; Dux et al., 2009; Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; Jiang 
& Kanwisher, 2003; Marois, Larson, Chun, & Shima, 2006; Schubert & Szameitat, 2003; 
Szametitat, Schugbert, Muller, & von Cramon, 2002). Given the extensive overlap 
between the superior parietal lobule and superior IPS ROIs in the majority of subjects, we 
collapsed univariate and multivariate results across these two parietal regions (denoted as 
sIPS/SPL); hence, 18 ROIs were examined. 
 
Table 1. Anatomical locations of the regions of interest. 
All regions were isolated using data from the Localiser task. ‘Attentional/executive’ and 
‘Object perception’ regions of interest (ROIs) were isolated by contrasting activity between 
stimuli blocks with fixation. The ‘Scene perception’ ROIs were localised by contrasting 
activity between scene and face stimuli blocks. The ‘No. of Participants’ column represents 
the number of participants for whom an ROI was successfully identified. The ‘Talairach 
Coordinates (x, y, z)’ column represents the mean Talairach for each brain region with 
standard deviation in the parentheses. Region abbreviations are: IFJ, inferior frontal 
junction; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; SMFC, superior medial frontal cortex; DLPFC, 
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; SPL, superior parietal lobule; sIPS, 
superior intra-parietal sulcus; iIPS, inferior intra-parietal sulcus; LOC, lateral occipital 
complex; PPA, parahippocampal place area. L, left; R, right; Bi, bilateral. 
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ROI No. of Participants Talairach Coordinates 
(x, y, z) 
Attentional/executive   
IFJ (L) 18 -43 (2.4), 8 (2.6), 29 (3.1) 
      (R) 20 44 (5.0), 8 (2.9), 28 (2.4) 
ACC (Bi) 22 1 (6.7), 11 (3.7), 39 (2.9) 
SMFC (Bi) 23 -2 (4.2), -3 (4.1), 57 (2.4) 
DLPFC (L) 19 -33 (3.7), 31 (6.1), 29 (4.8) 
             (R) 15 37 (5.1), 30 (2.6), 28 (4.6) 
PMC (L) 21 -27 (3.9), -8 (3.2), 50 (4.9) 
         (R) 21 30 (4.4), -6 (4.1), 48 (3.6) 
SPL (L) 21 -27 (2.8), -56 (3.6), 44 (3.1) 
        (R) 21 26 (3.0), -58 (3.8), 45 (3.1) 
Insula (L) 19 -33 (4.3), 16 (5.3), 10 (4.0) 
           (R) 
 
19 34 (4.4), 18 (4.6), 8 (4.0) 
Object perception   
Inferior IPS (L) 22 -28 (4.1), -78 (6.2), 25 (4.7) 
                   (R) 22 27 (4.0), -77 (3.7), 25 (4.0) 
Superior IPS (L) 23 -26 (3.7), -62 (2.8), 40 (3.8) 
                     (R) 23 26 (3.7), -56 (4.9), 44 (3.1) 
LOC (L) 23 -34 (3.2), -80 (3.4), 13 (3.1) 
        (R) 
 
22 46 (3.9), -59 (4.2), 4 (4.4) 
Scene perception   
PPA (L) 23 -24 (2.1), -42 (2.3), -6 (1.7) 
        (R) 23 24 (1.9), -42 (1.7), -6 (1.6) 
 
 To localise these ROIs in each participant, we submitted data from the localiser 
runs to single-participant general linear model voxel-wise analyses using a statistical 
threshold of q < .05 (FDR). We defined regressors for the Fixation, Passive Face, Task 
Face, Passive Scene and Task Scene blocks, which were then convolved with a double-
gamma hemodynamic response function. To isolate the PPA, we contrasted activity 
between scene and face blocks. Bilateral PPA ROIs were identified as active voxels in the 
anterior section of the parahippocampal gyrus in the left and right hemisphere (Epstein et 
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al., 2003). To isolate the remaining ROIs, we contrasted activity in the four stimulus blocks 
with Fixation. We defined the object perception and attentional/executive ROIs on these 
statistical maps using mean Talairach coordinates derived from Xu (2009) and Dux et al. 
(2009), respectively, as a guide for establishing the most relevant functionally-defined 
regions. Each ROI was identified as the cluster of active voxels that most closely matched 
the previously established coordinates for that region. If there were two non-contiguous 
equidistant activation clusters, we used whichever cluster was still present at a more 
stringent threshold. In each region, we only analysed data from the event-related runs for 
participants in which that ROI could be isolated (see Table 1).  
For the univariate analysis, an ROI included all voxels above statistical threshold 
surrounding the peak voxel up to a maximum of 6 x 6 x 6 mm (8 voxels). For the 
multivariate analysis, ROIs were defined by a 15 x 15 x 15 mm and 21 x 21 x 21 mm cube 
(125 and 343 voxels, respectively), centered on each individual participant’s Talairach 
coordinates of the peak voxel. We used larger ROI sizes in the multivariate analysis to 
increase variance across voxels and be consistent with other studies that have employed 
this analytic technique (e.g., Gallivan, McLean, Valyear, Pettypiece, & Culham, 2011; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2012). We 
defined ROIs for the multivariate analyses using two different sizes to ensure that 
decoding results were reliable, regardless of the particular number of voxels included in 
the analysis (Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002). We only report the MVPA results for ROIs 
defined by a 21 x 21 x 21 mm cube, but our findings were consistent across both ROI 
sizes unless otherwise stated. 
Univariate analysis. We first analysed data from the RB event-related runs using a 
standard univariate approach. Timecourses for each condition, ROI (with signal averaged 
across all voxels in the ROI) and participant were extracted. Percentage signal change 
was calculated relative to signal during the volume preceding trial onset. This baseline was 
chosen to exclude any potential activity associated with the previous trial. Individual 
participant timecourses were averaged across all participants and we compared 
differences in peak amplitude between the experimental conditions. Peak amplitude was 
defined as the averaged signal across time points 4-8 s post-trial onset. Statistical 
significance was assessed using repeated-measures t-tests and a statistical threshold of p 
< .05 (Bonferroni corrected for the 18 regions tested). 
Multivariate analyses. To increase the sensitivity of our analysis, we also analysed 
our data using MVPA (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). This analytic 
approach is more sensitive than univariate methods as it examines differences in activity 
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across multiple voxels, rather than each voxel individually. Indeed, activity within any 
single voxel might show weak differences between conditions if only a small proportion of 
neurons in that voxel code for information associated with the experimental task. MVPA 
attempts to improve the sensitivity of fMRI analysis by pooling these weak, but reliable, 
signals across voxels and comparing conditions based on the resulting ensemble patterns 
of activity. MVPA was implemented using custom MATLAB software and a linear support 
vector machine binary algorithm (Chang & Lin, 2011). 
For each voxel in a given ROI, we extracted the average percentage signal change 
corresponding to the peak of the timecourse for each trial (4-8 s post-trial onset). Before 
each MVPA, data for each voxel in an ROI were z-transformed and mean-centered by 
subtracting the condition mean for the entire ROI from the response in each individual 
voxel to control for overall differences in signal amplitude between conditions (see, 
Esterman, Chiu, Tamber-Rosenau, & Yantis, 2009; Tamber-Rosenau, Esterman, Chiu, & 
Yantis, 2011). We trained a series of binary classifiers to discriminate between patterns of 
activity associated with the experimental conditions using the leave-one-out cross-
validation method. In each fold, one run was used to test the classifier’s generalisation 
performance and the remaining seven runs were used to train the classifier. Decoding 
accuracy for each ROI was averaged across each cross-validation loop and tested against 
chance accuracy (50%) using one-sample t-tests and a statistical threshold of p < .05 
(Bonferroni corrected for the 18 regions tested). If there is a functional distinction between 
pools of neurons within a given ROI that respond to each condition, then the classifier 
should be better than chance at discriminating between patterns of activity on the test 
trials (Pereira, Mitchell, & Botvinick, 2009). 
We also performed a searchlight analysis to explore whether other regions outside 
our ROIs showed a similar pattern of results to the ROIs we tested (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, 
& Bandettini, 2006). A spherical searchlight ROI with a 2-voxel radius (33 voxels) was 
centered on every voxel of the volume. We used the same cross-validation classification 
method procedure as the ROI analysis to test for information contained in these local 
activity patterns. Classification accuracy for each searchlight was assigned to the central 
voxel and compared against chance performance to test for significance (q < .05, FDR).  
 
Results 
 All statistical analyses were conducted with a two-tailed alpha level of .05 and a 
Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparisons unless otherwise stated.  
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Behavioural Experiments 
Chance performance in the RB task was 33.3%. To first assess whether our 
paradigm could elicit the standard RB behavioural effect, we submitted the mean detection 
accuracy data from the Long ITI RB experiment to a repeated-measures t-test. Detection 
accuracy reflects the percentage of trials in which participants correctly detected the 
identity of the two critical scenes (e.g., a ‘repeat’ response on repeat trials; ‘non-repeat’ or 
‘two scene only’ responses would be considered incorrect on this trial). Consistent with 
other RB studies that have used a similar paradigm to ours (e.g., Hochhaus & Johnston, 
1996; Kanwisher et al., 1996; Park & Kanwisher, 1994), participants were significantly less 
accurate on repeat trials relative to non-repeat trials, t(5) = 2.93, p = .033 (see Figure 2A). 
In subsequent experiments conducted in our laboratory, we have replicated this RB result 
using alphanumeric stimuli, suggesting that this behavioural effect is not specific to the 
type of stimulus used. Performance on catch trials was around chance in this experiment 
(M = 36.7%, SD = 8.2%), t(5) < 1, where participants’ erroneous responses were more 
likely to be a non-repeat response than a repeat response (69.6% versus 25.2% of errors, 
respectively; the remaining 5.2% of errors were absent responses). This proportion and 
pattern of catch trial errors is consistent with previous RB studies (Dux & Coltheart, 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Behavioural results from the behavioural and fMRI experiments. 
(A) Mean detection accuracy results from the Long ITI RB experiment, separately for 
repeat and non-repeat trials. (B) Mean detection accuracy from the Lag RB experiment, 
separately for repeat and non-repeat trials across the four temporal lag conditions. (C) 
Mean detection accuracy results from the fMRI experiment, separately for repeat and non-
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repeat trials. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean across participants and 
the dotted line indicates chance performance (33.3%). 
 
Data from the Lag RB experiment were used to test whether our RB paradigm 
specifically tapped the temporal capacity limits of individuation, rather than identification. If 
our paradigm elicited identification limitations, we expected participants would be poorer at 
detecting both repeated and non-repeated scenes at shorter temporal lags, relative to 
longer temporal lags. On the other hand, deficits in individuation indicate a specific 
difficulty in registering two repeated items as separate stimuli. Thus, if our paradigm only 
tapped the temporal capacity limits of individuation, we predicted detection of repeated 
scenes alone would be affected by lag. 
To assess this, we submitted mean detection accuracy data from the Lag RB 
experiment to a 2 (Scene Repetition: repeat, non-repeat) by 4 (Lag: 2, 3, 5, 7) repeated-
measures ANOVA. A significant main effect was found for both Scene Repetition, F(1, 9) = 
5.51, MSE = 394, p = .044,   = .38, and Lag, F(3, 27) = 4.44, MSE = 75, p = .012, = 
.33 (see Figure 2B). Crucially, a significant interaction between these two factors also 
emerged, F(3, 27) = 6.28, MSE = 169, p = .002, = .41. Follow-up t-tests revealed 
detection accuracy on repeat trials was significantly reduced at shorter lags (Lags 2 and 3) 
relative to longer lags (Lags 5 and 7), t(9) = 5.55, p < .001, but detection accuracy on non-
repeat trials did not vary with Lag, t(9) = 1.31, p = .222. Thus, our RB paradigm specifically 
tapped temporal capacity limitations associated with individuation rather than identification. 
These findings demonstrate that the present paradigm elicited a pure RB effect that was 
not confounded by the AB. Similar to the first behavioural experiment, catch trial 
performance was no greater than chance (M = 24.5%, SD = 16.2%), t(9) = 1.72, p = .119. 
 
fMRI Experiment 
 Behavioural performance. A repeated-measures t-test revealed that behavioural 
performance on the RB task inside the scanner was consistent with previous behavioural 
experiments, whereby detection accuracy was reduced on repeat trials relative to non-
repeat trials, t(22) = 4.72, p < .001 (see Figure 2C). In contrast to the behavioural 
experiments, however, performance on catch trials was significantly above chance (M = 
46.4%, SD = 5.0%), t(22) = 2.67, p = .014, with participants more likely to make erroneous 
non-repeat than repeat responses (54.0% versus 27.1% of errors, respectively; the 
remaining 19.0% of errors were absent responses). Participants could successfully 
ηp
2 ηp
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complete the task blocks on the Localiser runs as behavioural performance was close to 
ceiling (Ms > 93.0 %, SDs < 1.2 %), ts > 36.06, ps < .001 (compared to chance). 
Trial types and comparisons. For the fMRI analyses, we binned repeat and non-
repeat trials into the following conditions: Hit (repeat trial, repeat response), Miss (repeat 
trial, non-repeat response), Correct Rejection (non-repeat trial, non-repeat response) and 
False Alarm (non-repeat trial, repeat response). Table 2 displays the average response  
proportions for all conditions. Note that catch trials (or repeat/non-repeat trials where a 
‘two scene only’ response or no response was made) were not included in the fMRI 
analyses as these trials served only as filler trials to reduce the likelihood of guessing 
responses. 
 
Table 2. Average response proportions to repeat, non-repeat and catch trials in the 
fMRI experiment. 
 
 Response  
Trial Type Repeated Non-Repeated Catch Absent Total 
Repeat 0.45 (0.11) 0.25 (0.10) 0.05 (0.04) 0.26 (0.13) 1.00 
Non-Repeat 0.14 (0.14) 0.58 (0.15) 0.10 (0.08) 0.18 (0.11) 1.00 
Catch 0.11 (0.09) 0.28 (0.13) 0.46 (0.23) 0.15 (0.10) 1.00 
 
To first isolate the brain areas involved in temporally individuating items during 
encoding, we compared Hit and Correct Rejection trials as these conditions place different 
demands on individuation. That is, given that repeated stimuli presented in close temporal 
proximity are more difficult to individuate relative to non-repeated stimuli (Kanwisher, 
1987), Hit trials should, on average, place greater demands on the process of temporal 
individuation, relative to Correct Rejection trials. It is important to note that this comparison 
reflects only trials on which a correct response was made, and we therefore know, with 
some degree of certainty, that the scenes were successfully individuated in both trial types 
(although this process was more demanding in under Hit trials). In addition, this 
comparison is balanced in terms of reward associated with making a correct response. 
Our second key comparison aimed to identify brain areas involved in the RB deficit (i.e., 
regions that may underlie the capacity limit on temporal individuation). To do this, we 
contrasted Hit and Miss trials, as this comparison reflects instances where two repeated 
stimuli are successfully detected or not. As RB reflects an inability to bind a second 
repeated item’s identity to its token, rather than a failure to create the second token 
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altogether (Kanwisher, Driver, & Machado, 1995; Kanwisher, 1987; Park & Kanwisher, 
1994), it was more appropriate to compare between conditions that reflect a 
misidentification error, rather than trials where participants reported seeing nothing at all 
(e.g., Hits versus Repeated scene/‘Two scene only’ response trials). Even though this RB 
comparison uses trial definitions that are based on a post-run selection of trials by 
accuracy, this is a common approach employed in imaging studies that use RSVP tasks 
(e.g., Marois et al., 2004). We tested for differences using both univariate gross amplitude 
and multivariate spatial patterns of BOLD activity.  
Univariate analyses. For the demands on temporal individuation comparison, we 
found no significant amplitude differences between Hit and Correct Rejection trials. This 
finding suggests that the amplitude of activity in all of our ROIs was not modulated by 
conditions that place differential demands on temporal individuation. On the other hand, 
when we compared between conditions that reflect a capacity limit of temporal 
individuation, we found a single region – left hemisphere premotor cortex – that showed 
significantly greater activity on Miss trials relative to Hit trials, t(20) = 3.42, p = .049 
(corrected for multiple comparisons, see Figure 3). Thus, processing in this region may be 
involved in RB.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The single significant region of interest that reflected changes in gross 
blood oxygen level dependent amplitude for the capacity limits of temporal 
individuation. 
Anatomical images show individual regions of interest (ROIs) from all participants for 
whom an ROI could be identified for that given area. As none of the ROIs showed 
significant differences in blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) amplitude between Hit and 
Correct Rejection trials (demands on temporal individuation comparison), the graphs only 
display BOLD timecourse for Hit and Miss trials for this region. Error bars denote one 
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standard error of the mean across participants. Peak amplitude was taken as the average 
signal across volumes 4-8 s post-trial onset. Region abbreviations are the same as Table 
1. 
 
These gross differences in BOLD amplitude were specific to the successful 
individuation of two repeated stimuli, as none of our ROIs showed any differences in 
amplitude between correct and incorrect non-repeated trials (Correct Rejections versus 
False Alarms, ts < 2.16, corrected for multiple comparisons ps > .809). This result is 
consistent with behavioural findings from the Lag RB experiment in that it shows that our 
paradigm specifically taps processing limitations associated with the perception of two 
repeated stimuli, but not two non-repeated stimuli (see also, Chun, 1997). In addition, this 
difference in amplitude cannot simply reflect response conflict or ambiguity, as this same 
region responded similarly on Hit and False Alarm trials, t < 1. These trial types showed 
the greatest difference in reaction time (1166 ms versus 1430 ms; although response 
speed was not emphasized in the task) and would arguably reflect the greatest difference 
in response uncertainty. 
Multivariate analyses. We further explored the neural underpinnings of temporal 
individuation and its capacity limits using ROI-based and whole-brain searchlight MVPAs. 
As our experimental conditions were jointly determined by stimulus presentation and 
participants’ response, the number of trials in each condition was not balanced. 
Unbalanced trials are particularly problematic for MVPA as this can bias the classifier 
towards the more numerous condition, rather than the actual properties associated with 
the experimental conditions (Pereira et al., 2009). To address this issue, we balanced trial 
numbers across conditions in both training and testing subsets by removing a random 
selection of trials from the more plentiful condition before the MVPA. Decoding results for 
the ROI-based MVPA were averaged across 100 repetitions of this procedure and the 
number of iterations was reduced to 10 for the searchlight analysis to save computation 
time. Using this strict balancing method, there was an average of 35 trials in training sets 
and 5 trials in testing sets in each cross-validation loop.  
ROI-based MVPA. To first identify differences in activity patterns associated with 
the demands placed on temporal individuation, we trained a classifier to discriminate 
between Hit and Correct Rejection trials in each of our ROIs. Above-chance decoding 
performance for this comparison emerged in 17 out of our 18 ROIs, ts > 4.22, ps < .010 
(corrected for multiple comparisons, see Figure 4). While activity in the left hemisphere 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) could be discriminated between these two 
 66 
conditions for the 21 mm ROI cube, this result did not hold for the 15 mm ROI cube, t(18) 
= 2.28, p = .637. The significant ROIs included both lower-level areas involved in 
perceptual processes (e.g., Epstein et al., 2003; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Xu, 2009) and 
higher-level executive areas that have previously been associated with other capacity-
limited processes, such as response selection, decision making and encoding (e.g., Dux et 
al., 2006; Dux et al., 2009; Heekeren et al., 2004; Szametitat et al., 2002; Tombu et al., 
2011). In contrast, the classifier was only able to differentiate between activity patterns 
associated with successful and unsuccessful instances of temporal individuation (Hits 
versus Misses) in the left hemisphere superior IPS/SPL, t(21) = 3.58, p = .031 (corrected 
for multiple comparisons). This result, however, did not hold over changes in ROI size 
(classification under 15 mm ROI cube, corrected for multiple comparisons p > 1). These 
multivariate results therefore suggest that perceptual demands placed on temporal 
individuation influence the patterns of activity across a widely distributed set of brain 
regions, including both lower and higher cortical areas. This finding contrasts with the 
single brain region that has previously been associated with spatial individuation (Xu, 
2009) in that it suggests that this process is underpinned by a far more distributed set of 
areas. The processing limitations associated with individuation, however, have no 
consistent effect on the ensemble patterns of activity in any region. 
 
 67 
 
 
Figure 4. Results from the main multivariate analyses and task difficulty control 
analysis.  
The Hit versus Correct Rejection (CR) comparison reflected differences in the demands 
placed on temporal individuation (denoted by the white bars). The Hit versus Miss 
comparison identified the neural consequences associated with the capacity limits of 
temporal individuation (denoted by the black bars). The Hit versus False Alarm (FA) 
comparison reflected reaction time differences as a proxy for task difficulty-related 
changes in activity patterns (denoted by grey bars). Chance performance is indicated by 
the dotted line and the significance symbol (*) reflects greater than chance performance at 
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p < .05 (corrected for multiple comparisons). Error bars represent one standard error of the 
mean. Region abbreviations are the same as Table 1. 
 
Control analyses. We conducted an additional set of control MVPAs to test 
whether the distributed differences in activity patterns associated with Hit and Correct 
Rejection trials were driven by other differences that existed between these conditions 
(i.e., not related to individuation). As Hit and Correct Rejection trials showed significant 
differences in reaction time (1166 versus 1297 ms, t(22) = 4.23, p < .001), the first control 
analysis aimed to assess whether our results could be attributed to task-related effects 
such as general difficulty or the amount of time spent on the task. Using reaction time as a 
proxy for task difficulty, we trained classifiers to discriminate between the two trial types 
that showed the largest difference in reaction time: Hit (1166 ms) and False Alarm trials 
(1430 ms), t(22) = 5.50, p < .001. Significant decoding emerged for this comparison in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and right hemisphere LOC, ts > 3.46, ps < .042 (corrected 
for multiple comparisons), however only the ACC result was also observed for the 15 mm 
cube (ACC, t(21) = 3.94, p = .014; right hemisphere LOC, t(21) = 2.96, p = .134). Results 
from this control analysis suggest that, with the possible exception of the ACC, the 
distributed patterns of activity associated with the perceptual demands placed on temporal 
individuation do not simply reflect task difficulty or the amount of time spent on the task. In 
contrast to the remaining ROIs, the activity patterns in the ACC likely reflect general task 
difficulty as opposed to a specific difficulty associated with individuating two scenes. 
Further, the lack of significant results are unlikely to reflect insufficient power due to the 
low number of False Alarm trials, as our results from the demands on temporal 
individuation comparison held for all previously significant ROIs (ts > 3.29, p = .078 for left 
hemisphere inferior frontal junction, ts > 3.48, ps < .048 for all other ROIs, both corrected 
for multiple comparisons) even when we equated trial numbers across all trial types, rather 
than only across the conditions being compared. 
The second set of control analyses tested whether the differences in activity 
patterns associated with temporal individuation reflected purely stimulus- or response-
related effects, as Hit and Correct Rejection conditions differed on both these factors. To 
first test for stimulus-related differences in activity, we decoded patterns of activity 
associated with repeated and non-repeated stimuli, regardless of participants’ response. 
For this analysis, we collapsed across both repeated stimuli (Hits and Misses) and non-
repeated stimuli (Correct Rejections and False Alarms) conditions to give ourselves the 
best chance of detecting any stimulus-related effects if they did indeed exist. As we used 
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all four trial types in this analysis, we balanced trial numbers across all conditions prior to 
decoding to ensure the differences in trial numbers did not affect the results. No significant 
decoding emerged for repeated and non-repeated stimulus conditions in any region, ts < 
2.97, ps > .126 (corrected for multiple comparisons, see Figure 5), suggesting that none of 
our ROIs exclusively coded for stimulus properties in this experiment. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Results from the stimulus and response multivariate control analyses. 
This figure is displayed in the same format as Figure 4. To identify purely stimulus-driven 
changes in activity patterns, we compared repeated and non-repeated stimuli trials, 
regardless of participants’ response (Hit and Miss versus Correct Rejection [CR] and False 
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Alarm [FA], denoted by white bars). Likewise, to isolate purely response-driven changes in 
activity patterns, we contrasted instances where participants made a repeated and non-
repeated response, regardless of the stimulus presentation (Hit and FA versus CR and 
Miss, denoted by black bars). 
 
We also decoded activity patterns associated with repeated and non-repeated 
responses regardless of the stimulus presentation (Hits and False Alarms versus Misses 
and Correct Rejections), and found these two conditions could be discriminated in two of 
the eighteen ROIs: The right hemisphere PPA and left hemisphere sIPS/SPL, ts > 3.38, ps 
< .048, corrected (see Figure 5). The same decoding performance in these regions did not 
hold across both ROI sizes, however, suggesting that the response coding in these 
regions was not reliable (ts < 2.80, ps > .189, for 15 mm ROI cube). Thus, the widespread 
differences in patterns of activity associated with Hit and Correct Rejection conditions did 
not appear to be purely stimulus- or response-based, but rather reflected an interaction 
between these stimulus and decision/response factors that would be necessary to 
individuate temporally distinct items.  
Although our results were not driven by stimulus and response factors individually, 
one could argue that they reflect a simple stimulus-response interaction rather than 
anything specific to temporal individuation. To provide further support that our Hit versus 
Correct Rejection comparison reflects temporal individuation demands, rather than some 
other sort of stimulus-response interaction, we decoded Miss versus False Alarm trials (we 
balanced trial numbers in this comparison as well, like all other analyses). These are both 
incorrect trials so we cannot be sure of the extent to which each critical item was 
individuated, but these trials do differ in terms of the stimulus presented and the response 
made. Unlike our key analysis of Hit versus Correct Rejection, the analysis of Miss versus 
False Alarm revealed significant decoding in the bilateral LOC only, ts > 3.49, ps < .039 
(corrected). Importantly, after averaging over decoding values in all the ROIs, to increase 
statistical power and counter the fact that not all subjects showed every ROI (see Table 1), 
we found that the overall decoding across the brain for Hits versus Correct Rejections was 
significantly greater than that found for Miss versus False Alarms, t(22) = 2.91, p = .008 
(uncorrected, as data was averaged across all ROIs). Collectively, these results suggest 
all significant Hit versus Correct Rejection ROIs – with the possible exception of the 
bilateral LOC – reflect the specific stimulus-response interaction involved in temporal 
individuation. As we elaborate on in the General Discussion, we propose that such 
interactions are facilitated within a distributed neural framework or ‘workspace’ in which 
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information can be shared between lower and higher regions (Baars & Franklin, 2003; 
Dehaene et al., 2003; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). 
A final control analysis was conducted to ensure that results from the demands on 
temporal individuation analysis did not simply reflect a data artifact that would produce 
above chance decoding across the entire brain. To test this, we decoded activity patterns 
in two additional control ROIs that predominantly respond to auditory information rather 
than visual information (left and right primary auditory cortices). These ROIs were 
anatomically defined as the superior region of the temporal lobe (Rademacher et al., 
2001). We decoded activity in these areas for the two main comparisons and the task 
difficulty control comparison. If decoding performance in the temporal individuation 
analysis did indeed reflect the differential perceptual demands associated with 
individuating visual stimuli across time (and not an artifact in the data, task design, or 
analysis), the classifier should be no better than chance at discriminating between Hit and 
Correct Rejection conditions in either of these control regions. Consistent with this 
prediction, no significant decoding emerged in either of the auditory ROIs for any of the 
classifier comparisons, including the demands on temporal individuation comparison, ts < 
2.32, ps > .544, corrected for multiple comparisons (see Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Results for the main and task difficulty control multivariate analysis for the 
two control regions. 
This figure is displayed in the same format and reflects the same comparisons as Figure 4. 
Region abbreviations are: A1, primary auditory cortex; L, left; R, right. 
 
Searchlight analysis. We conducted a whole-brain searchlight analysis to 
determine if brain regions other than our ROIs could discriminate between the different 
demands placed on temporal individuation. Consistent with our previous ROI-based 
MVPA, the searchlight analysis revealed that widespread parts of the brain show distinct 
activity patterns for Hit compared to Correct Rejection trials (see Figure 7). The information 
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map generated from this analysis included all of our ROIs, and provided confirmatory 
support for the findings that emerged in our ROI-based MVPA. In addition to these ROIs, 
we also found that large parts of the frontal, parietal and occipital cortices were sensitive to 
the conditions under which temporal individuation occurred. Consistent with our control 
ROI analysis, no voxels in the auditory cortices could be reliably classified, suggesting that 
our classification results do not reflect an artifact of the data analyses. We also performed 
a searchlight analysis for the RB comparison, but found no significant classification across 
the entire brain. This finding further supports the idea that the processing limitations that 
lead to RB modulate the amplitude, rather than the patterns, of BOLD activity. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Results for the whole-brain searchlight analysis for the demands on 
temporal individuation comparison. 
We centered a searchlight ROI (33 voxels) on every voxel in the volume and tested for 
differences in these local patterns for Hits versus Correct Rejections. Classification 
accuracies were compared to chance performance (50%) and t-values are only displayed 
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for voxels that survived the multiple comparisons correction (q < .05). Region 
abbreviations are the same as Table 1. 
 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the present study was twofold: First, we aimed to examine whether 
individuation processes could be localized to a single neural correlate or if this operation 
tapped a widely distributed network of brain areas, as has been proposed in models of 
consciousness and encoding (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene et al., 2003; Sergent & 
Dehaene, 2004). Second, we aimed to pinpoint the neural areas involved in the 
behavioural RB deficit. To accomplish these goals, we employed an RB paradigm and a 
combination of univariate and multivariate analysis techniques. In response to the first aim, 
we found that activity patterns associated with the perception of two repeated stimuli 
(which are more demanding to individuate) and non-repeated stimuli (which are relatively 
easy to individuate) could be successfully discriminated. Critically, these two conditions 
reflected correct trials, meaning that we can be confident that stimuli were successfully 
individuated on these trials, although this process was more demanding for repeated 
stimuli. Even though these two conditions could not be distinguished when univariate 
BOLD amplitude was compared, our multivariate analyses revealed that these conditions 
elicited reliably different spatial patterns of activity in the majority of our ROIs. This set of 
regions included both lower-level perceptual and higher-level attentional/executive regions 
that covered parts of the frontal, parietal and occipital cortices. Although we cannot be 
sure of the stage(s) of processing at which the increased demands associated with 
temporal individuation had their impact, our findings nevertheless demonstrate a 
measurable difference in BOLD activity that is evoked by these changes in temporal 
individuation demands.  
For our secondary analysis – to identify the brain area(s) associated with RB (i.e., a 
processing limitation associated with temporal individuation) – we compared activity 
between conditions in which two repeated stimuli were successfully detected or not. In 
contrast to the primary analysis in which we manipulated the demands on temporal 
individuation, we found that this RB analysis did not reliably affect the spatial patterns of 
activity in any of our ROIs, but instead modulated the amplitude of BOLD activity in the left 
hemisphere premotor cortex. Together, our findings suggest that a large group of cortical 
regions are sensitive to demands placed on the temporal individuation process, whereas 
the processing limitations associated with this operation that lead to RB specifically 
influence the strength of activity in a focal brain region. Our two key comparisons therefore 
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appear to reflect distinct processes: The demand or load associated with constructing an 
individuated representation across time, and a specific capacity limitation associated with 
individuation. 
The differences that emerged for the amplitude and patterns of BOLD activity 
resonate with recent findings in the visual short-term memory literature. Several studies 
have shown that increasing the number of items held in memory leads to sustained, 
elevated BOLD amplitude in the parietal cortex (Todd & Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006), 
yet maintaining these items in memory alters the patterns, but not the amplitude, of activity 
in early sensory areas (e.g., Emrich, Riggall, LaRocque, & Postle, 2013; Serences, Ester, 
Vogel, & Awh, 2009). Emrich et al. (2013) suggest that changes in activity patterns in 
sensory areas reflect the precision of item representations (see also, Ester, Anderson, 
Serences, & Awh, 2013), whereas changes in amplitude are associated with the allocation 
of attention resources to a limited number of items. An analogous explanation fits our 
findings, where the distributed changes in activity patterns associated with the demands 
placed on temporal individuation could reflect the precision of individuated 
representations. On the other hand, the specific changes in amplitude reflected by RB 
could arise from processing limitations associated with the allocation of attentional 
resources that are necessary to bind an individuated representation (token) to its identity 
(type).   
 Decoding associated with the demands placed on temporal individuation was only 
attributed to a general effect of task difficulty in one ROI (the ACC), as the patterns of 
activity in the remaining ROIs did not discriminate between differences in reaction time. 
These remaining regions appear to reflect the demands associated with individuating two 
temporally distinct scenes, whereas the ACC appears to code for more general task-
related effects. The latter finding fits well with the existing literature that suggests that the 
ACC is involved in general task conflict and cognitive control (Kerns et al., 2004).  
Differences associated with temporal individuation were also distinguished from 
purely stimulus- or response-related effects, as classifiers could not consistently 
discriminate between repeated and non-repeated stimuli (regardless of participants’ 
response) or responses (regardless of the physical stimulus presentation) in any of our 
‘temporal individuation’ regions. This finding suggests that these brain areas code for the 
interaction between stimulus and decision/response factors associated with successfully 
individuating two temporally distinct visual items. Importantly, this stimulus-response 
interaction appears to be specifically related to temporal individuation in all regions with 
the possible exception of the bilateral LOC, as it was only in this area where patterns of 
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activity could distinguish between Miss and False Alarm trials. These trials differed in 
stimulus and response characteristics but likely not in the demands they placed on 
temporal individuation. Moreover, when we collapsed decoding results across all ROIs for 
the Hit versus Correct Rejection comparison and Miss versus False Alarm comparison, we 
found a significant overall difference between these two comparisons, suggesting that the 
information reflected by these two comparisons differs across the brain. In addition, signals 
associated with Hits and Correct Rejections were restricted to brain regions that code for 
visual information or higher-level abstractions that do not depend on perceptual modality, 
and our decoding findings did not extend to other non-visual (auditory) areas. Thus, 
activity patterns associated with the differential demands placed on temporal individuation 
did not merely reflect false positives across the entire brain. Finally, our key individuation 
results cannot reflect general positive effects of target detection (e.g., reward, satisfaction), 
as both Hits and Correct Rejections represent correct trials and would presumably have 
elicited the same level of reward and satisfaction. 
In contrast to the wide set of brain areas that emerged in the current study, previous 
research and theoretical models of object individuation have attributed this operation to a 
single brain region (see, Jeong & Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006, 2007, 2009). 
Studies such as those by Xu and colleagues are not uncommon in the cognitive 
neuroscience literature and assume that any given perceptual or cognitive process will be 
supported by a focal set of brain areas. Although this approach is hypothesis-driven, it can 
be problematic as it limits the underlying neural substrates associated with particular 
processes, and might miss the involvement of a more diffuse network of brain regions 
(see, Vickery, Chun, & Lee, 2011). For example, it was previously thought that signals 
associated with reward processes were represented in specific parts of the basal ganglia, 
prefrontal and parietal cortex (Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; 
Kahnt, Heinzle, Park, & Haynes, 2010; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Vickery & Jiang, 
2009). More recently however, Vickery et al. (2011) used MVPA to show that reward 
processes are reflected across the whole brain, suggesting that cognitive operations (like 
temporal individuation studied here) can be underpinned by an extensive neural network. 
Interestingly, these authors identified only a small subset of areas involved in reward 
processing when they employed a univariate approach. 
The widespread patterns of activity that emerged for temporal individuation are 
instead in line with existing accounts of consciousness, such as the global neuronal 
workspace model (Dehaene et al., 2003; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; see also, Baars & 
Franlin, 2003). According to this framework, conscious awareness is underpinned by a 
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distributed network of workspace neurons that communicate via long-range connections in 
the brain. For a stimulus to be consciously perceived, it must activate this workspace, 
which then allows information to be accessed by a wide variety of processes. The global 
neuronal workspace model hypothesizes that these neurons are present in both early 
sensory areas and higher-level parietal and frontal areas, and information about a given 
stimulus is transferred through recurrent communications between different levels of the 
cortical hierarchy. In the context of the present study, these long-range connections 
provide a possible avenue in which lower and higher cortical areas interact during 
temporal individuation. We hypothesize that conditions in which it is more demanding to 
individuate two distinct object occurrences alter communications within this distributed 
workspace, leading to changes in the resulting patterns of activity in both lower- and 
higher-level brain areas. Our findings provide important insights into the neural 
underpinnings of temporal individuation in that we show it is a far more distributed process 
in the brain than initially proposed (e.g., Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009). 
It is interesting to consider the discrepancy between the results we report here and 
those from prior investigations into individuation by Xu and colleagues (Jeong & Xu, 2013; 
Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006, 2007). These previous studies implicated the inferior IPS as 
the sole substrate of object individuation, which contrasts with the more diffuse group of 
brain regions we found in the current work. Even when we analysed our data using the 
same univariate method as Xu and colleagues, we found that BOLD activity in a smaller 
group of ROIs was modulated by the demands placed on temporal individuation (ACC, 
superior medial frontal cortex, left hemisphere DLPFC and left hemisphere LOC, ts > 2.18, 
ps < .043, using the uncorrected test as in Xu and colleagues), but this subset did not 
include the inferior IPS. Below we consider several key differences between these 
previous studies and our work that could account for this discrepancy.  
First is the episodic context in which object individuation was investigated. In our 
paradigm, items could only be individuated using temporal cues, whereas participants in 
Xu and colleagues’ studies could only rely on the items’ spatial locations (see, Jeong & 
Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006; Xu & Chun, 2007). It is unknown how the neural 
mechanisms associated with object individuation processes differ between the spatial and 
temporal domains, and the types of paradigms used in these studies and the present 
study are too dissimilar to make any strong conclusions regarding how these two 
operations might be related. Further research using a single paradigm that can manipulate 
spatial and temporal individuation processes will be useful in informing us about the nature 
of these two processes in the brain. Second, Xu and colleagues examined a different 
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aspect of object individuation from the present study. Here we looked at the brain areas 
that support the process of individuation during perception, whereas Xu and colleagues’ 
investigations focused on how individuated representations are consolidated, stored and 
retrieved in visual short-term memory. An interesting possibility could be that different 
groups of brain areas are recruited when individuated representations are constructed 
during perception and later stored in memory.  
Could the neural operation associated with temporal individuation simply reflect 
other forms of repetition processing in the brain? Repetition suppression, for instance, is a 
phenomenon wherein the presentation of a repeated stimulus leads to a reduction in 
neural activity (Desimone, 1996; Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Henson & Rugg, 
2003; MacKay & Miller, 1994). Like the distributed signals that emerged in response to the 
differential demands placed on temporal individuation, repetition suppression has also 
been detected extensively throughout the brain (Gotts, Chow, & Martin, 2012). Our 
findings are unlikely to reflect repetition suppression for two key reasons, one reflecting 
methodology and the other a control analysis. First, the differential patterns of activity we 
observed for successfully individuating repeated and non-repeated stimuli were present 
after gross differences in mean BOLD amplitude were removed from each condition. Thus, 
the activity patterns that emerged for temporal individuation specifically reflect differences 
in spatial patterns of activity, not gross amplitude. Second, we were unable to decode 
purely stimulus-related changes in activity patterns associated with repeated and non-
repeated stimuli (Hits and Misses versus Correct Rejections and False Alarms) in any ROI. 
Rather, the regions that could discriminate between Hits and Correct Rejections appear to 
be sensitive to the conditions under which the correct perceptual representation is 
successfully registered for a given stimulus. Our findings can therefore be distinguished 
from repetition suppression effects in the brain. 
 The present study also provides novel behavioural and fMRI evidence regarding the 
locus of RB. Although RB has been demonstrated for a variety of simple and complex 
stimuli (see, for a review, Coltheart, 2010), our behavioural findings extend the generality 
of RB by providing the first evidence that this deficit can occur for the perception of 
scenes. In addition, our univariate fMRI results provide new insights into the ongoing 
debate over whether RB reflects an early (Kanwisher, 1987; Luo & Caramazza, 1996) or 
late (Fagot & Pashler, 1995; Whittlesea & Masson, 2005) processing locus. Although the 
limited electrophysiological investigations into RB suggest that this deficit arises between 
220-350 ms after the repeated stimulus appears (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008; Schendan, 
Kanwisher, & Kutas, 1997), the paradigms used in these studies do not exclusively tap the 
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capacity limits of individuation. To our knowledge, this study reflects the first neuroimaging 
work conducted using RB, where we found that the gross amplitude of BOLD activity in a 
higher-level premotor area – which has been previously implicated in processes such as 
top-down attention and response selection (e.g., Marois et al., 2006; Schumacher, Elston, 
& D'Esposito, 2003) – was influenced by whether participants successfully detected two 
repeated stimuli or not. Contrary to the prominent models of RB, this result suggests that 
this deficit has neither a purely perceptual or memory retrieval locus, but reflects a mid-
level top-down attentional bottleneck in conscious awareness (see also, Chun, 1997). 
The direction of amplitude differences for the capacity limits of temporal 
individuation might appear counter to what one would predict, as activity in the left 
hemisphere premotor cortex increased when a repetition was missed, compared with 
when it was correctly detected. Similar findings were noted in the AB literature, however, 
such that activity in two occipito-temporal regions were enhanced when two different 
letters were missed, relative to when they were detected (Kranczioch, Debener, 
Schwarzbach, Goebel, & Engel, 2005). As RB is hypothesized to reflect an inability to bind 
an individuated token to a repeated type (Kanwisher, 1987; Park & Kanwisher, 1994), the 
enhanced activity associated with Miss trials could reflect maintenance of the second 
target’s type representation as the visual system attempts (but is unable) to register the 
source of this representation. Similar to Kanwisher’s original type-token account 
(Kanwisher, 1987; Park & Kanwisher, 1994), this interpretation suggests that the increased 
activation that emerged for Miss trials, relative to Hit trials, reflects changes in processing 
of the second target rather than the first. 
The present findings also add to the existing literature on the relationship between 
RB and other capacity-limited processes such as the AB. Behavioural comparisons 
between these two phenomena have found similar results to our Lag RB experiment, in 
that they suggest that the AB and RB reflect distinct processing limitations (Chun, 1997; 
Dux & Marois, 2007). This apparent dissociation is further supported by the present fMRI 
findings, as we found different regions were implicated in RB relative to the AB, which has 
been associated with activity in parts of the lateral frontal, posterior parietal and occipito-
temporal cortices (Kranczioch et al., 2005; Marcantoni, Lepage, Beaudoin, Bourgouin, & 
Richer, 2003; Marois et al., 2004). Although we are limited in making strong conclusions 
about the possible neural dissociation between the AB and RB, given that these 
investigations differed in paradigm and task, these findings do suggest that these two 
phenomena might be dissociable neurally as well as behaviourally. Our findings point 
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towards the possibility of exploring the dissociation or overlap in the brain between 
different bottlenecks in conscious awareness. 
We have provided the first evidence for an extensive set of brain regions that 
support the process of temporal individuation in perception, as well as the neural 
consequences associated with the processing limitations that lead to the RB deficit. We 
found that varying the demands placed on temporal individuation produced distributed 
changes in the patterns of activity across the brain, suggesting that such processes 
operate within a widespread neuronal workspace and involve multiple sources of 
information (e.g., stimulus, decisional, response). In contrast, when the capacity limit of 
individuation is reached, there are focal increases in the gross amplitude of BOLD activity, 
possibly reflecting changes in the allocation of attentional resources to processing the 
second repeated target. These findings highlight apparent differences in the neural coding 
of two distinct processes associated with temporal individuation; namely, the demands 
under which individuated representations are generated and the capacity limits that 
bottleneck the binding of these individuated tokens to an identity representation for 
conscious report. 
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Abstract 
Object individuation and identification are two key processes involved in representing 
visual information in short-term memory (VSTM). Individuation involves the use of spatial 
and temporal cues to register an object as a distinct perceptual event relative to other 
stimuli, whereas object identification involves extraction of featural and related conceptual 
properties of a stimulus. Together, individuation and identification provide the ‘what’, 
‘where’ and ‘when’ of visual perception. In the current study, we asked whether 
individuation and identification processes are underpinned by distinct neural substrates, 
and to what extent brain regions that reflect these two operations are consistent across 
encoding, maintenance and retrieval stages of VSTM. We used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to identify brain regions that represent the number of objects 
(individuation) and/or object features (identification) in an array. Using univariate and 
multivariate analyses, we found substantial overlap between these two operations in the 
brain. Moreover, we show that regions supporting individuation and identification vary 
across distinct stages of information processing. Our findings challenge influential models 
of multiple object encoding in VSTM which argue that individuation and identification are 
underpinned by a limited set of non-overlapping brain regions. 
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Many everyday activities, like searching for a stapler on a cluttered desk, rely on our ability 
to simultaneously isolate and identify multiple visual objects. To complete such a task, an 
observer must use spatial and temporal information to register each object as distinct 
(object individuation), and bind its features into a coherent form (object identification; 
Chun, 1997; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Pylyshyn, 1989; Xu & Chun, 2009). It 
is currently unclear how these processes are represented in the brain. In their neural 
object file theory, Xu and Chun (2009) predict that the inferior intra-parietal sulcus (iIPS) 
plays a key role in object individuation, whereas the superior intra-parietal sulcus (sIPS) 
and lateral occipital complex (LOC) are involved in object identification (Jeong & Xu, 2013; 
Xu, 2007, 2008, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2007). Here we test Xu and colleagues’ prediction of a 
strict functional dissociation between the contributions of these and other regions to object 
individuation and object identification. 
 In a pioneering study, Xu (2009) provided evidence for a dissociation between 
object individuation and identification within a single experiment. While undergoing 
functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) imaging, participants were briefly presented with a 
sample display consisting of one object, four identical objects or four different objects (see 
Figure 1). After a short delay, a single test item appeared centrally, and participants’ task 
was to indicate whether the test identity matched one of the sample identities. Xu 
observed reduced blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity in the iIPS for one-object 
displays, relative to both four-identical object and four-different object displays, which did 
not differ from each other. Conversely, the sIPS and LOC responded similarly for one-
object and four-identical object displays, but both had reduced BOLD activity relative to 
four-different object displays. Consistent with the neural object file theory (Xu & Chun, 
2009), these findings demonstrated that iIPS is sensitive to the number of objects in a 
display requiring individuation, whereas the sIPS and LOC respond to the number of 
distinct object identities requiring identification. 
A potential shortcoming of Xu’s (2009) study, and related empirical work (Jeong & 
Xu, 2013; e.g., Xu, 2007; Xu, 2008; Xu & Chun, 2007) upon which the neural object file 
theory is based, is that brain activity was analysed within occipital and parietal regions 
only, thus potentially missing contributions from other brain regions. Further, these studies 
employed univariate analyses of the fMRI data, which are less sensitive to small changes 
in patterns of BOLD response that can emerge when activity is analysed across groups of 
voxels (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). Our recent work using multi-voxel 
pattern analysis (MVPA) suggests that temporal individuation – registering objects as 
distinct perceptual events based on when they appear in time – recruits a broad set of 
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frontal, parietal and occipital regions (Naughtin, Tamber-Rosenau, & Dux, 2013). Based 
on this work, we predicted that such widespread networks of brain activity might also 
emerge from MVPA analyses of fMRI data obtained for displays in which objects must be 
individuated and identified in the spatial domain. 
Previous work on the neural object file theory has been also limited to paradigms 
with short retention intervals (Xu, 2009), meaning that these studies have not been able to 
examine individuation and identification during distinct visual short-term memory (VSTM) 
stages. It is important to consider the role of different processing stages, given VSTM has 
been hypothesised to involve encoding, maintenance and retrieval operations (e.g., Cohen 
et al., 1997; Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1997). Although Jeong and Xu (2013; 
also see, Xu and Chun, 2006) did use a long-delay VSTM paradigm and suggested that 
the iIPS, sIPS and LOC are involved in individuation and identification processes during 
the encoding phase and beyond, their contrasts differed in both the number of objects 
presented, and the number object identities. Thus, they could not unambiguously compare 
individuation and identification processes. 
Here we adopted a similar logic and approach to that used by Xu (2009), but with 
several important modifications, to test whether object individuation and identification can 
be dissociated in the brain (as suggested in the neural object file theory; Xu, 2009; Xu & 
Chun, 2009). We analysed activity across a broad set of brain regions using both 
univariate and MVPA approaches, and compared the role of each region across encoding, 
maintenance and retrieval stages of VSTM. In addition, unlike Xu’s (2009) paradigm, our 
task required participants to remember both the identity and spatial location of all the 
objects in the display; this task ensured that both identification and individuation 
operations were engaged. By using both analytic approaches, we could first attempt to 
replicate the original univariate results from Xu (2009) under different task conditions, and 
also determine whether other brain regions show evidence of object identification or 
individuation using the more sensitive MVPA approach. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
 We recruited 21 volunteers to participate in the experiment (12 females, mean age 
= 25.7 years, SD = 3.4 years). Data from one participant were excluded due to excessive 
head motion, and from another due to a technical error that meant behavioural responses 
were not recorded. A post-hoc power analysis confirmed that a minimum sample size of 10 
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was sufficient to have an 80% chance of detecting similar effects (Cohen’s fs > 1.13) to 
those reported by Xu (2009). Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave 
informed consent, and were financially reimbursed for their time ($15/hour). The University 
of Queensland ethics committee approved the experimental protocol. 
 
Design and Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of eight distinct shapes derived from Xu and Chun (2006). Each 
shape was presented in black on a light grey background (3.1º x 3.1º of visual angle). 
Stimuli could appear in one of eight dark grey placeholders (3.4º x 3.4º) arranged in a 
circular array, with each placeholder presented 5.3º from fixation. Placeholders were 
included to prevent grouping between closely presented objects (see Figure 1; Xu, 2009). 
The experiment was programmed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the short-term memory paradigm.  
Each trial began with the auditory presentation of two letters, followed by a sample display 
consisting of one object, four identical objects or four different objects. After an extended 
delay, observers identified whether a single test shape was the same as, or different from, 
one of the sample shapes, both in terms of its identity and location. The same judgement 
was also made for two subsequent test letters. The secondary auditory memory task was 
included to prevent participants from using verbal rehearsal strategies to remember the 
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shape stimuli. Stimuli were reproduced from Xu and Chun (2006) with permission from 
Nature Publishing Group. 
 
Procedure 
 We used a STM paradigm, based on that of Xu (2009), to identify brain areas that 
selectively code for the number of objects (individuation) and/or number of object features 
(identification; see Figure 1). This paradigm had two components: A primary VSTM task 
and a secondary verbal memory task. Each trial began with the auditory presentation of 
two letters via headphones and participants were asked to rehearse these letters 
throughout the trial. The verbal memory task was included to prevent participants from 
using verbal rehearsal strategies for the visual stimuli (Todd & Marois, 2004). After a brief 
inter-stimulus interval, a sample display consisting of one object, four identical objects or 
four different objects was presented for 200 ms. Participants were instructed to remember 
the locations and identities of the sample objects during a subsequent 12.8 s retention 
interval. We used a slightly longer retention interval than is typically employed in slow 
event-related VSTM paradigms (e.g., see Emrich, Riggall, LaRocque, & Postle, 2013; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Serences, Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2009) to ensure that we could 
clearly distinguish between each stage of VSTM. 
A single test shape appeared in one of the placeholders after the retention interval. 
The participants’ task was to identify whether this test shape matched or mismatched one 
of the previously presented sample shapes, both in terms of its identity and location. It is 
important to note that a correct response on this task required that participants 
successfully individuate and identify each of the sample items, rather than merely their 
identity (cf. Jeong & Xu, 2013; Xu, 2009, 2010; Xu & Chun, 2007). Thus, even though the 
four identical-object displays only contained a single identity, participants still had to 
individuate where each object appeared to produce a correct response. Two test letters 
were then presented, and participants made the same match/mismatch response for these 
letters, relative to the two sample letters presented at the beginning of the trial. Only 
response accuracy was emphasised, but participants had a fixed interval of 2 s in which to 
make each of their responses. The test shape and letter matched or mismatched one of 
the sample items an equal number of times.  
Each trial was followed by a 12 s fixation period. This experimental design allowed 
us to isolate sources of BOLD activity previously associated with encoding, maintenance 
and retrieval of the visual information (e.g., see Emrich et al., 2013; Harrison & Tong, 
2009; Serences et al., 2009). We chose to use these labels for the different time periods 
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because previous studies have used them to describe the distinct phases of activity 
observed across long retention intervals. A more theoretically neutral approach might be to 
label the stages as ‘early,’ ‘middle’ and ‘late’, but we chose to adopt the former set of 
labels to be consistent with prior VSTM studies (e.g., Todd & Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 
2006). 
Participants completed 6 practice trials outside the scanner, followed by 8 scanning 
runs of 12 test trials. We only provided feedback for incorrect responses on practice trials, 
in which the central fixation square briefly turned red. Each run contained an equal number 
of trials per trial type. Trial types were presented in a randomised order and the selection 
of stimuli and their locations were randomised across trials. Preliminary pilot testing 
ensured that participants could complete the task with a high level of accuracy (>80%). We 
made sure participants could perform this task well, as only correct trials were included in 
the fMRI analyses. 
 
fMRI Acquisition 
 We acquired anatomical and functional images using a 3T Siemens Trio MRI 
scanner (Erlangen, Germany) and a 12-channel head coil. Participants lay supine in the 
scanner and viewed the visual display via a rear-projection mirror. Functional T2*-weighted 
images were acquired parallel to the AC-PC plane using a GRE EPI sequence (TR = 2 s, 
TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 90º, FOV = 192 x 192, matrix = 64 x 64, in-plane resolution = 3 x 
3 mm). Each volume consisted of 33 slices with a thickness of 3 mm and a 0.3 mm inter-
slice gap. In the middle of the session, we collected a T1-weighted anatomical image 
using a MPRAGE sequence (TR = 1.9 s, TE = 2.32 ms, flip angle = 9º, FOV = 192 x 230 x 
256, resolution = 1 mm3). We synchronised the stimulus presentation with the acquisition 
of functional volumes. Each run consisted of 184 volumes, including an 8 s dummy fixation 
block presented at the start of the run. 
 
fMRI Analyses 
We conducted pre-processing, univariate analyses and MVPA with Brain Voyager 
QX 2.4 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands) and custom MATLAB code. We used 
both univariate and MVPA techniques to test for overall differences in BOLD amplitude 
and changes in the spatial patterns of activity across groups of voxels for each condition, 
respectively. There were two key comparisons of interest: First, to identify regions that 
reflect object individuation, we compared activity between displays containing one object 
and those containing four identical objects. Regions associated with this process should 
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be sensitive to the episodic properties of objects (i.e., the number of objects in the display), 
but not to object identity (since this remained constant across the two display types). 
Second, to isolate regions that support object identification, we compared activity for 
displays containing four identical objects with those containing four different objects. If a 
given brain region specifically contributes to object identification, it should show a 
difference in activity in response to the number of distinct identities present, rather than to 
the number of objects per se. These were the same comparisons previously used by Xu 
(2009). 
 Pre-processing. Data pre-processing steps consisted of 3D motion correction (with 
all functional images aligned to the first image), slice-scan time correction, high-pass 
temporal filtering (3 cycles per run) and Talairach space transformation (Talairach & 
Tourmoux, 1988). We did not apply spatial smoothing to the data to preserve fine-grained 
changes in activity for MVPA (as described in detail below). 
 Regions of interest. All ROIs were defined anatomically using mean Talairach 
coordinates from other relevant published studies. We used coordinates from Xu and 
Chun (2006) to define the iIPS, sIPS and LOC, which have previously been implicated in 
object individuation and identification (e.g., Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009). To explore the 
role of other regions, we also isolated a set of frontal, parietal and occipital regions 
involved in higher-level resource-limited processes such as response selection, decision 
making and encoding (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; Dux et al., 2009; Heekeren, 
Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; Naughtin et al., 2013; Szametitat, Schugbert, 
Muller, & von Cramon, 2002; Tombu et al., 2011). Talairach coordinates for these regions 
were derived from our previous published studies (Dux et al., 2009; Naughtin et al., 2013). 
Since the sIPS and superior parietal lobule (SPL) ROIs overlapped in the majority of 
participants, we averaged the results across these two regions (referred to as sIPS/SPL). 
ROIs were defined by an 11 mm3 cube for the univariate analyses (we used the 
same number of voxels in each ROI as Xu, 2009) and a 15 mm3 or 21 mm3 cube for 
MVPA. In both cases, the ROI cube was centered on the mean Talairach coordinates. We 
defined each ROI using a larger number of voxels for MVPA, compared with the univariate 
analyses, as it is conventional to use larger ROIs in the former to provide increased 
variability across voxels (e.g., Gallivan, McLean, Valyear, Pettypiece, & Culham, 2011; 
Harrison & Tong, 2009; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2012). As 
the sensitivity of MVPA depends upon the number of voxels included in the analysis, we 
used two different ROI sizes for MVPA – rather than choosing an arbitrary ROI size – to 
ensure the results were reliable, regardless of the number of voxels included in the 
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classification analysis (Carp, Park, Polk, & Park, 2011; Naughtin et al., 2013; Spiridon & 
Kanwisher, 2002). For simplicity, we report the MVPA results from the 21 mm3 ROIs that 
were significant across both ROI sizes. In addition to our main experimental ROIs, we also 
used the left and right primary auditory cortices as control regions (see also, Naughtin et 
al., 2013). As these areas primarily respond to auditory information rather than visual 
information (e.g., pitch; Hyde, Peretz, & Zatorre, 2008), they should not show any 
evidence of individuation or identification. The auditory cortex control regions were defined 
in the same way as the other ROIs, with the ROI cube centered on the superior portion of 
the temporal lobe (Rademacher et al., 2001). 
 Univariate analysis. The purpose of the univariate analysis was to identify gross 
changes in BOLD amplitude that have been hypothesized to reflect the processes of 
individuation or identification. We extracted timecourses for each display condition with 
percentage signal change at each time point calculated relative one volume prior to trial 
onset. This procedure was performed separately for each ROI and participant. To 
determine the peak amplitude for encoding, maintenance and retrieval, we collapsed 
timecourses across all display types, participants and ROIs, and selected the two volumes 
corresponding to the peak at each stage. The time windows for the encoding, 
maintenance and retrieval stages of VSTM were 4-8 s, 12-16 s and 18-22 s after sample 
display onset, respectively (similar to previous VSTM studies, Jeong & Xu, 2013; Todd & 
Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006). 
 Multivariate analyses. MVPA was employed to assess for individuation- or 
identification-related changes in activity that may be present in the ensemble patterns of 
activity of each ROI (Haynes & Rees, 2006; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). This type of 
approach is more sensitive to small, reliable changes in activity that might not be detected 
in standard univariate analyses. We used custom MATLAB software and a linear support 
vector machine algorithm (Chang & Lin, 2011) for these analyses. We ran separate 
classification analyses for encoding, maintenance and retrieval stages for each ROI; data 
for each voxel were averaged across the respective time windows (4-8, 12-16 and 18-22 s 
after sample display onset). Prior to MVPA, these data samples were transformed into z-
scores and mean-centered to remove any amplitude differences between conditions 
(Esterman, Chiu, Tamber-Rosenau, & Yantis, 2009; Tamber-Rosenau, Esterman, Chiu, & 
Yantis, 2011). To assess classification performance, we used the leave-one-out cross-
validation procedure. On each loop, one run was reserved to test the classifier’s 
generalisation performance and the remaining seven runs were used to train the classifier. 
We averaged classification performance for each ROI across all cross-validation loops and 
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compared this accuracy to chance performance (50%) using a one-sample t-test (p < .05, 
Bonferroni corrected for the number of ROIs and number of VSTM stages tested). 
 
Results 
 
Behavioural performance 
Performance on the verbal memory task did not differ between the three display 
types (88.7-90.6% accuracy across all display types; F < 1), which is consistent with the 
idea that auditory and visual short-term memory systems operate independently of each 
other (Baddeley, 1992; Smith & Jonides, 1998). We used Cowan’s K formula (Cowan, 
2001) to estimate participants’ VSTM capacity for each display type in the visual memory 
task. As shown in Figure 2, K estimates significantly differed across display types, F(2, 36) 
= 75.21, p < .001, 𝜂!! = 0.81. Behavioural performance was close to ceiling for one object 
and four identical objects, but participants could only hold about two objects in memory for 
the four-different object displays. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Behavioural estimates of visual short-term memory capacity as a function 
of the three display types.  
These estimates were calculated using Cowan’s (2001) K formula. Error bars denote one 
standard error of the mean. VSTM, visual short-term memory. 
 
Univariate Analyses 
We first tested for gross differences in BOLD amplitude associated with 
individuation and identification processes. For each comparison, we conducted a 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors of display type (one object, 
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four identical objects, four different objects) and stage (encoding, maintenance, retrieval), 
separately for each ROI. A significant main effect of display type indicates that a given 
region is consistently modulated by one or both of the processes of interest (i.e., the 
number of objects – individuation; or the number of object features – identification) and a 
significant display type by stage interaction signals that activity associated with the 
process(es) of interest varies across different VSTM stages. Whenever the analysis for a 
given region yielded a significant interaction, we ran follow-up t-tests at each VSTM stage 
to identify the stage(s) at which that region was recruited for the process(es). We present 
results from the significant regions according to whether they were modulated by the 
number of objects, the number of object features, or both.  
Individuation-related activity. Areas associated with object individuation either 
showed an overall amplitude difference between one-object versus four-identical object 
displays, or an interaction between these two display types and stage (see Figure 3). We 
found the left and right iIPS were showed a significant main effect of display type, Fs(2, 
36) > 4.44, ps < .024,  𝜂!!s > .20, and follow-up t-tests revealed that activity was 
significantly reduced for displays with one-object, compared with four-identical object 
displays, ts(18) > 2.95, ps < .009. The comparison between four identical objects and four 
different objects was not significant, ts(18) < 1.08, ps > .294. Consistent with previous 
work by Xu (2009), we found a profile in the univariate activity that suggests that the iIPS 
is recruited for object individuation and not object identification. Here we also show, for the 
first time, that the involvement of these regions in individuation is consistent across all 
three VSTM stages. 
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Figure 3. Blood oxygen level dependent timecourses during encoding, maintenance 
and retrieval stages for regions that were influenced by the number of objects in the 
display (reflecting object individuation).  
These areas showed a significant difference between one-object and four-identical object 
displays at one or more visual short-term memory (VSTM) stages. Separate lines denote 
display types and the shaded grey areas reflect the time window used for each stage of 
VSTM. Error bars denote one standard error of the mean. Region abbreviations are: iIPS, 
inferior intra-parietal sulcus; L, left; R, right. 
 
Identification-related activity. We identified areas that support object identification 
as those for which there were significant amplitude differences between four-identical 
object displays and four-different object displays, or an interaction between these two 
display types and stage (see Figure 4). The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) showed a significant main effect of display type, 
Fs(2, 36) > 3.62, ps < .040,  𝜂!!s > .17. Follow-up t-tests revealed that this effect was driven 
by an enhanced response for four different objects versus four identical objects, ts(18) > 
2.40, ps < .027.  
Five additional ROIs showed a significant display type x stage interaction, Fs(4, 72) 
> 2.87, ps < .047, 𝜂!!s > .14 (four of which also showed a significant effect of display type, 
Fs(2, 36) > 5.14, ps < .011, 𝜂!!s > .22): superior medial frontal cortex (SMFC), right 
premotor cortex (PMC), bilateral insula and left inferior frontal junction (IFJ). All these 
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regions showed a significant difference in activity between four identical and four different 
objects for the encoding and maintenance time windows, ts(18) > 2.06, ps < .054, and the 
right insula also showed a significant difference at retrieval, t(18) = 3.17, p = .005. Unlike 
the individuation results, in a task where both identity and location information had to be 
processed, we failed to observe Xu’s (2009) finding that object identification is restricted to 
the sIPS and LOC. Instead, we found a different set of brain regions was associated with 
this process, and these regions were active during the encoding and maintenance time 
windows. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Blood oxygen level dependent timecourses during encoding, maintenance 
and retrieval periods for regions that were influenced by the number of object 
features in the display (reflecting object identification).  
These regions showed a significant difference between displays containing four identical 
objects and those with four different objects at one or more visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) stages. Separate lines denote display types and the shaded grey areas reflect the 
time window used for each stage of VSTM. Error bars denote one standard error of the 
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mean. Region abbreviations are: SMFC, superior medial frontal cortex; ACC, anterior 
cingulate cortex; IFJ, inferior frontal junction; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, 
premotor cortex; Bi, bilateral; L, left; R, right. 
 
Individuation- and identification-related activity. In addition to those regions that 
were modulated either by the number of objects (individuation) or object features 
(identification), we also found some regions that showed evidence of both processes: Left 
PMC, right IFJ and bilateral sIPS/SPL (see Figure 5). These four regions showed a 
significant interaction between display type and stage, Fs(4, 72) > 4.09, ps < .005, 𝜂!!s > 
.19. Follow-up t-tests revealed that all regions showed a difference between one object 
and four identical objects at encoding, ts(18) > 2.01, ps < .059. A significant difference 
between one-object and four-identical objects displays was also observed during 
maintenance in the bilateral sIPS/SPL regions, ts(18) > 2.15, ps < .045, and in the right 
hemisphere sIPS/SPL during retrieval, t(18) = 2.66, p = .016. For the identification 
comparison, activity was significantly reduced for four-identical object displays versus four-
different object displays for the left PMC, right IFJ and bilateral sIPS/SPL during encoding 
and maintenance, ts(18) > 2.11, ps < .049. Contrary to what Xu and Chun originally 
proposed (Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009), these findings suggest that individuation and 
identification cannot be completely dissociated in the brain under conditions where identity 
and location must be analysed, as our univariate results revealed a subset of brain areas 
that are involved in both operations. 
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Figure 5. Blood oxygen level dependent timecourses during encoding, maintenance 
and retrieval periods for regions that were influenced by both the number of objects 
(object individuation) and number of object features (object identification).  
These regions showed significant differences between both comparisons of interest at one 
or more visual short-term memory (VSTM) stages. Separate lines denote display types, 
and the shaded grey areas reflect the time window used for each stage of VSTM. Error 
bars denote one standard error of the mean. Region abbreviations are: PMC, premotor 
cortex; IFJ, inferior frontal junction; sIPS/SPL, superior intra-parietal sulcus/superior 
parietal lobule; L, left; R, right. 
 
Multivariate Analyses  
 Similar to the univariate analyses, we conducted MVPA on data corresponding to 
encoding, maintenance and retrieval stages of VSTM. In separate analyses, we trained a 
classifier to discriminate between the same two key comparisons used in the univariate 
analyses: One object versus four identical objects for individuation, and four identical 
objects versus four different objects for identification. Classification performance for each 
ROI was compared to chance (50%) using a one-sample t-test and a significance 
threshold of p < .05, Bonferroni corrected for the 18 regions tested (i.e., 16 main regions of 
interest plus 2 control regions) and the 3 VSTM stages (critical p = .0009).  
 Compared with the univariate analyses, the MVPA approach revealed a more 
extensive neural overlap between individuation and identification processes (see Figure 
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6). Six regions displayed evidence of either individuation or identification processes. 
Specifically, right IFJ, bilateral insula and left LOC showed significant decoding for the 
number of objects, ts(18) > 4.47, ps < .016 (corrected), whereas the right DLPFC showed 
significant decoding for the number of object features, t(18) = 4.78, p = .008 (corrected). 
For nine of the sixteen regions – the left IFJ, left sIPS/SPL, left LOC, ACC, SMFC, and 
bilaterally in the PMC and iIPS – classifiers could decode activity between the ‘number of 
objects’ comparison (one object versus four identical objects) and the ‘number of object 
features’ comparison (four identical versus four different objects) in one or more VSTM 
stages, ts(18) > 4.06, ps < .040 (corrected). This finding suggests that these regions 
represent individuation and identification processes, rather than one distinct process. In 
addition, while activity associated with the number of objects or object features could be 
decoded across all VSTM stages in some regions (e.g., bilateral sIPS/SPL, left PMC, right 
LOC), other brain areas were recruited during specific stages (e.g., within the left IFJ, the 
number of object features presented could be decoded during encoding and maintenance, 
but the number of objects per se could be decoded at retrieval only).  
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Figure 6. Mean classification performance during encoding, maintenance and 
retrieval periods across all key regions of interest.  
Classifiers were trained to discriminate between the two key comparisons: One object 
versus four identical objects (‘number of objects’ comparison; object individuation), and 
four identical objects versus four different objects (‘number of object features’ comparison; 
object identification). Results from each region are displayed on separate plots. Asterisks 
denote classification performance that is significantly greater than chance across both ROI 
sizes (Bonferroni-corrected for the number of regions and VSTM stages tested). Error bars 
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reflect standard error of the mean. Region abbreviations are: IFJ, inferior frontal junction; 
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; SMFC, superior medial frontal cortex; DLPFC, dorsal 
lateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; SPL, superior parietal lobule; sIPS/SPL, 
superior intra-parietal sulcus/superior parietal lobule; iIPS, inferior intra-parietal sulcus; 
LOC, lateral occipital complex; Bi, bilateral; L, left; R, right. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest an extensive interplay between object 
individuation and identification in the brain, and suggest that signals associated with these 
processes can be detected across a wide network of regions at each stage of VSTM (see 
also, Naughtin et al., 2013). These findings are inconsistent with the neural object file 
theory put forward by Xu and Chun (2009), which predicts that individuation and 
identification are subserved by a limited set of non-overlapping brain regions. Rather, we 
show that activity is modulated in a distributed set of common regions when observers are 
required to identify and individuate a set of items in a display (novel conditions that are not 
accounted for in the current conceptualisation of the neural object file theory). 
One caveat to these conclusions is that the differences we observed for 
individuation and identification could instead reflect some general, unspecified effect of 
task difficulty. As we elaborate on in the General Discussion, such task difficulty effects are 
a potential issue for any study where there are behavioural differences between conditions 
(including the previous work by Xu and colleagues). It is therefore challenging to 
operationalize general, unspecified effects of task difficulty as a measure that is 
independent of the manipulated factors. Nevertheless, as MVPA has the potential to 
exacerbate such difficulty effects (e.g., see Todd, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013), we addressed 
this issue by balancing reaction times across our two key comparisons of interest. Prior to 
conducting the MVPAs, we equated reaction times between the ‘number of objects’ and 
‘number of object features’ comparisons by removing the slowest trials from the condition 
with the longest average reaction time and the fastest trials from the condition with the 
shortest average reaction time, until there was no significant reaction time difference 
between the conditions, ts(14) < 1.56, ps > .141. Data from four participants were removed 
from these analyses, as we could not balance their reaction times between conditions for 
one or both comparisons (leaving the sample at n = 15).  
Despite the substantial reduction in power due to fewer trials and subjects included 
in this analysis, we found 32 of our original 43 significant decoding effects held once 
reaction time was equated (see Table 1). The number of objects and/or object features 
could no longer be discriminated in the maintenance or retrieval periods for the left IFJ, 
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right DLPFC, bilateral PMC, left insula and right sIPS/SPL (ps > .05, corrected, across one 
or both ROI sizes). For the encoding period, the number of objects in the right LOC and 
the number of object features in the left PMC could not be reliably discriminated (ps > .05, 
corrected, across one or both ROI sizes). It is possible that those effects that were no 
longer reliable reaction time balanced analysis might have reflected some general effect of 
task difficulty, rather than the processes of interest. An alternative explanation is that this 
control analysis simply had less power than the main analysis to detect these effects, due 
to the reduction in trial numbers and subjects. Although these reaction time controlled 
results raise a degree of doubt about the role played by some of our ROIs in individuation 
and identification, the overall results were largely robust to this balancing procedure. 
Collectively, our findings demonstrate that individuation and identification processes can 
be detected in overlapping substrates that are distributed across the brain. 
 
Table 1. Mean classification performance during encoding, maintenance and 
retrieval periods for the main decoding analysis (where reaction time was not 
equated) and the task difficulty control analysis (where reaction time was equated).  
Standard deviations are denoted in the parentheses. Decoding accuracies for each region 
are displayed separately for the ‘number of objects’ comparison (one object versus four 
identical objects, 1 vs. 4I) and the ‘number of object features’ comparison (four identical 
objects versus four different objects, 4I vs. 4D). All statistical results are Bonferroni-
corrected for the number of regions and visual short-term memory stages tested. *p < .050, 
#p < .082 (marginally significant). Region abbreviations are the same as Figure 6. RTs, 
reaction times; VSTM, visual short-term memory. 
 
 VSTM: Encoding VSTM: Maintenance VSTM: Retrieval 
Region of 
Interest 
Unequal 
RTs 
Equal 
RTs 
Unequal 
RTs 
Equal 
RTs 
Unequal 
RTs 
Equal 
RTs 
IFJ (L) 
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
57.8 (11) 
64.1 (12)* 
 
56.1 (11) 
68.8 (15)* 
 
54.9 (10) 
61.1 (11)* 
 
56.1 (12) 
62.9 (12) 
 
61.1 (10)* 
56.8 (8) 
 
59.5 (9) 
61.5 (12) 
IFJ (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
61.2 (13) 
61.2 (9) 
 
60.3 (15) 
62.1 (12) 
 
59.4 (10) 
62.8 (14) 
 
59.5 (12) 
63.8 (15) 
 
64.0 (8)* 
55.6 (10) 
 
63.2 (9)* 
64.7 (15)# 
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ACC (Bi)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
55.7 (8) 
62.9 (12)* 
 
55.4 (10) 
67.0 (15)* 
 
54.4 (8) 
63.6 (14)* 
 
55.2 (10) 
66.8 (15)* 
 
72.5 (9)* 
57.4 (9) 
 
73.3 (9)* 
73.1 (11)* 
SMFC (Bi)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
58.3 (10) 
62.2 (11)* 
 
60.0 (12) 
67.2 (9)* 
 
49.4 (9) 
62.9 (13)* 
 
52.8 (11) 
66.6 (13)* 
 
68.6 (14)* 
54.2 (7) 
 
69.2 (12)* 
67.6 (13) 
DLPFC (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
52.9 (11) 
60.3 (10) 
 
54.5 (11) 
62.6 (14) 
 
55.1 (7) 
64.8 (15) 
 
56.9 (11) 
64.9 (15) 
 
58.6 (8) 
55.3 (8) 
 
55.1 (8) 
60.3 (12) 
DLPFC (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
55.1 (10) 
56.3 (14) 
 
55.5 (11) 
60.3 (14) 
 
57.3 (10) 
62.4 (11)* 
 
58.2 (11) 
65.2 (13) 
 
59.7 (11) 
56.9 (9) 
 
60.1 (12) 
60.7 (10)* 
PMC (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
63.6 (10)* 
61.7 (11)* 
 
66.1 (12)* 
61.4 (11) 
 
59.1 (6)* 
61.3 (12)* 
 
61.4 (10) 
62.5 (12) 
 
59.7 (10)* 
53.3 (11) 
 
59.7 (11) 
62.3 (14) 
PMC (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
62.6 (11)* 
60.9 (11)* 
 
63.7 (9)* 
64.8 (13)* 
 
57.7 (11) 
62.2 (13)* 
 
57.9 (13) 
64.0 (14)# 
 
61.7 (12)* 
57.9 (9) 
 
58.5 (14) 
62.1 (11) 
Insula (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
51.8 (7) 
58.9 (9) 
 
52.3 (12) 
61.7 (12) 
 
52.4 (8) 
60.4 (9) 
 
54.3 (10) 
63.8 (10) 
 
61.0 (11)* 
53.7 (10) 
 
59.2 (10) 
59.5 (14) 
Insula (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
55.0 (8) 
55.5 (11) 
 
54.7 (9) 
60.3 (16) 
 
55.8 (7) 
57.6 (11) 
 
56.9 (10) 
62.8 (11)* 
 
65.0 (11)* 
56.6 (10) 
 
63.9 (13)# 
63.0 (12)* 
iIPS (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
69.8 (10)* 
57.8 (7)* 
 
66.2 (12)* 
67.2 (13)* 
 
68.3 (8)* 
61.3 (11)* 
 
67.2 (9)* 
65.3 (12)* 
 
57.3 (9) 
51.6 (9) 
 
57.4 (7) 
59.8 (14) 
iIPS (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
66.3 (10)* 
56.0 (7) 
 
65.1 (12)* 
65.3 (14)* 
 
66.9 (11)* 
61.0 (10)* 
 
69.7 (12)* 
66.9 (11)* 
 
61.2 (13) 
54.4 (7) 
 
59.4 (13) 
59.0 (12) 
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sIPS/SPL (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
67.6 (10)* 
62.9 (9)* 
 
67.4 (10)* 
68.7 (11)* 
 
64.5 (8)* 
64.0 (10)* 
 
63.7 (10)* 
66.5 (12)* 
 
63.2 (10)* 
54.8 (9) 
 
61.8 (11)* 
67.0 (10)* 
sIPS/SPL (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
66.0 (13)* 
61.3 (11) 
 
66.7 (13)* 
67.0 (14)* 
 
63.4 (9)* 
62.3 (10) 
 
65.1 (10)* 
66.6 (12)* 
 
63.6 (11)* 
56.2 (8) 
 
62.7 (12) 
63.6 (11)* 
LOC (L)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
60.9 (10) 
60.0 (12) 
 
62.4 (10)* 
64.8 (14) 
 
60.1 (9)* 
61.6 (10)* 
 
62.8 (8)* 
67.6 (11)* 
 
63.5 (9)* 
55.4 (9) 
 
62.2 (11)* 
60.6 (13) 
LOC (R)  
1 vs. 4I 
4I vs. 4D 
 
62.7 (11)* 
55.6 (9) 
 
60.1 (12) 
61.2 (12) 
 
66.0 (7)* 
57.2 (13) 
 
66.7 (6)* 
58.0 (11) 
 
67.9 (11)* 
54.2 (4) 
 
67.5 (12)* 
68.8 (11)* 
 
Control Analysis 
 We conducted the same MVPAs using data from two control regions (left and right 
auditory cortices) that should not be involved in visual individuation or identification. The 
purpose of this control analysis was to ensure that the decoding differences described 
above reflect the processes of interest – object individuation and identification – rather 
than any unanticipated artifact of our data, task design or analyses. As expected, 
classifiers could not reliably discriminate between the number of objects in the display (one 
object versus four identical objects) or the number of object features (four identical objects 
versus four different objects) in the left or right auditory cortices at any VSTM stage, ts(18) 
= 2.64, ps > .855 (corrected). These control results confirm that the observed differences 
between the display types within the experimental ROIs reflect processes specifically 
associated with individuating or identifying multiple objects.  
 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the current study was twofold: We wanted to test whether object 
individuation and identification are distinct processes in the brain, and whether the brain 
regions that support these operations vary across different processing stages of VSTM. 
Using the same logic and a similar experimental approach to that previously employed by 
Xu (2009), we compared changes in BOLD activity under conditions that differed in either 
the number of objects (one object versus four identical objects) or the number of object 
features (four identical objects versus four different objects). We used a slow event-related 
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protocol that allowed us to separate activity reflected by encoding, maintenance and 
retrieval VSTM stages. Across both univariate analyses and MVPA, we found evidence for 
both distinct and overlapping neural substrates for individuation and identification. The 
overlap between these two operations was most apparent in the MVPA results, where nine 
ROIs showed evidence of individuation and identification at a single or multiple VSTM 
stages. These results suggest that individuation and identification have distributed and 
overlapping neural substrates (see also, Naughtin et al., 2013), and these operations are 
not restricted to a few process-specific brain areas, as has previously been suggested (Xu, 
2009; Xu & Chun, 2009). 
The involvement of most brain regions in individuation and identification was 
variable across VSTM stages, particularly at retrieval. The timing of the auditory memory 
response, however, could account for the absence of individuation- or identification-related 
activity at the retrieval stage. In other words, activity associated with the auditory memory 
response could have obscured effects present in the visual memory response. By 
contrast, the observed modulations associated with differences in number of objects or 
object features in the display could not simply reflect an artifact of our data, task design or 
analysis, as these same comparisons yielded no significant decoding in two auditory 
control regions.  
One could argue that data from our main analyses do not rule out the potential 
confound of general, unspecified task difficulty. In fact, such difficulty is also a possible 
issue for the prior studies by Xu and colleagues, and likely any other study in cognitive 
neuroscience where performance differs between conditions (e.g., the standard parametric 
manipulation). Similarly, it is equally problematic to interpret imaging findings when there is 
no behavioural difference between conditions. Here we find complementary differences in 
behaviour and the brain. In an attempt to rule out the potential confound of task difficulty, 
we equated reaction times between our two key comparisons, and the results were largely 
comparable to those from our main decoding analysis. We still found activity in a 
distributed set of brain regions that was specifically associated with individuation or 
identification, and seven of the original nine regions showed evidence of both processes 
(ACC, SMFC, right PMC, bilateral iIPS, left sIPS/SPL and left LOC). Thus, any non-
specific effect of difficulty cannot account for the overlap between individuation and 
identification that we observe. 
 The large number of common brain regions associated with individuation and 
identification, either at the same stage or different stages of VSTM, contrasts with 
theoretical accounts and fMRI results put forward by Xu and colleagues (Jeong & Xu, 
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2013; Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2006, 2007, 2009). For example, Xu (2009) used univariate 
analyses and found evidence for individuation tapping only the iIPS and identification only 
the sIPS and LOC. Within these three posterior regions, however, we found the greatest 
overlap between individuation and identification, particularly during encoding and 
maintenance VSTM stages. These discrepant findings resonate with seminal MVPA work 
by Haxby et al. (2001), who found that decoding techniques, unlike univariate analyses, 
reveal overlapping stimulus representations in the ventral temporal cortex, even though 
this cortical area was previously thought to contain subregions that only responded to a 
single stimulus category (i.e., faces and man-made objects such as houses, scissors and 
chairs). Thus, it appears that information pertaining to individuation and identification is 
reflected by more subtle changes in BOLD activity, which we were able to detect using 
MVPA. 
There are several other reasons why Xu and colleagues might not have observed 
an overlap between individuation and identification. First, in the present study participants 
were required to individuate and identify each item within the sample display. By contrast, 
Xu (2009) had participants judge a test shape based upon its identity only, and not its 
location. The active involvement of each process in completing the task could have 
enhanced neural responses associated with individuation and identification. While we 
cannot say whether the same overlap between object individuation and identification 
would be observed if we used a pure identification task (e.g., Xu, 2009), our findings do 
suggest that these processes are reflected in common neural substrates in tasks that 
require participants to individuate and identify all objects in the display.  
Second, we used a longer memory retention period. Xu (2009) had participants 
maintain sample shapes in memory for only 1 s, and thus activity associated with each 
VSTM stage was collapsed and finer differences at any given stage could have been 
temporally smeared. Finally, we analysed activity in a wider set of ROIs. This broader 
approach ensured a more thorough exploration of individuation and identification 
processes in the brain, and revealed that signals associated with each of these processes 
can be detected in a far more distributed neural network. 
 Results from our recent fMRI study on temporal individuation (Naughtin et al., 2013) 
are consistent with the current findings of involvement of both lower-level perceptual 
regions and higher-level executive regions in spatial individuation and identification 
processes. In the previous study, we used a repetition blindness paradigm in which 
participants had to detect the presence of a scene repetition embedded within a rapid 
stream of distractors. As participants are typically poorer at individuating an item when it is 
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preceded by one with the same identity (Kanwisher, 1987; Park & Kanwisher, 1994), we 
hypothesised that it would be more demanding to successfully individuate two temporally-
distinct scenes when they had the same identity (repeated), relative to different identities 
(non-repeated). Using MVPA, we found activity in the same set of lower- and higher-level 
regions could discriminate between correctly identified repeated and non-repeated scenes. 
Thus, even though our previous investigation (Naughtin et al., 2013) and the current study 
employed paradigms that differed in both task demands and stimulus properties, findings 
from both point to a common distributed network for identification and individuation in the 
spatial and temporal domains. 
 We are not the first to propose a distributed neural network as the underlying neural 
basis for perceptual or cognitive abilities. For example, in their MVPA study, Vickery, 
Chun, and Lee (2011) found that reward processes are reflected across many brain 
regions, yet a smaller, more focal set of regions emerged in the univariate analysis. In 
addition, Duncan (2010, 2013) has proposed that a large range of cognitive tasks are 
underpinned by a distributed set of frontal and parietal regions, which he refers to as the 
multiple demands system. These findings underscore the importance of exploring the role 
of distributed brain regions in any given perceptual or cognitive process. 
 
Conclusion  
The present evidence challenges an earlier view that object individuation and 
identification are subserved by a relatively small set of distinct brain regions (as suggested 
by Xu, 2009; Xu & Chun, 2009). Both univariate analyses and MVPA suggested that 
individuation and identification are instead reflected across a larger group of brain regions 
and that these processes have overlapping neural substrates. We propose that 
individuation and identification might operate within a distributed neural network in which 
lower- and higher-level regions communicate. Our findings further indicate that earlier work 
on the neural bases of object individuation and identification may have been restricted in 
the number of regions tested and the sensitivity of the data analysis techniques. At the 
very least, our data illustrates conditions in which the neural object file theory (Xu & Chun, 
2009) cannot account for how object individuation and identification are represented in the 
brain. That is, when the observer must track both the location and identity of objects. 
Furthermore, we found involvement of these distributed regions varied across different 
processing stages of VSTM, in a substantial proportion of regions. These results provide 
new insights into the nature of the neural substrates that give rise to individuation and 
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identification – two operations that are crucial for a stimulus to reach conscious awareness 
and be consolidated in VSTM. 
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Abstract 
A typical visual scene contains multiple coherent objects distributed across different 
regions of space. To isolate each object from its surrounds, it must be represented as a 
stable perceptual entity across both time and space. There has been considerable 
theoretical debate as to whether this process of object individuation occurs pre-attentively 
or at later attentive stages of visual processing. Moreover, the potential contributions of 
early sensory areas to object individuation are yet to be determined. Here we used 
electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
measure the timecourse of individuation, both for stimuli within and outside the focus of 
attention, to assess the information processing stage at which object individuation arises, 
and the extent to which it draws on activity within early visual cortex. We developed a 
novel paradigm involving items defined by illusory contours, which allowed us to vary the 
number of to-be-individuated objects while holding the physical stimulus characteristics of 
the display constant. As early as 100 ms post-stimulus onset, event-related potentials 
tracked the number of objects in the attended hemifield, but not in the unattended 
hemifield. Moreover, using multivariate pattern analyses of the fMRI data, we found that 
area V2 and other extrastriate visual areas were sensitive to the number of individuated 
objects. We conclude that object individuation of attended items arises at a relatively early 
stage in the visual information processing hierarchy, and that voluntary spatial attention 
influences the timecourse of this operation. 
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To isolate objects in a cluttered visual environment, individuals must first register, or 
individuate, each item as a distinct perceptual entity on the basis of its spatiotemporal 
properties. Representations generated at this stage of information processing are coarse 
and are thought to precede analyses necessary for identification (Kahneman, Treisman, & 
Gibbs, 1992; Pylyshyn, 1994). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of 
the neural substrates of object individuation have implicated a distributed network of 
occipital, parietal and frontal brain regions (Naughtin, Mattingley, & Dux, in press; 
Naughtin, Tamber-Rosenau, & Dux, 2013; Xu, 2009). Currently, however, there is no clear 
picture regarding the temporal dynamics of object individuation, or whether this is 
influenced by selective attention (Kahneman et al., 1992; Pylyshyn, 1994; Xu & Chun, 
2009). Here we used electroencephalography (EEG) to determine the time point at which 
object individuation arises, for both attended and unattended items. In addition, we 
employed fMRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to assess the extent to which 
object individuation relies upon activity within early sensory brain regions. 
 Previous EEG studies have found that the number of individuated stimuli in an 
attended hemifield modulates a lateralized, negative-going event-related potential (ERP) 
that begins 200-300 ms after stimulus onset (the N2pc component; Ester, Drew, Klee, 
Vogel, & Awh, 2012; Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008). Importantly, N2pc 
amplitude only increases with target numerosity for sets of four items or less, but not for 
larger set sizes (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2014; Ester et al., 2012). This component 
therefore tracks object number only within the established range of subitizing, an operation 
that draws on individuation mechanisms to facilitate rapid and accurate enumeration of 
distinct items within a display (Piazza, Fumarola, Chinello, & Melcher, 2011; Trick & 
Pylyshyn, 1994). Although subitizing appears to draw on attentional processes (e.g., 
Ansari, Lyons, van Eimeren, & Xu, 2007; Cavanagh & Alvarez, 2005; Vetter, Butterworth, 
& Bahrami, 2010), it is unclear whether individuation, as indexed by subitizing, is evident 
at time points earlier than the N2pc (but also see, Hyde & Spelke, 2009, 2012; Mazza, 
Pagano, & Caramazza, 2013), or whether its timecourse is modulated by selective spatial 
attention. 
 Here we developed a novel enumeration paradigm that manipulated the number of 
to-be-individuated items at cued and uncued locations within the left and right visual fields. 
Each target object was an illusory square produced when a quarter segment was briefly 
removed from each one of a set of four black-disk inducers (see Figure 1). Unlike previous 
paradigms in which displays confounded manipulations of target numerosity with other 
low-level visual variables, such as hue, luminance or eccentricity, the physical stimuli were 
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identical across all our numerosity conditions. If object individuation depends upon 
selective attention, we should observe distinct timecourses for attended and unattended 
objects. Further, as neurons within the primary visual cortex respond to illusory contours 
(Murray & Herrmann, 2013), we expected that neural activity associated with individuation 
should be evident within early sensory cortical areas.  
 
Method and Materials 
 
Participants 
 The study consisted of three separate experiments. There were 25 participants (18 
female) in Experiment 1, the aim of which was to validate the behavioural protocol. There 
were a further 26 participants (15 females) in Experiment 2, which employed EEG to 
measure the timecourse of object individuation processes. A subset of 14 participants (9 
females) from Experiment 2 also participated in Experiment 3, which employed fMRI to 
measure patterns of activity across visual cortex associated with object individuation. The 
mean ages of participants in each of the three experiments were 22.8 years (SD = 5.1), 
25.5 years (SD = 4.4) and 27.4 years (SD = 5.4), respectively. Data were excluded from 
participants with poor task accuracy (three participants in Experiment 1, n = 22; two 
participants in Experiment 2, n = 24). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, gave written, informed consent and were financially reimbursed for their time. The 
University of Queensland ethics committee approved the experimental protocol. 
 
Design and Stimuli 
 Placeholder and inducer stimuli consisted of solid black disks (radius of 0.5º of 
visual angle) superimposed on a light grey background. Inducer disks also contained a 
gap in one of four quadrants (Figure 1B). These stimuli were presented in groups of four in 
a square configuration, with a centre-to-centre distance of 1.5º between each disk. Four 
such configurations were presented in each hemifield (left and right), and the centre of 
each was 6.2º from fixation. In illusory contour configurations, all four inducers had their 
gap oriented toward the centre of the configuration. This arrangement created an 
additional illusory square that was apparent on top of the four black disks (Kanizsa, 1955). 
These illusory squares served as the objects that participants had to detect. There were 
also non-illusory configurations in which the inducers were oriented randomly, such that 
the gap could appear in any one of the quadrants, with the only constraint that no two 
adjacent inducers ever formed an illusory edge. On any given trial, either side of the array 
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could contain 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 new objects (illusory squares), depending on the configuration 
of the black inducer disks. Critically, the number, shape and positions of the inducer disks 
remained constant on each side of the display across all trials; only the appearance of one 
or more illusory squares varied across the trials. We also manipulated covert spatial 
attention on each trial by cueing participants to one of the two visual hemifields (left or 
right). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Paradigm and behavioural results for Experiment 1.  
(A) Schematic representation of a single trial of the illusory enumeration task. Each trial 
began with the presentation of four placeholder groups (black disks) in each hemifield, 
followed by a central arrow cue. The placeholders then changed into inducers (disks with 
quarter segments removed), where some of the inducer groups were arranged to form an 
additional illusory square (targets). When prompted, participants reported the number of 
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targets in the attended hemifield.  (B) Example stimulus display in which there are three 
targets (illusory squares) in the attended hemifield and one to-be-ignored non-target in the 
unattended hemifield. All remaining placeholder groups contain inducer disks that are 
oriented such that they do not form any illusory contours. (C) Error rates as a function of 
the five target numerosity conditions. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
In each experiment, there were three within-participant factors: ‘Target numerosity’ 
(0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 items), ‘non-target numerosity’ (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 items) and ‘cued hemifield’ 
(left or right). Target numerosity was the number of illusory squares in the cued hemifield, 
and non-target numerosity was the number of illusory squares in the uncued hemifield. 
The cued hemifield was indicated by an arrow cue (‘<’ or ‘>’) presented in the centre of the 
screen (1º x 1º). Stimuli were generated in Photoshop and the experiments were 
programmed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
 
Procedure 
Experiment 1. We first validated our novel enumeration task for manipulating 
individuation load (Figure 1A). The goal was to employ a paradigm that was similar to 
standard enumeration tasks in which participants have to individuate a variable number of 
target items (e.g., Ester et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 2013; Pagano & Mazza, 2012), while 
controlling for low-level visual features, such as the number of visual elements, hue, 
luminosity and eccentricity, to ensure visual displays were physically identical across all 
conditions. Each trial began with a fixation square (500 ms), followed by the presentation 
of four placeholder configurations in the left and right hemifields (500 ms), each consisting 
of four black disks. An arrow cue then appeared in the centre of the screen to indicate the 
visual hemifield to which participants should attend. After 500 ms, each group of 
placeholder disks then changed to inducer disks by removal of a quarter segment from 
each. Each configuration within the cued and uncued hemifield could form an illusory 
square object or a non-illusory configuration (i.e., no illusory square; Figure 1B). This 
target display remained on the screen for 300 ms, and participants’ task was to determine 
the number of illusory squares that appeared within the cued hemifield. 
A response screen appeared after offset of the target display, and participants 
indicated the number of targets via key press. We emphasised response accuracy over 
speed, and no response deadline was imposed. On any given trial, there could be zero, 
one, two, three or four targets in the cued hemifield, and the same possible number of 
ignored non-targets in the uncued hemifield. The next trial began after a 500 ms interval. 
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Participants completed 100 practice trials, followed by 600 test trials (split across 6 
blocks). Response feedback was provided on practice trials only. Trial types were 
presented in a pseudo-randomised order, and the selection of target/non-target 
configurations was randomised across trials. Participants were tested in a dimly lit 
laboratory to minimise distraction from other visual stimuli. 
Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, we recorded EEG while participants completed the 
illusory enumeration task, with the aim of isolating the time point in information processing 
at which object individuation arises for attended and unattended items. The enumeration 
task was identical to that described for Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Each 
trial began with the cue display for a variable duration of 400-600 ms (the exact duration 
was randomly determined for each trial), followed by the target display for 300 ms. Cue 
display duration was jittered to minimise the extent to which any cue-related activity would 
be present in the ERPs in response to the target display. A response prompt then 
appeared for 1,700 ms, during which participants had to indicate the number of targets 
they detected in the cued hemifield. We imposed a response time limit to be consistent 
with other subitizing ERP studies (e.g., Mazza et al., 2013; Pagano & Mazza, 2012).  
To ensure that participants’ responses were uniformly distributed over the 
keyboard, we also assigned arbitrary response keys for each target numerosity (‘D’ for one 
target, ‘F’ for two targets, ‘J’ for three targets, ‘K’ for four targets and ‘spacebar’ for zero 
targets). Participants responded with the following fingers: left middle, ‘D’; left index, ‘F’; 
right index, ‘J’; right middle, ‘K’; right thumb, ‘spacebar.’ After the response period, there 
was a delay of 1,500 ms before the next trial began. Participants completed 800 test trials 
(split over 8 blocks) and 50 practice trials, and were fitted with a 64-electrode head cap 
during the practice block. We instructed participants to minimise eye, head and body 
movements during the experiment, and to take breaks in between each of the testing 
blocks. 
EEG recording. Continuous EEG data were acquired using a BioSemi Active Two 
system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands), digitised at a 1024 Hz sample rate with 24-bit 
A/D conversion. We recorded from 64 active scalp electrodes mounted on a nylon cap, 
and these electrodes were arranged according to the International Standard 10-10 system. 
Electrodes were referenced online to the standard BioSemi reference electrodes. We also 
recorded eye movements from bipolar horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) using electrodes 
placed to the outer canthi of each eye, and from the bipolar vertical EOG using electrodes 
placed above and below the left eye. 
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EEG analysis. EEG data were analysed offline using Brain Electrical Source 
Acquisition (BESA 5.3; MEGIS software GmbH, Gräfeling, Germany). Each scalp 
electrode was referenced offline to the average of all 64 scalp electrodes and subjected to 
a 0.1 Hz low-pass and a 45 Hz high-pass digital filter. EOG electrodes were referenced 
offline into bipolar vertical and horizontal EOG channels. Any noisy scalp electrodes 
identified via visual inspection were replaced by a spherical spline interpolation of voltages 
recorded at all other scalp electrodes (the maximum number of interpolated electrodes for 
any given participant was three). The data were segmented into epochs from 100 ms 
before to 400 ms after the target display onset, and the average voltage recorded 100 ms 
prior to stimulus onset served as the baseline measurement. Incorrect trials were removed 
from the ERP analyses (18.1% of trials), due to the unknown source of the error on these 
trials. We also identified and removed any trials with blinks, eye movements or other 
artifacts as trials where the difference between the minimum and maximum voltage 
exceeded 120 µV (a further 1.8% of trials).  
 The remaining epochs were averaged together, separately for each participant, 
target numerosity and non-target numerosity conditions (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 objects). Even 
though we jittered the duration of the arrow cue over a 200 ms range to cancel out any 
cue-related activity in the target display ERPs, some residual overlap from the cue ERPs 
might still have remained. To ensure there was no remaining cue-related activity in the 
target ERPs, we also subtracted the ERP evoked by zero-target/non-target trials from all 
other remaining target/non-target numerosities (Busse & Woldorff, 2003). The zero-item 
trials were identical to the other trial types in terms of the physical stimuli, trial structure, 
task demands and frequency, except that no illusory squares were presented in the cued 
and uncued hemifields. This subtraction method effectively removed any activity in the 
continuous EEG data that were not time-locked to the target display (Talsma & Woldorff, 
2005).  
Two key components of interest – the P1 and N2 – were identified via visual 
inspection of the grand average waveform topography maps (Figure 2). For each 
component, we analysed non-lateralised mean amplitude for the following time windows 
across a cluster of occipitoparietal electrodes at which the peak was maximal: 100-140 ms 
for P1 (PO7/PO8 and P7/P8 electrodes) and 185-250 ms for N2 (PO7/PO8 and O1/O2 
electrodes). The peaks corresponding to each of these components were calculated from 
the grand-average waveforms shown in Figure 2A, which reflect the average waveform 
collapsed across all participants, target numerosity conditions normalised to zero-target 
trials and non-target numerosity conditions. The mean amplitudes and peak latencies, 
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collapsed across the two corresponding electrodes for each component, were then 
subjected to separate one-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the 
factors of target numerosity (1, 2, 3, 4; collapsed across all non-target conditions) and non-
target numerosity (1, 2, 3, 4; collapsed across all target conditions). We conducted 
separate ERP analyses for targets and non-targets to ensure there were sufficient trial 
numbers within each cell of the analysis. For all behavioural and ERP analyses, the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied for violations of the sphericity assumption. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Grand average event-related potentials elicited by different target 
numerosities in Experiment 2.  
(A) Target display event-related potentials (ERPs) averaged across all cued set sizes, 
recorded at three contralateral occipitoparietal electrodes (P7/P8, PO7/PO8, and O1/O2). 
These electrodes produced the greatest amplitude either at the early positive (P1; 100-140 
ms) or later negative (N2; 185-250 ms) components. The two electrodes with the highest 
peak amplitude during these time windows were selected for the mean amplitude analysis. 
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We subtracted the ERP elicited by zero-target (null) trials from the corresponding ERPs 
under all other target numerosities to remove any residual cue-related activity. (B) Spline-
interpolated isocontour voltage topographies at the time corresponding to each peak. 
These topography maps are averaged across all set size conditions, separately for targets 
appearing within the left and right hemifield. We also averaged across hemifields for the 
ERP analysis. Black and white circles indicate which electrodes were used in each peak 
analysis. (C) ERP peaks as a function of the four target numerosities (1, 2, 3, 4). Error 
bars indicate one standard error of the mean. 
 
Experiment 3. We followed Experiment 2 with an fMRI study to examine patterns of 
neural activity associated with object individuation in cortical sensory areas. We employed 
fMRI because it has superior spatial resolution to EEG, which instead reflects the summed 
activity recorded across a large number of cortical areas (Luck, 2005). The illusory 
enumeration task was similar to that used in Experiment 2, with the following changes. The 
size of all stimuli was reduced by 75% to accommodate the smaller display size inside the 
scanner, but the relative size of all stimuli was comparable with the previous two 
experiments. To remove possible carryover effects of the cue to the activity associated 
with the target display – which likely would have a more prolonged effect given the slow 
temporal nature of the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal – we varied the cued 
hemifield across blocks of eight trials, rather than between trials. There were four blocks in 
each run, and attention was cued to the left or right hemifield an equal number of times. 
The arrow cue remained on screen throughout the entire block and enlarged slightly (from 
0.75˚ to 1.13˚) for 2 s to alert the participant to the upcoming trial. The target display was 
then presented for 500 ms, followed by the response screen for 1,500 ms. The response 
screen now included the placeholder stimuli in both hemifields in addition to the central 
response prompt. After the response prompt offset and the placeholders remained on 
screen for the 8 s inter-trial interval. We included the placeholders in the response and 
inter-trial interval screens to reduce the amount of visual onsets and offsets between each 
display, which might otherwise have added noise to the fMRI data. We also omitted the set 
size of four items to ensure we had sufficient trial numbers for each condition when using a 
slow-event related design; thus, there could be zero, one, two or three illusory square 
objects presented within the cued or uncued hemifields. Participants responded using a 
four-button response box in the scanner, and completed seven scanning runs in total. 
fMRI acquisition. We used a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany) 
and a 32-channel head coil to acquire anatomical and functional images. Participants lay 
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supine in the scanner and viewed the visual display via a rear-projection mirror. We 
acquired functional T2*-weighted images using a GRE EPI sequence with the following 
parameters: TR = 2 s, TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 90º, FOV = 192 x 192, matrix = 64 x 64, in-
plane resolution = 3 x 3 mm. These images were aligned to the AC-PC plane and 
consisted of 33 slices with a thickness of 3 mm and a 0.3 mm inter-slice gap. The 
acquisition of each volume was synchronised with the timing of the stimulus presentation. 
There were 199 volumes acquired in each run, including 4 initial dummy volumes that 
were discarded prior to analysis. After the third functional run, a T1-weighted anatomical 
image was collected using a MPRAGE sequence (TR = 1.9 s, TE = 2.32 ms, flip angle = 
9º, FOV = 192 x 230 x 256, resolution = 1 mm3).  
fMRI analyses. All pre-processing steps and analyses were conducted using Brain 
Voyager QX 2.4 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands) and custom MATLAB code. 
The data pre-processing steps included 3D motion correction (where each functional 
image was aligned to the image from the first run), slice-scan time correction and high-
pass temporal filtering (three cycles per run). All images were transformed into Talairach 
space (Talairach & Tourmoux, 1988), and no spatial smoothing was applied to preserve 
fine-grained spatial information. We used a region of interest (ROI) approach and these 
ROIs were defined anatomically using the Brodmann (1909) template. We had four ROIs, 
analysed separately across left and right hemispheres: Primary visual cortex (V1; BA 17), 
secondary visual cortex (V2; BA 18), extrastriate visual cortex (V3/V4/V5; BA 19) and 
primary auditory cortex (A1; BA 41). The visual areas were our key ROIs, and A1 was 
used as a control region to rule out the possibility that some unknown data artifact might 
have contributed to any observed changes in BOLD activity. As A1 is primarily responsive 
to auditory information (e.g., Hyde, Peretz, & Zatorre, 2008), it should not be sensitive to 
the number of visual objects to be individuated. 
Data from the fMRI experiment were analysed using MVPA. MVPA has previously 
been used to show evidence of various perceptual and cognitive operations in early visual 
areas, such as orientation coding (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) and the 
maintenance of information in working memory (Harrison & Tong, 2009), which could not 
be detected using traditional univariate analyses. This type of analysis examines whether 
there are subtle changes in the spatial patterns of fMRI activity that can be detected when 
voxel activity is analysed as an ensemble. MVPA is sensitive to small changes in BOLD 
activity that are reliable across a cluster of voxels, even if the difference in overall 
amplitude between conditions is not large enough to be detected in that region (Norman, 
Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). Specifically, we trained linear classifiers to discriminate 
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between patterns of voxel activity for the zero-target trials, compared with the three other 
target numerosities (1, 2, or 3 objects), yielding three binary comparisons (0 versus 1, 0 
versus 2 and 0 versus 3 objects). We also ran an additional analysis that directly tested for 
an individuation load effect by decoding one-target and three-target conditions. Activity in 
each ROI was averaged across the time window corresponding to the peak of the BOLD 
signal (4-8 s after target display onset), transformed into z-scores and mean-centered to 
remove any overall differences in amplitude between conditions (Naughtin et al., in press; 
Naughtin et al., 2013).  
To ensure any differences between ROIs were not driven by differences in the 
number of voxels included in the analysis, we only included data from the 100 voxels that 
showed the greatest overall amplitude, collapsed across the two classifier-conditions. 
These data were then entered into a linear support vector machine algorithm (Chang & 
Lin, 2011). We used a leave-one-out classification procedure, whereby one run was 
reserved to test the generalisation performance of the trained classifier, and the remaining 
six runs were used to train the classifier. This procedure was repeated seven times such 
that data from each run were used as the test run once, and classification performance 
was averaged across all iterations. Significance was tested against chance performance 
(50%) using a one-sample t-test (corrected for multiple comparisons). Our rationale for this 
analysis was that, if a given region shows evidence of object individuation, it should show 
improved decoding accuracy with increases in item numerosity. 
 
Results 
 
Behavioural Experiments 
Experiment 1. A target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) by non-target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 
3, 4) repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean proportion of errors revealed a significant 
main effect of target numerosity, F(1, 28) = 5.06, p = .024, 𝜂!! = .19, including a significant 
positive linear trend such that errors increased with larger target numerosities, F(1, 21) = 
6.07, p = .022, 𝜂!! = .22 (Figure 1C). There was no significant effect of non-target 
numerosity, nor a significant target by non-target numerosity interaction, Fs < 1.09, ps > 
.370, 𝜂!!s < .05. These results confirm that the illusory squares produced a subitizing effect 
analogous to that observed in previous studies (e.g., Ester et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 2013; 
Pagano & Mazza, 2012). 
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Experiment 2 
 Behavioural performance. Consistent with Experiment 1, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the mean proportion errors with factors of target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) and 
non-target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) revealed a significant main effect of the former, F(2, 
53) = 7.92, p = .001, 𝜂!! = .26, including a significant positive linear trend, F(1, 23) = 11.94, 
p = .002, 𝜂!! = .34. There was no effect of non-target numerosity, F(4, 23) = 1.73 p = .002, 𝜂!! = .34, but the target by non-target numerosity interaction did reach significance, F(16, 
368) = 2.05, p = .010, 𝜂!! = .082. We followed up this interaction with separate one-way 
target numerosity ANOVAs conducted on data at each level of non-target numerosity. A 
significant effect of target numerosity was found for all non-target numerosity ANOVAs, Fs 
> 3.05, ps < .021, 𝜂!!s > .12, including a significant positive linear trend, Fs > 4.49, ps < 
.045, 𝜂!!s > .16. This result replicates the behavioural performance observed in Experiment 
1, again demonstrating a typical subitizing effect. It should be noted that, even though 
there was also a significant interaction in this experiment, the effect of target numerosity 
was still evident under all non-target numerosity conditions. 
 ERP results.  
P1. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with the factor of target numerosity (1, 
2, 3, 4) on mean P1 amplitudes revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 56) = 5.21, p = 
.005, 𝜂!! = .19, including a significant positive linear trend, F(1, 23) = 11.40, p = .003, 𝜂!! = 
.33. There was no significant main effect when an identical ANOVA was applied to non-
target numerosity mean P1 amplitudes, F(3, 69) = 1.27, p = .290, 𝜂!! = .05. In addition, no 
significant effects were observed for P1 peak latency measures for either targets or non-
targets, Fs < 1.70, ps > .190, 𝜂!!s < .07. These results suggest that the number of illusory 
squares in the attended hemifield modulated activity as early as 100-140 ms after target 
onset, thus, providing the first evidence for object individuation at this early stage of visual 
information processing. 
N2. To assess for later modulations of brain activity associated with individuation, 
we also conducted separate one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs on mean N2 amplitude 
for target numerosity (1, 2, 3, 4) and non-target numerosity (1, 2, 3, 4). As was observed 
for the P1 component, there was a significant main effect of target numerosity, F(2, 43) = 
13.81, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .38, including a significant positive linear trend, F(1, 23) = 20.09, p < 
.001, 𝜂!! = .47. There was also a significant main effect of non-target numerosity, F(3, 69) 
= 8.10, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .26, as well as a significant positive linear trend, F(1, 23) = 9.09, p < 
.001, 𝜂!! = .43. The effect of target numerosity is consistent with previous ERP studies of 
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object individuation and subitizing, which found enhanced negativity in a similar time 
window associated with the number of attended targets (e.g., Mazza et al., 2013; Mazza, 
Turatto, Umiltà, & Eimer, 2007; Pagano, Lombardi, & Mazza, 2014). There were no 
significant effects for the analysis of peak latency values for either targets or non-targets, 
Fs < 1.35, ps > .265, 𝜂!!s < .06. 
N2pc. To be consistent with previous ERP studies, we also analysed target- and 
non-target-related activity for the lateralised N2 component (N2pc). Statistical analyses 
were performed on mean difference amplitudes and latencies (180-300 ms; time window 
taken from Mazza and colleagues, Mazza et al., 2013; Mazza et al., 2007; Pagano et al., 
2014) after subtracting activity recorded at ipsilateral posterior sites (PO7 and O1 for left 
targets, PO8 and O2 for right targets) from that recorded at contralateral sites (PO8 and 
O2 for left targets, PO7 and O1 for right targets). As the N2pc component is a difference 
waveform, cue-related activity is already partialed out. Thus, for this component only, we 
did not subtract activity on zero-target trials from the other trial types, allowing us to 
examine responses on trials in which there were no targets to be individuated.  
Separate, one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs on mean N2pc amplitudes with 
factors of target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) and non-target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) revealed 
significant main effects of both target numerosity and non-target numerosity, Fs > 3.28, ps 
< .015, 𝜂!!s > .13 (Figure 3A). N2pc amplitude showed a significant positive linear increase 
with target numerosity, F(1, 23) = 9.22, p = .006, 𝜂!! = .29, whereas non-target numerosity 
showed a significant negative linear trend, F(1, 23) = 4.96, p = .036, 𝜂!! = .18. The effect of 
target numerosity is consistent with prior N2pc investigations into object individuation 
(Ester et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 2013; Mazza et al., 2007; Pagano et al., 2014), but here 
we provide the first evidence comparing this with ERP measures of task-irrelevant object 
individuation. It appears that objects in unattended locations are individuated, but the 
extent of this processing declines with each additional object in the display. We return to 
this issue in the Discussion. 
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Figure 3. Event-related potential peaks for the N2pc component as a function of 
target and non-target numerosity.  
This component was calculated as a difference waveform between posterior electrodes 
contralateral, relative to ipsilateral, to the attended hemifield. The plots show mean 
amplitude across the target (left) and non-target numerosity (right) conditions. Error bars 
indicate one standard error of the mean. 
 
Experiment 3 
 Behavioural results. Behavioural performance in the fMRI experiment was 
comparable to that observed in the previous experiments. A target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3) 
by non-target numerosity (0, 1, 2, 3) repeated-measures ANOVA on mean proportion error 
rates showed a significant main effect of target numerosity, F(3, 23) = 4.67, p = .023, 𝜂!! = 
.28, with a marginal positive linear trend, F(1, 12) = 3.22, p = .098, 𝜂!! = .21. There were no 
other significant effects or interactions, Fs < 1.30, ps > .244, 𝜂!!s < .10. These findings 
confirm that adjustments made to the behavioural paradigm for the purposes of fMRI did 
not compromise the key behavioural effect. 
 MVPA results. To be consistent with our ERP approach, we collapsed across the 
factor of hemifield and assessed whether decoding accuracy was greater than chance for 
each contralateral and ipsilateral ROI. A series of one-sample t-tests (corrected for the 
statistical tests conducted across each region, hemisphere and classifier comparison; 
minimum p = .002) revealed that activity in V1 could not be decoded across any of the 
classifier comparisons, ts > 3.35, ps > .168, with the exception of the zero-versus-two 
comparison for ipsilateral V1, t(13) = 7.10, p = .019 (Figure 4). Classifiers could not 
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discriminate between zero- versus one-target conditions in V2 or V3/V4/V5 activity, ts > 
2.83, ps > .453, but activity in these bilateral regions could distinguish zero-target trials 
from both two- and three-target trials, ts > 7.10, p < .001. Moreover, the direct comparison 
between one-target and three-target trials also revealed significant decoding bilaterally in 
V2 and V3/V4/V5 (minimum decoding accuracy = 62.7%), ts > 8.72, ps < .001. These 
decoding results therefore suggest that activity in visual areas as early as V2 tracks the 
number of individuated targets, and that this bilateral activity reflects a plausible source of 
modulation observed in the P1 component in Experiment 2. There were no significant 
differences in decoding for contralateral and ipsilateral regions for any of the ROIs, ts < 
3.04, ps > .302. To confirm that the significant decoding we observed was specific to 
object individuation and did not simply reflect some artifact of our design, data or analyses, 
we also assessed decoding accuracy in two control regions – contralateral and ipsilateral 
A1. Activity in these regions could not be discriminated between the conditions for any of 
the comparisons, ts > 3.50, ps > .125, suggesting that the above-chance decoding 
observed for V2 and V3/V4/V5 reflects a genuine effect of object individuation load. 
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Figure 4. Paradigm and multi-voxel pattern analysis results for Experiment 3.  
(A) Schematic representation of a single trial of the slow-event related illusory enumeration 
task. Similar to the paradigm used in Experiment 1, participants were first presented with 
the placeholder display with a central arrow cue (cued hemifield was now blocked across 
each experimental run). The placeholders then changed into inducers and participants had 
to indicate the number of new objects (illusory squares) that appeared in the attended 
hemifield. There was an extended inter-trial interval (ITI), following a standard slow-event 
related design. (B) Anatomical regions of interest (ROIs) defined using the Brodmann 
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areas (BA) atlas. These ROIs correspond to primary visual cortex (V1; BA 17), secondary 
visual cortex (V2; BA 18) and extrastriate visual cortex (V3-V5; BA 19). (C) Decoding 
accuracy results from the multi-voxel pattern analyses conducted on each ROI in the 
hemisphere contralateral and ipsilateral to the attended hemifield. Classifiers were trained 
to discriminate between zero-target trials and each of the other target numerosities 
separately. Dashed lines indicate chance performance and the asterisk (*) denotes 
accuracies greater than chance performance, corrected for multiple comparisons. Error 
bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
 Here we examined the temporal dynamics of individuation for attended and 
unattended objects, and the extent to which this operation relies on activity within sensory 
processing regions of the brain. We employed a novel enumeration paradigm in which 
identical inducers (black disks with quarter segments removed) either did or did not form 
illusory squares. Critically, this design kept visual elements constant across numerosity 
conditions (zero to four illusory squares), which allowed us to explore early cortical 
contributions to object individuation in the absence of other confounding physical variables 
(e.g., changes in hue or luminance as a function of numerosity). We observed that the 
number of attended targets modulated EEG activity as early as 100 ms post-stimulus 
onset. This finding suggests that object individuation occurs early in the visual information 
processing hierarchy for attended targets (Johannes, Münte, Heinze, & Mangun, 1995). In 
the fMRI experiment, we also found evidence of individuation in sensory processing 
regions of visual cortex (V2 and extrastriate visual areas). Specifically, activity in these 
areas discriminated between conditions in which two or three targets were individuated, 
relative to no objects, and between conditions of low (one target) and high (three targets) 
individuation load. We speculate that activity within these brain areas reflects the source of 
the set-size-modulation of the P1 observed in our EEG experiment. 
We also found evidence that unattended, task-irrelevant items are individuated, but 
that this operation has a later temporal signature than that for attended objects; 
specifically, the number of unattended non-targets only modulated the N2 component, not 
the P1. These findings show, for the first time, that distractor objects are indeed 
individuated, but not at the same time point or in the same manner attended targets. This 
suggests a key role of attention in the timecourse of operations involved in the registration 
of stimuli as distinct objects, and is consistent with attentive accounts of object 
individuation (Kahneman et al., 1992; Xu & Chun, 2009), and previous studies 
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demonstrating the influence of attention on subitizing (e.g., Ansari et al., 2007; Cavanagh 
& Alvarez, 2005; Vetter et al., 2010). Crucially though, here we show the time window at 
which this effect arises. Specifically, when we considered the lateralised difference in N2 
amplitude, we found the N2pc component decreased in negativity with non-target 
numerosity, which contrasted with the positive linear relationship between target 
numerosity and N2pc amplitude observed for attended objects. This latter result is 
consistent with previous ERP studies of subitizing (e.g., Ester et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 
2013). Although our study was not designed to directly assess interactions between the 
individuation of targets and distractors, the differing N2pc patterns observed for each 
might reflect that distractor individuation depends on the number of targets that must be 
concurrently individuated. This interpretation is consistent with this operation being 
severely capacity-limited (Pylyshyn, 1994; Xu & Chun, 2009). Given that an fMRI study by 
Jeong and Xu (2013) found evidence of distractor individuation under low, but not high, 
target encoding loads, one would predict that N2pc amplitude might interact in a similar 
way.  
The time window (P1, 100-140 ms) in which we observed evidence for object 
individuation is much earlier than has been previously reported in subitizing studies. For 
example, Hyde and Spelke (2009, 2012) had participants passively view a variable 
number of dots within a small (1, 2, 3) or large set size (8, 16, 24). These authors 
observed a negative-going potential that peaked 139-199 ms after stimulus onset, and that 
increased with target numerosity for small set sizes (i.e., within the subitizing range), but 
not large set sizes. This finding suggests that object individuation occurs within the first 
200 ms after stimulus onset. However, this conclusion was challenged by Mazza et al. 
(2013), who found no effect of numerosity when targets appeared amongst distractors, 
which effectively equated the total number of visual elements across numerosities (see 
also, Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012; Libertus, Woldorff, & Brannon, 2007). But, the conclusions 
of Mazza et al. (2013) are not definitive, as low-level properties of the displays differed 
between individuation loads in this study (the targets were defined as a unique colour 
relative to distractor items). We overcame this issue by implementing a novel paradigm in 
which all sensory properties were balanced across target conditions, yet the number of 
separate target objects (illusory squares) could be systematically manipulated across 
trials. In addition, we found converging evidence for an early onset of this individuation 
effect in Experiment 3, in which the number of target objects could be decoded in V2 and 
extrastriate visual areas.  
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It is worth noting an ERP study by Anderson, Vogel, and Awh (2013), in which 
target numerosity was also manipulated under conditions that kept the physical input 
constant. In this study, participants were presented with a target display containing two 
pairs of circular inducers with a square gap missing from one side. Inducers in both pairs 
were either oriented toward each other to form an illusory rectangle (the ‘grouped’ 
condition) or oriented randomly (the ‘ungrouped’ condition). Participants’ task was to 
remember the orientation of each individual inducer (i.e., the illusory shape itself was task-
irrelevant). Anderson et al. found that N2pc amplitude was reduced in the grouped relative 
to the ungrouped condition. Similar findings have been reported using fMRI, in which 
individuation-related brain regions are less active for grouped objects than ungrouped 
objects, suggesting that grouping cues can enhance the amount of information encoded in 
memory (Xu, 2008; Xu & Chun, 2007). In the present study, the illusory contours formed 
additional target items and were therefore integral, rather than incidental, to participants’ 
task. Put differently, our results reflect a measure of the number of perceived objects, 
rather than a measure of the number of physical objects under grouped or ungrouped 
contexts. 
In conclusion, we have shown that object individuation of attended items arises 100 
ms after stimulus onset (P1), suggesting that this operation occurs earlier in the visual 
information processing hierarchy then previously proposed. Our ERP evidence was 
corroborated by fMRI results, which showed that the number of attended targets could be 
decoded in early visual cortex, including V2 and extrastriate visual areas (V3-V5). 
Moreover, we found that unattended items are individuated, but at a later time point (N2), 
demonstrating that selective attention impacts the temporal dynamics of individuation. 
These findings extend our earlier fMRI work (Naughtin et al., in press; Naughtin et al., 
2013) by showing evidence of object individuation in brain areas that are earlier in the 
visual processing hierarchy than previously explored. Collectively, by controlling for low-
level visual differences between numerosity conditions, and employing neuroimaging 
techniques with high temporal (EEG) and spatial (fMRI) resolution, we have uncovered 
differences in the temporal dynamics associated with the individuation of attended and 
unattended objects, and have demonstrated the role of early sensory brain regions in this 
operation. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Summary of Research Findings 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine the cognitive and systems-level neural 
mechanisms involved in registering objects as distinct events across time and space. 
Specifically, I explored the brain regions that support spatio-temporal object individuation, 
at initial perceptual stages of information processing and those involved in encoding, 
maintenance and retrieval stages of visual short-term memory. In addition, I investigated 
how object individuation interacts with identification processes in the brain, and the 
timecourse associated with this operation. These research questions were addressed 
using a range of behavioural paradigms and neuroimaging techniques (with multiple 
analytic approaches). 
The study reported in Chapter 2 (Naughtin, Tamber-Rosenau, & Dux, 2013) had 
two key aims: To isolate the brain regions that are involved in successfully individuating 
objects during perception on the basis of temporal information alone, and the neural 
consequences that arise when individuation reaches its capacity limit (as reflected in 
repetition blindness, RB). During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
participants completed a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task designed to elicit RB 
– a reduced ability to report the second of two repeated items when they appear close 
together in time. RB is hypothesised to reflect a failure of object individuation, such that 
the second repeated item is not registered as a separate occurrence to the first, and 
hence does not enter consciousness. It has been proposed that this failure of perceptual 
awareness arises due to a temporal limit in the number of distinct items (tokens) that can 
be linked with the same identity representation (type; see also, Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, 
1987; Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009).  
I compared correct and incorrect instances on repeated and non-repeated trial 
types to isolate temporal individuation and RB. For temporal individuation, I found that 
trials where observers correctly reported the appearance of a repetition (high individuation 
load) compared with those in which they correctly reported a non-repetition (low 
individuation load) elicited distinct patterns of activity across a large set of occipital, frontal 
and parietal brain regions. This finding suggests that temporal individuation relies upon a 
wide range of ‘lower-level’ perceptual and ‘higher-level’ attentional and executive brain 
regions. The distributed nature of this activation pattern is in line with existing models of 
consciousness (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), which argue that a diffuse set of brain regions contributes to 
processes that give rise to awareness. Second, in response to the capacity limits of 
individuation, I found the left premotor cortex was more active to missed than to seen 
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repetitions, suggesting that this region is implicated in the processing limitations that give 
rise to RB. Collectively, the results reported in Chapter 2 provide the first indication of the 
neural substrates of temporal individuation and RB.  
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 explored the extent to which object 
individuation and object identification draw on overlapping neural substrates during 
encoding, maintenance and retrieval stages of visual short-term memory (Naughtin, 
Mattingley, & Dux, in press). According to the neural object file theory (Xu, 2009; Xu & 
Chun, 2009), object individuation and identification are underpinned by distinct brain 
regions; the inferior intra-parietal sulcus (IPS) is involved in the former, and the superior 
IPS and lateral occipital complex in the latter. To test this proposed neural dissociation at 
the level of encoding and beyond, I scanned participants using fMRI while they viewed 
displays consisting of one shape, four identical shapes or four different shapes. 
Participants were instructed to remember the location and identity of these items over a 
relatively long retention interval to isolate the different short-term memory stages.  
Using the same comparisons as Xu (2009), brain regions involved in individuation 
were defined as those that distinguished between one object and four identical objects 
(reflecting changes in the number of objects only). On the other hand, identification areas 
were characterised as being sensitive to differences between four identical versus four 
different objects (reflecting changes in the number of object identities only). Consistent 
with Xu and Chun’s (2009; Xu, 2009) proposal that individuation and identification have 
distinct neural substrates, I found some brain regions that were uniquely responsive to one 
of these operations. However, this hypothesis did not hold across all the brain regions 
examined, as other areas reflected both processes. This overlap between brain regions 
involved in individuation and identification processes was evident in both lower- and 
higher-level cortical areas, either at the same or different stages of visual short-term 
memory. These findings challenge the dissociation proposed by Xu and Chun in the neural 
object file theory, and instead implicate a common set of brain regions in object 
individuation and identification. In addition, the distributed neural areas implicated in 
spatial individuation in Chapter 3 are consistent with the temporal individuation results 
reported in Chapter 2 (Naughtin et al., 2013). 
The experiments presented in Chapter 4 aimed to characterise the timecourse of 
object individuation to determine the stage of processing at which this operation arises for 
attended and unattended items, and the extent to which it draws on early sensory brain 
areas. This study was motivated by previous work that had linked the N2pc component 
with subitizing – the ability to rapidly and accurately enumerate a small set of items, which 
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draws heavily on individuation processes (Piazza, Fumarola, Chinello, & Melcher, 2011; 
Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Typically, increasing the number of individuated objects within the 
subitizing range (up to four items) enhances N2pc amplitude (e.g., Ester, Drew, Vogel, & 
Awh, 2012; Mazza, Pagano, & Caramazza, 2013; Pagano, Lombardi, & Mazza, 2014), an 
event-related potential that is often linked with shifts of spatial attention (Jolicœur, Brisson, 
& Robitaille, 2008; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). Evidence for the same set-size modulation at 
earlier event-related potentials is mixed (Hyde & Spelke, 2009, 2012; Mazza et al., 2013), 
however, and these conclusions were hindered by the fact that manipulations of object 
individuation load (i.e., the number of target items) was confounded with other low-level 
visual factors (e.g., the total number of visual elements, hue, luminosity, etc.). Moreover, 
theoretical accounts differ in terms of whether object individuation arises pre-attentively 
(Pylyshyn, 1994), or at later attentive stage of processing (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992; Xu & Chun, 2009), but this is yet to be directly tested (but also see, Jeong & Xu, 
2013). I explored the temporal dynamics of individuation are influenced by selective 
attention by comparing the timecourses associated with the individuation of task-relevant 
and irrelevant objects. 
To explore the timecourse of object individuation, I recorded 
electroencephalography (EEG) during a novel enumeration paradigm, in which 
participants had to individuate up to four target items (i.e., within the subitizing range). 
Importantly, this task removed low-level visual differences between numerosity conditions 
by using illusory targets created by identical inducing stimuli. Both the P1 (sensory 
processing) and N2 (perceptual encoding) components reflected the number of attended 
targets, whereas the number of unattended non-targets was only evident at the level of the 
N2. Convergent evidence for the early locus of target-related individuation was found 
using fMRI. Activity in early visual areas, including V2, varied as a function of the number 
of individuated targets. I hypothesised that these early visual areas might have generated 
the P1 effect observed for attended targets in the EEG experiment. These findings 
suggest that object individuation occurs at an early stage of information processing. 
Furthermore, as unattended items are individuated at a later stage of analysis, this 
suggests that voluntary spatial attention modulates the timecourse of this operation. 
 
Implications of Research Findings 
 As noted above, the findings reported in Chapters 2 and 3 – which demonstrate that 
the neural substrates for object individuation are distributed across the brain – have 
important implications for the dominant cognitive-neuroscientific account of object 
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individuation (Xu & Chun, 2009). Xu and Chun have proposed a key role of the inferior IPS 
in object individuation, and that this brain area is distinct from of those that support object 
identification, and vice versa. The present data, however, suggest that object individuation 
and identification are distributed and overlapping processes in the brain. It is important to 
note that this neural overlap does not necessarily suggest that these two cognitive 
processes interact directly, but rather that activity associated with individuation and 
identification can be detected in common brain regions. Support for the hypothesis that 
individuation and identification might draw on common resources, however, comes from 
behavioural experiments that have shown that these two operations can interfere with 
each other. For example, Piazza et al. (2011) found the number of separate identities held 
in memory correlates with, and can impair (in a dual-task setting), the number of items that 
observers can simultaneously subitize. Thus, future theoretical work on object 
individuation and its neural bases will need to consider this process from a systems-level 
approach, beyond the current focal regions it is implicated in, and account for how it 
relates to identification operations. 
 It is worth noting the large number of regions of interest and multiple analytic 
approaches used in the fMRI investigations reported in this thesis. In previous studies, 
object individuation was only ever probed in three regions across the occipital and parietal 
lobes, which restricted the search for the neural substrates of this process to these brain 
areas. This type of ‘divide and conquer’ approach is not uncommon in cognitive 
neuroscience because it is focused and hypothesis-driven, but it does come with the risk 
of possibly missing the involvement of a larger set of brain areas (see, Vickery, Chun, & 
Lee, 2011). Moreover, evidence of object individuation was previously only assessed on 
the basis of gross changes in blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) amplitude (that is, a 
conventional univariate analysis approach). But univariate, activation-based analyses are 
only one way to assess changes in BOLD signals across experimental conditions. By 
employing a multivariate approach – specifically, multi-voxel pattern analysis – along with 
univariate analyses, I was able to identify brain regions displaying both relative differences 
in their level of activation, as well as others with distinct activity patterns, in response to the 
experimental manipulations (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006; Tong & Pratte, 2012). 
The combination of these multiple analytic approaches afforded a more thorough 
exploration of the extent to which a given cognitive operation is reflected in the brain. 
 The experiments presented in this thesis employed a range of behavioural 
paradigms to investigate object individuation: Repetition blindness (Chapter 2), visual 
short-term memory (Chapter 3) and enumeration (Chapter 4). It is important to study 
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cognitive processes using a variety of approaches, as this allows one to demonstrate that 
effects generalise and are not simply a reflection of a specific stimulus-response pairing. 
These paradigms likely tapped different aspects of individuation, such as the specific 
stage of processing, but they nonetheless help form a coherent picture of this operation. 
For instance, while the RB paradigm likely tapped an early perceptual locus of 
individuation, and the visual short-term memory paradigm probably reflected later stages, 
the regions implicated in object individuation largely overlapped. This consistency 
suggests the involvement of a common individuation mechanism across both tasks. 
Furthermore, a recent review of electrophysiological work by Anderson, Vogel, and Awh 
(2014) suggests a similar task-independent relationship between the N2pc component and 
subitizing. These authors propose that what is common across these tasks is an 
individuation mechanism that determines the capacity of subsequent processing stages. 
Object individuation could therefore act as a core gating mechanism for a range of 
cognitive operations in vision. 
 The results presented in this thesis raise important considerations for how object 
individuation is operationalized. A standard approach for manipulating object individuation 
load is to vary the physical number of items (e.g., Xu, 2009) or number of distinct-coloured 
items in a display (e.g., Ester et al., 2012; Mazza et al., 2013); the more target items there 
are, the higher the individuation load. For example, Mazza et al. (2013) used displays that 
consisted of a variable number of red shapes (targets) presented among green shapes 
(distractors). The problem with these types of tasks is that they confound changes related 
to object individuation with numerous other low-level stimulus factors (e.g., the total 
amount of visual information, hue, luminosity, etc.). I ruled out the influence of such factors 
using various approaches in this thesis. For instance, in Chapter 2, I conducted an 
additional control analysis on conditions that differed in stimulus properties (e.g., repeated 
scenes versus non-repeated scenes), but kept individuation load constant. Despite the fact 
that this stimulus control analysis was substantially more powerful than the key analysis 
that manipulated temporal individuation load, I did not find any significant decoding in the 
control analysis, as predicted. I addressed this issue more directly in Chapter 4 by 
developing a paradigm that eliminates these visual confounds entirely by using illusory 
target stimuli. The physical stimuli were therefore constant across all numerosity 
conditions, meaning that any early perceptual effects could not have been driven by lower-
level sensory properties. This paradigm presents a novel way to isolate and manipulate 
object individuation. 
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Future Research Directions 
 The experiments reported in Chapter 2 used RB as a measure of the temporal 
capacity limits of object individuation, but there are other paradigms that might also tap a 
similar processing limit. One of these phenomena is object substitution masking (OSM). In 
the standard task used to elicit this effect, an array of items is presented (e.g., circles with 
a gap on one side). A four-dot mask is presented around one of the items and this item is 
denoted as the target. The critical manipulation is the offset of the four-dot mask: The 
mask either offsets simultaneously with the entire array, or is delayed relative to the rest of 
the stimulus array. Participants are typically poorer at reporting the target item when the 
mask’s offset is delayed, relative to when it is simultaneous, with the target (the OSM 
effect), and this deficit is thought to reflect a failure of perceptual consciousness (Di Lollo, 
Enns, & Rensink, 2000). According to Lleras and Moore (2003; Moore & Lleras, 2005), 
when the target and mask first appear together, a token is created for their spatial location. 
Relevant featural information for both items is then linked to this single representation. 
When the target offsets and the mask remains on the screen, however, the object 
representation is updated such that it now only includes the featural information 
corresponding to the mask. Thus, the necessary target information does not reach 
awareness and is no longer available for conscious report.  
Whereas RB represents a failure to individuate two targets as distinct items, OSM 
reflects an inability to individuate a target as a distinct item from its mask. This account by 
Lleras and Moore is similar to that proposed in Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink’s (2000) re-
entrant theory. Di Lollo et al. argue that when the target and mask first appear together, a 
fleeting representation of this combined stimulus is created in lower-level brain areas and 
then fed forward to higher anterior brain regions for further processing and consolidation. 
Because of the brief nature of the stimulus exposure, the initial representation sent to 
anterior brain areas is coarse and incomplete and, via re-entrant processing, must be 
checked against information present in lower-level areas to develop a more durable 
representation. If the mask remains on screen after the target has offset, however, there 
will be a mismatch between the representations present in lower areas (mask alone) and 
higher areas (combined mask and target). Thus, the initial representation is substituted 
with the new representation, effectively discarding any information about the target. Like 
this account of Di Lollo et al., Lleras and Moore suggest that the initial mask-target 
representation is updated to include only mask information, but they provide more detail 
about the specific manner in which the mask gets substituted for the target (Guest, 
Gellatly, & Pilling, 2012).  
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Future research could investigate whether RB and OSM tap the same capacity 
limits of individuation at the behavioural level and, if that is the case, how this overlap is 
reflected in the brain. It would also be interesting to examine how limitations of object 
individuation relate to other perceptual deficits like the attentional blink. At least 
behaviourally, the evidence suggests that RB and the attentional blink can be dissociated 
(Chun, 1997; Dux & Marois, 2007; Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1997), but these two 
processing limitations are yet to be examined concurrently in the brain. The results from 
Chapter 2 suggest that the attentional blink and RB might have dissociable neural 
substrates, but the tasks used in this experiment and those used to investigate the 
attentional blink (e.g., Marois, Yi, & Chun, 2004) are too dissimilar to make any strong 
conclusions. This research question could be addressed directly using a single paradigm 
that can elicit both deficits, like the RSVP tasks used by Chun (1997) and Dux and Marois 
(2007). 
 Experiments described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 implicate a widespread network of 
brain areas in object individuation, but it is unclear how these areas are coordinated, or 
whether they form a single network or multiple networks. Future research could therefore 
investigate functional relationships between brain areas during object individuation. The 
use of connectivity analysis techniques, such as psychophysiological interactions (Friston 
et al., 1997), dynamic causal modelling (Friston, Li, Daunizeau, & Stephan, 2011), 
independent component analysis (Hyvarinen, 1999) or Granger causality (Granger, 1969), 
would provide insights into how information is transferred between individuation regions, 
and which brain regions directly or indirectly influence each other.  
For example, it would be interesting to explore the dynamics of the object 
individuation network across different processing stages. The findings from Chapter 3 
suggest that brain regions that reflect individuation vary across encoding, maintenance 
and retrieval stages of visual short-term memory, suggesting that different brain regions 
might be active depending on specific processing demands. The use of connectivity 
analyses could also shed light on how brain regions associated with object individuation 
are related to those involved in object identification. Gazzaley, Rissman and D’Esposito 
(2004) have used this approach to examine the functional relationship between brain 
regions during working memory maintenance. These authors found that activity in a 
distributed network of frontal, parietal, occipitotemporal and subcortical areas was 
significantly correlated with responses in the fusiform face area (defined as the seed 
region) during the maintenance period. These findings not only implicate a distributed set 
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of brain regions in working memory maintenance, but also demonstrate the functional 
connections within this network. 
 The experiments presented in this thesis focused on the relationship between 
functional changes in the human brain and object individuation, but it is also highly likely 
that structural brain characteristics are linked with this cognitive operation. Indeed, 
structural differences might help determine why some people have a larger individuation 
capacity than others (for an example of such individual differences, see Piazza et al., 
2011). One avenue for future research would be to examine the role of white matter 
integrity in individuation. Because the global workspace model of consciousness 
implicates a distributed network of brain regions that communicate with each other via 
long-range connections (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001), one might predict that conscious awareness should depend upon white 
matter integrity (Reuter et al., 2009). In support of this hypothesis, Reuter et al. (2009) 
found that patients with multiple sclerosis – an autoimmune disorder that is characterised 
by damage to white matter fibres (Au Duong, Audoin, et al., 2005; Au Duong, Boulanouar, 
et al., 2005; Cader, Cifelli, Abu-Omar, Palace, & Matthews, 2006) – required a longer 
delay between the onset of a target and subsequent mask before they could consciously 
report it. In addition, white matter density has been associated with the development of 
working memory capacity (Klingberg, 2006), and normal age-related declines in working 
memory performance (Kennedy & Raz, 2009). Given the associations between structural 
differences in white matter tracts and these cognitive operations, future work could explore 
the relationship between structure (e.g., white matter integrity) and object individuation 
performance. This research question could be addressed either using diffusion tensor 
imaging to measure white fibre tracts in healthy adults, or by testing clinical populations 
who show declines in white matter density. 
Future work might further explore the nature of distractor-related individuation. 
Findings from Chapter 4 suggest that distractors that appear in unattended spatial 
locations can be individuated, but that this process occurs at a later stage than that for 
attended stimuli. Although these results suggest that selective attention mechanisms play 
a role in object individuation (Kahneman et al., 1992; Xu & Chun, 2009), it is unclear 
whether distractor-related individuation can be eliminated completely. Does object 
individuation operate in an automatic, pre-attentive manner, as was originally proposed by 
Pylyshyn (1989), such that objects outside the focus of attention are spontaneously 
indexed for further analysis? Results from Jeong and Xu (2013) suggest that distractors 
can be individuated automatically, but only when there is a small number of targets to be 
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encoded. Specifically, even when locations of upcoming targets are pre-cued (to direct 
attention to relevant locations; Posner, 1980), the inferior IPS is more active to targets in 
the presence of distractors than to targets alone. Here activity in the inferior IPS was taken 
as a proxy for object individuation processes, and thus, these findings do not characterise 
the nature of this operation in other brain regions; nor does fMRI provide the necessary 
temporal resolution to detect whether an attentional cue influences the timecourse of 
distractor-related individuation. Future work could use the paradigm introduced in Chapter 
4, with an additional cueing component, to explore whether the timecourse of distractor-
related individuation is influenced when attention is pre-cued to target locations, and how 
such pre-cueing affects the corresponding neural processes. 
 
Conclusions 
 Object individuation is an important cognitive process that allows an observer to 
effectively parse discrete stimuli in a visual scene, so that these representations can 
undergo further featural analysis. In this thesis, I found that both the temporal and spatial 
components of individuation can be detected across a common, distributed set of cortical 
regions, some of which overlap with identification processes. I also found that object 
individuation occurs relatively early in visual processing, and that selective attention plays 
a role in determining which items are indexed in this process. Overall, the results 
presented here provide novel insights into how object individuation is implemented in the 
human brain, the neural consequences that arise when its capacity limits are exceeded, 
and its temporal dynamics. 
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doi:10.1152/jn.00534.2013.—Individuation refers to individuals’ use of
spatial and temporal properties to register an object as a distinct
perceptual event relative to other stimuli. Although behavioral studies
have examined both spatial and temporal individuation, neuroimaging
investigations of individuation have been restricted to the spatial
domain and at relatively late stages of information processing. In this
study we used univariate and multivoxel pattern analyses of functional
magnetic resonance imaging data to identify brain regions involved in
individuating temporally distinct visual items and the neural conse-
quences that arise when this process reaches its capacity limit (repe-
tition blindness, RB). First, we found that regional patterns of blood
oxygen level-dependent activity in a large group of brain regions
involved in “lower-level” perceptual and “higher-level” attentional/
executive processing discriminated between instances where repeated
and nonrepeated stimuli were successfully individuated, conditions
that placed differential demands on temporal individuation. These
results could not be attributed to repetition suppression, stimulus or
response factors, task difficulty, regional activation differences,
other capacity-limited processes, or artifacts in the data or analy-
ses. Consistent with the global workplace model of consciousness,
this finding suggests that temporal individuation is supported by a
distributed set of brain regions, rather than a single neural corre-
late. Second, conditions that reflect the capacity limit of individ-
uation (instances of RB) modulated the amplitude, rather than
spatial pattern, of activity in the left hemisphere premotor cortex.
This finding could not be attributed to response conflict/ambiguity
and likely reflects a candidate brain region underlying the capacity-
limited process that gives rise to RB.
individuation; consciousness; repetition blindness; multivoxel pattern
analysis; attention
BEHAVIOR IS SHAPED by how individuals perceive their external
environment. Because our environment provides far too much
sensory information for all of it to be processed up to aware-
ness, we rely on selective attention mechanisms to reduce the
overwhelming amount of available information to a manage-
able set of relevant items and/or sources (Pashler 1998).
Merely attending to sensory information, however, does not
guarantee that it will reach awareness or impact behavior,
because such information needs to be encoded in relation to the
observer’s preexisting rules, goals, and knowledge (Cohen et
al. 2012).
In vision, a key operation implicated in successful object
encoding is “individuation,” the process by which observers
use spatial and temporal episodic cues to determine where and
when an object appeared (e.g., Chun 1997; Kahneman et al.
1992; Mitroff et al. 2007; Pylyshyn 1989, 1994; Xu and Chun
2009). This process is crucial for registering individual items as
distinct perceptual events and is thought to underlie observers’ im-
paired ability to discriminate between separate occurrences of
objects with the same identity relative to those with different
identities (Kanwisher 1987). Although observers show capac-
ity limits associated with individuating items across both
time and space (e.g., Kanwisher 1991; Kanwisher and Potter
1989; Luo and Caramazza 1995, 1996), and previous studies
have begun to identify the neural correlates of spatial
individuation (e.g., Jeong and Xu 2013; Xu 2009; Xu and
Chun 2006, 2007), no study has identified the neural sub-
strates underlying temporal individuation. In the present
study we used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to investigate the brain regions and mechanisms that
are involved in the successful individuation of temporally
distinct objects during encoding and how disruptions to this
process are represented in the brain.
Initial fMRI investigations into individuation have identified
a candidate brain area that might store individuated object
representations in visual short-term memory (Jeong and Xu
2013; Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2006, 2007). Specifically, Xu
(2009) found that activity in the inferior intraparietal sulcus
(IPS) was sensitive to the number of previously individuated
items, regardless of the overall number of perceptual features.
This finding suggested that the inferior IPS is involved in
storing spatially individuated items and that activity in this
region could be dissociated from that in other regions involved
in storing object identities. On the basis of their findings, Xu
and Chun (2009) proposed the “neural object-file” account,
which argues that object individuation is supported by the
inferior IPS.
Although Xu and colleagues’ investigations suggest a neural
basis for spatial individuation, their work focused on a few
posterior brain regions and did not explore the contributions of
other “higher-level” brain areas. Since recent models of con-
sciousness propose that awareness involves a distributed set of
psychological processes and neural substrates (Baars and
Franklin 2003; Dehaene et al. 2003; Sergent and Dehaene
2004), individuation could be underpinned by a more diffuse
group of regions. In addition, the inferior IPS appears to store
individuated representations, yet storage reflects the conse-
quences of individuation rather than the generation of such
representations. Here, we are interested in the brain regions
that are involved in actively individuating an object during
encoding. To address this issue, we directly compared 1)
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conditions that place high or low demands on temporal indi-
viduation processes during encoding and 2) conditions of
successful vs. unsuccessful registration of identical stimuli. To
explore the possible role of a more diverse set of regions, our
analyses compared changes in blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) activity across a wide set of cortical areas.
We employed the repetition blindness (RB) phenomenon to
investigate temporal individuation. RB refers to the finding that
observers are poorer at reporting two targets embedded in a
rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) if they have the same
identity, relative to different identities (Kanwisher 1987; Park
and Kanwisher 1994). Kanwisher’s (1987) prominent account
of RB argues that token information (spatiotemporal properties
of an object) for the second target cannot be bound to its type
representation (featural and conceptual properties of an object)
when it activates the same type as the first target within a short
space of time. RB does not reflect a failure to create a type or
token for a repeated item, but rather reflects a limitation
associated with binding these two representations for conscious
report. This deficit is thought to reflect a capacity limit of
individuation, because it is strongest when the two targets
appear within close temporal or spatial proximity (e.g., Chun
1997; Kanwisher 1987). Kanwisher’s account views RB as a
perceptual phenomenon, yet other models propose that RB has
a later locus, reflecting a retrieval bias or failure (Fagot and
Pashler 1995; Whittlesea and Masson 2005). However, be-
cause RB has been observed in tasks that have very low memory
demands or require immediate responses, there appears to be a
significant perceptual component to the effect (e.g., Anderson and
Neill 2002; Dux and Marois 2007; Johnston et al. 2002).
We therefore used a RB paradigm to vary the trial-level
demands of successfully individuating two sequentially pre-
sented stimuli as distinct items by manipulating whether the
critical items had the same or different identities. This ap-
proach allowed us to investigate two novel questions: First, can
temporal individuation be localized to a single brain region
(see Jeong and Xu 2013; Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2006, 2007),
or does this process arise from widespread encoding through-
out the brain, as suggested by recent models of consciousness
(Baars and Franklin 2003; Dehaene et al. 2003; Sergent and
Dehaene 2004)? We expected that activity in brain regions
involved in temporal individuation would be modulated by the
demands placed on this process, whereby it is more demanding
to successfully individuate repeated stimuli than nonrepeated
stimuli. Second, what neural consequences arise when de-
mands exceed the capacity limit of the individuation process,
as reflected by the behavioral RB deficit? We predicted the
brain areas that underpin capacity limits that lead to RB would
respond differently under conditions where two repeated stim-
uli were successfully detected compared with when they were
not.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 16 volunteers for 2 behavioral experiments (n  6
and 10, respectively; 2 males in each) and 28 volunteers for an fMRI
experiment (12 males). The mean ages for participants in the 3
experiments were 26.0 (SD 5.2), 18.8 (SD 1.0), and 23.8 (SD 3.7) yr,
respectively. Participants were compensated for their time with course
credit or payment. Data from five participants were excluded from the
fMRI experiment due to excessive head motion (motion 4 mm/deg
in any translational direction or rotation, respectively; henceforth, n
23). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Four
participants from the first behavioral experiment also participated in
the fMRI experiment. The University of Queensland Ethics Commit-
tee approved the protocol for all the experiments.
Stimuli
The stimulus set used in all the experiments consisted of 56 indoor
and 56 outdoor scenes and scrambled versions of each scene (Marois
et al. 2004). All stimuli were presented in grayscale and subtended
11.8° 11.8° of visual angle at the viewing distance of 57 cm outside
the scanner (scene stimuli measured 6.5° 6.5° of visual angle inside
the scanner, viewed from a distance of 90 cm). In the fMRI experi-
ment, we also used 18 photographs of faces from the NimStim face
database (Tottenham et al. 2009) for the localizer task. Face stimuli
were presented in grayscale and subtended 5.2° 6.5° of visual angle
inside the scanner. Experiments were programmed in MATLAB with
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997).
Behavioral Experiments
Long intertrial interval RB experiment. We first developed an RB
paradigm optimized for fMRI (Fig. 1). This paradigm was based on
similar studies that have used pictures or novel objects as stimuli (e.g.,
Coltheart et al. 2005; Harris and Dux 2005a, 2005b). The purpose of
the first behavioral experiment was to assess whether our protocol
could elicit the standard RB behavioral effect. Each trial began with
a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by an RSVP stream consisting
of a forward scrambled scene mask, three sequentially presented intact
scenes (first critical scene, C1; distractor scene; second critical scene,
C2), and a backward scrambled scene mask (100 ms/item). We
manipulated “scene repetition” within participants such that both
critical scenes had either the same identity (repeat) or different
identities (nonrepeat). Participants were informed that the distractor
scene would never be the same as C1 or C2.
At the end of the RSVP stream, a blank response screen was
presented for 3 s, followed by an 8-s intertrial interval (ITI; i.e., a slow
event-related fMRI protocol). The participants’ task was to report one
of three response options during the posttrial 3-s window: They could
report that a scene was repeated, no scene was repeated, or only two
scenes were presented (catch trial response; see below). Only response
accuracy was emphasized. We also ran a behavioral experiment using
this RB paradigm without the long ITI (the next trial began immedi-
ately after participants made an untimed response), and the pattern of
results was comparable to the present experiment (reported below).
We chose to use a paradigm in which participants had to detect the
presence of a repetition, rather than identify the critical items, because
this was more appropriate for studying RB in the scanner with scene
stimuli (i.e., responses were forced choice and could be made using a
button box). It should be noted that both detection and identification
approaches have been used to study RB previously (e.g., Hochhaus
and Johnston 1996; Kanwisher et al. 1996; Park and Kanwisher 1994)
and are considered to tap the same individuation processes.
As is standard in behavioral investigations of RB, catch trials
represented 20% of trials to reduce the likelihood of participants
guessing “repeat” on trials where they missed the second repeated
scene (Dux and Coltheart 2008; Harris and Dux 2005a, 2005b). These
trials only contained two different intact scenes in the RSVP stream.
To ensure catch trials lasted for the same duration as repeat and
nonrepeat trials (12 s), we included an additional fixation screen for
100 ms between the response window and ITI (see Fig. 1).
Participants were provided with an instruction sheet outlining the
task and response keys and completed 20 practice trials before the
testing. There were 6 blocks of 25 test trials with an equal number of
repeat and nonrepeat trials. The order of the trial types was random.
500 TEMPORAL INDIVIDUATION
J Neurophysiol • doi:10.1152/jn.00534.2013 • www.jn.org
o
n
 M
arch 23, 2014
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Behavioral experiments were completed on a 20-inch Dell Trinitron
CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 100 Hz using a Macintosh mini
computer.
Lag RB experiment. We conducted a second behavioral experiment
to ensure that our RB paradigm specifically tapped the temporal
capacity limits of individuation. The attentional blink (AB) is a similar
deficit to RB because it too occurs under dual-target RSVP conditions,
is characterized by poorer identification of a second target at short
intertarget intervals (e.g., 200–500 ms), and is thought to reflect a
failure of perceptual awareness (Chun and Potter 1995; Raymond et
al. 1992). The AB, however, occurs under conditions where the two
targets have different identities. Thus, in contrast to RB, the AB
reflects the temporal capacity limits of object identification, rather
than individuation (Chun 1997; see also Dux and Marois 2009). In an
additional behavioral experiment, we confirmed that the observed
differences in detection accuracy on repeat and nonrepeat trials in the
long ITI RB experiment reflected the temporal capacity limits of
individuation, rather than identification.
This lag RB experiment was similar to the first behavioral exper-
iment, except we also manipulated the temporal “lag” between C1 and
C2 (2, 3, 5, or 7 items). Each RSVP stream consisted of 3 intact scenes
(C1, distractor, C2) and 12 scrambled scenes. C1 and the distractor
scene always appeared at the sixth and seventh serial positions,
respectively. C2 would appear immediately following the distractor
scene (lag 2) or after one (lag 3), three (lag 5), or five (lag 7)
intervening items. The lag 2 condition had the same temporal gap
between C1 and C2 that was used in the long ITI RB experiment and
reflects the condition in which the RB deficit is most severe (e.g.,
Kanwisher 1987; Park and Kanwisher 1994). All scrambled scenes
were different. Catch trials were identical to repeat and nonrepeat
trials, except C2 was replaced with a scrambled scene, meaning that
only two intact scenes were presented. Because this version of the RB
paradigm was not used with fMRI, we removed the timed response
window and long ITI. Participants responded when prompted at the
end of the stream. There were 12 practice trials and 6 blocks of 50 test
trials.
fMRI Experiment
In the fMRI experiment, we used the long ITI RB paradigm to
manipulate the conditions under which temporal individuation oc-
curred. BOLD activity in response to this task was measured across
the whole brain, with a focus on a set of lower- and higher-level a
priori regions of interest (ROIs; see below). This paradigm included
200 trials split over 8 event-related runs, with 80 repeat, 80 nonrepeat,
and 40 catch trials. Each run consisted of a 20-s fixation period
followed by 25 RB trials and then a 12-s fixation period. Participants
responded by pressing one of two buttons on a button box in their
right hand for repeat and nonrepeat responses or one button with their
left hand for catch responses. The order of trial types was random, and
the number of trials for each condition was equal across runs.
Localizer task. After the RB runs, participants completed the
localizer task. Participants were presented with separate 20-s blocks of
fixation, face, and scene stimuli. At the beginning of each stimulus
block, a visual cue was presented for 2 s to indicate the block type.
Each block included nine trials in which an intact scene or face was
presented for 1 s, followed by a 1-s ITI. On half the scene and face
blocks, participants were cued to passively view the stimuli (“passive
scene” and “passive face”). On the remaining blocks, participants
were cued to classify the scenes as indoor or outdoor scenes (“task
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the repetition blindness (RB) paradigm. On repeat/nonrepeat trials, participants were presented with a rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) stream consisting of a forward scrambled scene mask, 3 intact scenes (first critical scene, distractor scene, second critical scene), and a
backward scrambled scene mask. The 2 critical scenes were either identical (repeat trial) or different (nonrepeat trial). Only 2 different intact scenes were
presented in the RSVP stream on catch trials. Participants reported whether they saw a scene repeated, no scene repeated, or only 2 scenes during the response
window. ITI, intertrial interval.
501TEMPORAL INDIVIDUATION
J Neurophysiol • doi:10.1152/jn.00534.2013 • www.jn.org
o
n
 M
arch 23, 2014
D
ow
nloaded from
 
scene”) or the faces as male or female (“task face”). This response was
speeded and was made using one of two buttons on a response box in
the left or right hand, respectively.
There were two localizer runs where each consisted of four blocks
of fixation and three blocks of each of the stimulus block types. The
order of the stimulus blocks was random without replacement, and a
fixation block was presented after every four stimulus blocks. An
additional 8-s fixation period was presented at the start and end of
each localizer run.
Data acquisition. Images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Trio
MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany). Participants lay supine in the
scanner and viewed the visual display via rear projection onto a mirror
mounted on a 12-channel head coil. A T1-weighted anatomic image
was collected in the middle of the scanning session using an
MPRAGE sequence [repetition time (TR)  1.9 s, echo time (TE) 
2.32 ms, flip angle (FA)  9°, field of view (FOV)  192  230 
256, resolution  1 mm3]. Functional T2*-weighted images were
acquired parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure
plane using a GRE EPI sequence (TR  2 s, TE  25 ms, FA  90°,
FOV  192  192, matrix  64  64, in-plane resolution  3  3
mm). Each volume consisted of 33 slices (thickness  3 mm,
interslice gap  0.3 mm), providing whole brain coverage. We
synchronized the stimulus presentation with the acquisition of func-
tional volumes. There were 166 and 168 volumes (including 4 dummy
volumes) acquired for each of the event-related and localizer runs,
respectively.
Data analyses. We analyzed our data using Brain Voyager QX
software (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) and custom
MATLAB code.
PREPROCESSING. Data preprocessing included three-dimensional
(3-D) motion correction (where each functional image was aligned to
the first run), slice-scan time correction, and high-pass temporal
filtering (3 cycles per run). All functional images were coregistered to
the anatomic scan and transformed into standardized space (Talairach
and Tourmoux 1988). No spatial smoothing was applied to preserve
fine-grained spatial information for the multivoxel pattern analyses
(MVPA; see below).
REGIONS OF INTEREST. We first isolated a group of 20 ROIs (Table 1).
These regions consisted of perceptual areas involved in processing
scenes (parahippocampal place area, PPA; Epstein et al. 2003) and
objects (lateral occipital complex, LOC; Kourtzi and Kanwisher
2001), regions previously implicated in object individuation and
identification (see Xu 2009), and higher-level attentional/executive
areas associated with capacity limits of information processing (Dux
et al. 2006, 2009; Heekeren et al. 2004; Jiang and Kanwisher 2003;
Marois et al. 2006; Schubert and Szameitat 2003; Szameitat et al.
2002). Given the extensive overlap between the superior parietal
lobule and superior IPS ROIs in the majority of subjects, we collapsed
univariate and multivariate results across these two parietal regions
(denoted as sIPS/SPL); hence, 18 ROIs were examined.
To localize these ROIs in each participant, we submitted data from
the localizer runs to single-participant general linear model voxelwise
analyses using a statistical threshold of q 0.05 (false discovery rate,
FDR). We defined regressors for the fixation, passive face, task face,
passive scene and task scene blocks, which were then convolved with
a double-gamma hemodynamic response function. To isolate the PPA,
we contrasted activity between scene and face blocks. Bilateral PPA
ROIs were identified as active voxels in the anterior section of the
parahippocampal gyrus in the left and right hemisphere (Epstein et al.
2003). To isolate the remaining ROIs, we contrasted activity in the
four stimulus blocks with fixation. We defined the object perception
and attentional/executive ROIs on these statistical maps using mean
Talairach coordinates derived from Xu (2009) and Dux et al. (2009),
respectively, as a guide for establishing the most relevant functionally
defined regions. Each ROI was identified as the cluster of active
voxels that most closely matched the previously established coordi-
nates for that region. If there were two noncontiguous equidistant
activation clusters, we used whichever cluster was still present at a
more stringent threshold. In each region, we only analyzed data from
the event-related runs for participants in which that ROI could be
isolated (see Table 1).
For the univariate analysis, an ROI included all voxels above
statistical threshold surrounding the peak voxel up to a maximum of
6  6  6 mm (8 voxels). For the multivariate analysis, ROIs were
defined by a 15 15 15-mm and 21 21 21-mm cube (125 and
343 voxels, respectively), centered on each individual participant’s
Talairach coordinates of the peak voxel. We used larger ROI sizes in
the multivariate analysis to increase variance across voxels and to be
consistent with other studies that have employed this analytic tech-
nique (e.g., Gallivan et al. 2011; Harrison and Tong 2009; Kamitani
and Tong 2005; Oosterhof et al. 2012). We defined ROIs for the
multivariate analyses using two different sizes to ensure that decoding
results were reliable, regardless of the particular number of voxels
included in the analysis (Spiridon and Kanwisher 2002). We only
report the MVPA results for ROIs defined by a 21  21  21-mm
cube, but our findings were consistent across both ROI sizes unless
otherwise stated.
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS. We first analyzed data from the RB event-
related runs using a standard univariate approach. Time courses for
each condition, ROI (with signal averaged across all voxels in the
ROI), and participant were extracted. Percent signal change was
calculated relative to signal during the volume preceding trial onset.
This baseline was chosen to exclude any potential activity associated
with the previous trial. Individual participant time courses were
averaged across all participants, and we compared differences in peak
amplitude between the experimental conditions. Peak amplitude was
Table 1. Anatomic locations of the ROIs
ROI No. of Participants Talairach Coordinates (x, y, z)
Attentional/executive
IFJ (L) 18 43 (2.4), 8 (2.6), 29 (3.1)
IFJ (R) 20 44 (5.0), 8 (2.9), 28 (2.4)
ACC (Bi) 22 1 (6.7), 11 (3.7), 39 (2.9)
SMFC (Bi) 23 2 (4.2), 3 (4.1), 57 (2.4)
DLPFC (L) 19 33 (3.7), 31 (6.1), 29 (4.8)
DLPFC (R) 15 37 (5.1), 30 (2.6), 28 (4.6)
PMC (L) 21 27 (3.9), 8 (3.2), 50 (4.9)
PMC (R) 21 30 (4.4),6 (4.1), 48 (3.6)
SPL (L) 21 27 (2.8), 56 (3.6), 44 (3.1)
SPL (R) 21 26 (3.0),58 (3.8), 45 (3.1)
Insula (L) 19 33 (4.3), 16 (5.3), 10 (4.0)
Insula (R) 19 34 (4.4), 18 (4.6), 8 (4.0)
Object perception
Inferior IPS (L) 22 28 (4.1), 78 (6.2), 25 (4.7)
Inferior IPS (R) 22 27 (4.0),77 (3.7), 25 (4.0)
Superior IPS (L) 23 26 (3.7), 62 (2.8), 40 (3.8)
Superior IPS (R) 23 26 (3.7),56 (4.9), 44 (3.1)
LOC (L) 23 34 (3.2), 80 (3.4), 13 (3.1)
LOC (R) 22 46 (3.9),59 (4.2), 4 (4.4)
Scene perception
PPA (L) 23 24 (2.1), 42 (2.3),6 (1.7)
PPA (R) 23 24 (1.9),42 (1.7),6 (1.6)
All regions were isolated using data from the localizer task. Attentional/
executive and object perception ROIs were isolated by contrasting activity
between stimuli blocks with fixation. The scene perception ROIs were local-
ized by contrasting activity between scene and face stimuli blocks. No. of
participants data indicates the number of participants for whom an ROI was
successfully identified. Talairach coordinates (x, y, z) represent the mean
Talairach for each brain region with SD in parentheses. IFJ, inferior frontal
junction; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; SMFC, superior medial frontal
cortex; DLPFC, dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; SPL,
superior parietal lobule; sIPS, superior intra-parietal sulcus; iIPS, inferior
intraparietal sulcus; LOC, lateral occipital complex; PPA, parahippocampal
place area. L, left; R, right; Bi, bilateral.
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defined as the averaged signal across time points 4–8 s post-trial
onset. Statistical significance was assessed using repeated-measures
t-tests and a statistical threshold of P 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected for
the 18 regions tested).
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES. To increase the sensitivity of our anal-
ysis, we also analyzed our data using MVPA (Haynes and Rees 2006;
Kamitani and Tong 2005). This analytic approach is more sensitive
than univariate methods because it examines differences in activity
across multiple voxels, rather than each voxel individually. Indeed,
activity within any single voxel might show weak differences between
conditions if only a small proportion of neurons in that voxel code for
information associated with the experimental task. MVPA attempts to
improve the sensitivity of fMRI analysis by pooling these weak, but
reliable, signals across voxels and comparing conditions based on the
resulting ensemble patterns of activity. MVPA was implemented
using custom MATLAB software and a linear support vector machine
binary algorithm (Chang and Lin 2011).
For each voxel in a given ROI, we extracted the average percent
signal change corresponding to the peak of the time course for each
trial (4–8 s post-trial onset). Before each MVPA, data for each voxel
in an ROI were z-transformed and mean-centered by subtracting the
condition mean for the entire ROI from the response in each individ-
ual voxel to control for overall differences in signal amplitude be-
tween conditions (see Esterman et al. 2009; Tamber-Rosenau et al.
2011). We trained a series of binary classifiers to discriminate
between patterns of activity associated with the experimental
conditions using the leave-one-out cross-validation method. In
each fold, one run was used to test the classifier’s generalization
performance and the remaining seven runs were used to train the
classifier. Decoding accuracy for each ROI was averaged across
each cross-validation loop and tested against chance accuracy
(50%) using one-sample t-tests and a statistical threshold of P 
0.05 (Bonferroni corrected for the 18 regions tested). If there is a
functional distinction between pools of neurons within a given ROI
that respond to each condition, then the classifier should be better
than chance at discriminating between patterns of activity on the
test trials (Pereira et al. 2009).
We also performed a searchlight analysis to explore whether other
regions outside our ROIs showed a similar pattern of results to the
ROIs we tested (Kriegeskorte et al. 2006). A spherical searchlight
ROI with a 2-voxel radius (33 voxels) was centered on every voxel of
the volume. We used the same cross-validation classification method
procedure as the ROI analysis to test for information contained in
these local activity patterns. Classification accuracy for each search-
light was assigned to the central voxel and compared against chance
performance to test for significance (q  0.05, FDR).
RESULTS
All statistical analyses were conducted with a two-tailed
alpha level of 0.05, and Bonferroni correction was applied for
multiple comparisons unless otherwise stated.
Behavioral Experiments
Chance performance in the RB task was 33.3%. To first
assess whether our paradigm could elicit the standard RB
behavioral effect, we submitted the mean detection accuracy
data from the long ITI RB experiment to a repeated-measures
t-test. Detection accuracy reflects the percentage of trials in
which participants correctly detected the identity of the two
critical scenes (e.g., a “repeat” response on repeat trials; “non-
repeat” or “2 scene only” responses would be considered
incorrect on this trial). Consistent with other RB studies that
have used a paradigm similar to ours (e.g., Hochhaus and
Johnston 1996; Kanwisher et al. 1996; Park and Kanwisher
1994), participants were significantly less accurate on repeat
trials relative to nonrepeat trials: t(5)  2.93, P  0.033 (see
Fig. 2A). In subsequent experiments conducted in our labora-
tory, we have replicated this RB result using alphanumeric
stimuli, suggesting that this behavioral effect is not specific to
the type of stimulus used. Performance on catch trials was
around chance in this experiment [mean 36.7%, SD 8.2%;
t(5)  1], where participants’ erroneous responses were more
likely to be a nonrepeat response than a repeat response (69.6
vs. 25.2% of errors, respectively; the remaining 5.2% of errors
were absent responses). This proportion and pattern of catch
trial errors are consistent with previous RB studies (Dux and
Coltheart 2008).
Data from the lag RB experiment were used to test whether
our RB paradigm specifically tapped the temporal capacity
limits of individuation, rather than identification. If our para-
digm elicited identification limitations, we expected partici-
pants would be poorer at detecting both repeated and nonre-
peated scenes at shorter temporal lags, relative to longer
temporal lags. On the other hand, deficits in individuation
indicate a specific difficulty in registering two repeated items
as separate items. Thus, if our paradigm only tapped the
temporal capacity limits of individuation, we predicted detec-
tion of repeated scenes alone would be affected by lag.
To assess this, we submitted mean detection accuracy data
from the lag RB experiment to a 2 (scene repetition: repeat,
nonrepeat) by 4 (lag: 2, 3, 5, 7) repeated-measures ANOVA. A
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Fig. 2. Behavioral results from the behavioral
and functional MRI (fMRI) experiments.
A: mean detection accuracy results from the
long ITI RB experiment, separately for repeat
and nonrepeat trials. B: mean detection accu-
racy from the lag RB experiment, separately
for repeat and nonrepeat trials across the 4
temporal lag conditions. C: mean detection
accuracy results from the fMRI experiment,
separately for repeat and nonrepeat trials. Er-
ror bars represent SE of the mean across
participants, and the dashed line indicates
chance performance (33.3%).
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significant main effect was found for both scene repetition
[F(1, 9)  5.51, mean squared error (MSE)  394, P  0.044,
p
2  0.38] and lag [F(3, 27) 4.44, MSE 75, P 0.012, p2
0.33] (see Fig. 2B). Crucially, a significant interaction between
these two factors also emerged [F(3, 27)  6.28, MSE  169,
P  0.002, p2  0.41]. Follow-up t-tests revealed detection
accuracy on repeat trials was significantly reduced at shorter
lags (lags 2 and 3) relative to longer lags (lags 5 and 7)
[t(9)  5.55, P  0.001], but detection accuracy on nonrepeat
trials did not vary with lag [t(9)  1.31, P  0.222]. Thus our
RB paradigm specifically tapped temporal capacity limitations
associated with individuation, rather than identification. These
findings demonstrate that the present paradigm elicited a pure
RB effect that was not confounded by the AB. Similar to the
first behavioral experiment, catch trial performance was no
greater than chance [mean 24.5%, SD 16.2%; t(9) 1.72, P
0.119].
fMRI Experiment
Behavioral performance. A repeated-measures t-test re-
vealed that behavioral performance on the RB task inside the
scanner was consistent with previous behavioral experiments,
whereby detection accuracy was reduced on repeat trials rela-
tive to nonrepeat trials [t(22)  4.72, P  0.001; see Fig. 2C].
In contrast to the behavioral experiments, however, perfor-
mance on catch trials was significantly above chance [mean
46.4%, SD 5.0%; t(22)  2.67, P  0.014], with participants
more likely to make erroneous nonrepeat than repeat responses
(54.0 vs. 27.1% of errors, respectively; the remaining 19.0% of
errors were absent responses). Participants could successfully
complete the task blocks on the localizer runs as behavioral
performance was close to ceiling (means 93.0%, SDs 
1.2%; ts 36.06, Ps 0.001 compared with chance).
Trial types and comparisons. For the fMRI analyses, we
binned repeat and nonrepeat trials into the following condi-
tions: hit (repeat trial, repeat response), miss (repeat trial,
nonrepeat response), correct rejection (nonrepeat trial, nonre-
peat response), and false alarm (nonrepeat trial, repeat re-
sponse). Table 2 displays the average response proportions for
all conditions. Note that catch trials (or repeat/nonrepeat trials
where a “2 scene only” response or no response was made)
were not included in the fMRI analyses because these trials
served only as filler trials to reduce the likelihood of guessing
responses.
To first isolate the brain areas involved in temporally indi-
viduating items during encoding, we compared hit and correct
rejection trials, because these conditions place different de-
mands on individuation. That is, given that repeated stimuli
presented in close temporal proximity are more difficult to
individuate relative to nonrepeated stimuli (Kanwisher 1987),
hit trials should, on average, place greater demands on the
process of temporal individuation, relative to correct rejection
trials. It is important to note that this comparison reflects only
trials on which a correct response was made, and we therefore
know, with some degree of certainty, that the scenes were
successfully individuated in both trial types (although this
process was more demanding in under hit trials). In addition,
this comparison is balanced in terms of reward associated with
making a correct response.
Our second key comparison aimed to identify brain areas
involved in the RB deficit (i.e., regions that may underlie the
capacity limit on temporal individuation). To do this, we
contrasted hit and miss trials, because this comparison reflects
instances where two repeated stimuli are successfully detected
or not. Because RB reflects an inability to bind a second
repeated item’s identity to its token, rather than a failure to
create the second token altogether (Kanwisher 1987; Kan-
wisher et al. 1995; Park and Kanwisher 1994), it was more
appropriate to compare between conditions that reflect a mis-
identification error, rather than trials where participants re-
ported seeing nothing at all (e.g., hits vs. repeated scene/“2
scene only” response trials). Even though this RB comparison
uses trial definitions that are based on a postrun selection of
trials by accuracy, this is a common approach employed in
imaging studies that use RSVP tasks (e.g., Marois et al. 2004).
We tested for differences using both univariate gross amplitude
and multivariate spatial patterns of BOLD activity.
Univariate analyses. For the demands on temporal individ-
uation comparison, we found no significant amplitude differ-
ences between hit and correct rejection trials. This finding
suggests that the amplitude of activity in all of our ROIs was
not modulated by conditions that place differential demands on
temporal individuation. On the other hand, when we compared
between conditions that reflect a capacity limit of temporal
individuation, we found a single region (left hemisphere pre-
motor cortex) that showed significantly greater activity on miss
trials relative to hit trials [t(20)  3.42, P  0.049, corrected
for multiple comparisons; see Fig. 3]. Thus processing in this
region may be involved in RB.
Table 2. Average response proportions to repeat, nonrepeat, and
catch trials in the fMRI experiment
Trial Type
Response
Repeated Nonrepeated Catch Absent Total
Repeat 0.45 (0.11) 0.25 (0.10) 0.05 (0.04) 0.26 (0.13) 1.00
Nonrepeat 0.14 (0.14) 0.58 (0.15) 0.10 (0.08) 0.18 (0.11) 1.00
Catch 0.11 (0.09) 0.28 (0.13) 0.46 (0.23) 0.15 (0.10) 1.00
Values are means (SD).
Time (s)
Fig. 3. Left: the single significant region of interest (ROI) that reflected changes
in gross blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) amplitude for the capacity
limits of temporal individuation. Anatomic image shows individual ROIs from
all participants for whom an ROI could be identified for that given area. L, left
hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; PMC, premotor cortex. Right: because none
of the ROIs showed significant differences in BOLD amplitude between hit
and correct rejection trials (demands on temporal individuation comparison),
the graph only displays the BOLD time course for hit and miss trials for this
region. Error bars denote SE of the mean across participants. Peak amplitude
was taken as the average signal across volumes 4–8 s post-trial onset.
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These gross differences in BOLD amplitude were specific to
the successful individuation of two repeated stimuli, because
none of our ROIs showed any differences in amplitude be-
tween correct and incorrect nonrepeated trials (correct rejec-
tions vs. false alarms; ts  2.16, corrected for multiple com-
parisons Ps  0.809). This result is consistent with behavioral
findings from the lag RB experiment in that it shows that our
paradigm specifically taps processing limitations associated
with the perception of two repeated stimuli, but not two
nonrepeated stimuli (see also Chun 1997). In addition, this
difference in amplitude cannot simply reflect response conflict
or ambiguity, because this same region responded similarly on
hit and false alarm trials (t  1). These trial types showed the
greatest difference in reaction time (1,166 vs. 1,430 ms; al-
though response speed was not emphasized in the task) and
would arguably reflect the greatest difference in response
uncertainty.
Multivariate analyses. We further explored the neural un-
derpinnings of temporal individuation and its capacity limits by
using ROI-based and whole brain searchlight MVPAs. Be-
cause our experimental conditions were jointly determined by
stimulus presentation and participants’ responses, the number
of trials in each condition was not balanced. Unbalanced trials
are particularly problematic for MVPA because this can bias the
classifier toward the more numerous condition, rather than the
actual properties associated with the experimental conditions
(Pereira et al. 2009). To address this issue, we balanced trial
numbers across conditions in both training and testing subsets
by removing a random selection of trials from the more
plentiful condition before the MVPA. Decoding results for the
ROI-based MVPA were averaged across 100 repetitions of this
procedure, and the number of iterations was reduced to 10 for
the searchlight analysis to save computation time. With the use
of this strict balancing method, there was an average of 35
trials in training sets and 5 trials in testing sets in each
cross-validation loop.
ROI-based MVPA. To first identify differences in activity
patterns associated with the demands placed on temporal indi-
viduation, we trained a classifier to discriminate between hit
and correct rejection trials in each of our ROIs. Above-chance
decoding performance for this comparison emerged in 17 of
our 18 ROIs (ts  4.22, Ps  0.010, corrected for multiple
comparisons; see Fig. 4). Although activity in the left hemi-
sphere dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) could be dis-
criminated between these two conditions for the 21-mm ROI
cube, this result did not hold for the 15-mm ROI cube [t(18) 
2.28, P  0.637]. The significant ROIs included both lower-
level areas involved in perceptual processes (e.g., Epstein et al.
2003; Kourtzi and Kanwisher 2001; Xu 2009) and higher-level
executive areas that have previously been associated with other
capacity-limited processes, such as response selection, decision
making, and encoding (e.g., Dux et al. 2006, 2009; Heekeren et
al. 2004; Szameitat et al. 2002; Tombu et al. 2011). In contrast,
the classifier was only able to differentiate between activity
patterns associated with successful and unsuccessful instances
of temporal individuation (hits vs. misses) in the left hemi-
sphere superior IPS/SPL [t(21)  3.58, P  0.031, corrected
for multiple comparisons]. This result, however, did not hold
over changes in ROI size (classification under 15-mm ROI
cube, corrected for multiple comparisons P  1). These mul-
tivariate results therefore suggest that perceptual demands
placed on temporal individuation influence the patterns of
activity across a widely distributed set of brain regions, includ-
ing both lower and higher cortical areas. This finding contrasts
with the single brain region that has previously been associated
with spatial individuation (Xu 2009) in that it suggests that this
process is underpinned by a far more distributed set of areas.
The processing limitations associated with individuation, how-
ever, have no consistent effect on the ensemble patterns of
activity in any region.
Control analyses. We conducted an additional set of control
MVPAs to test whether the distributed differences in activity
patterns associated with hit and correct rejection trials were
driven by other differences that existed between these condi-
tions (i.e., not related to individuation). Because hit and correct
rejection trials showed significant differences in reaction time
[1,166 vs. 1,297 ms; t(22)  4.23, P  0.001], the first control
analysis aimed to assess whether our results could be attributed
to task-related effects such as general difficulty or the amount
of time spent on the task. Using reaction time as a proxy for
task difficulty, we trained classifiers to discriminate between
the two trial types that showed the largest difference in reaction
time: hit (1,166 ms) and false alarm (1,430 ms) trials [t(22) 
5.50, P  0.001]. Significant decoding emerged for this com-
parison in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and right hemi-
sphere LOC (ts  3.46, Ps  0.042, corrected for multiple
comparisons); however, only the ACC result was also observed
for the 15-mm cube [ACC: t(21)  3.94, P  0.014; right
hemisphere LOC: t(21)  2.96, P  0.134]. Results from this
control analysis suggest that, with the possible exception of the
ACC, the distributed patterns of activity associated with the
perceptual demands placed on temporal individuation do not
simply reflect task difficulty or the amount of time spent on the
task. In contrast to the remaining ROIs, the activity patterns in
the ACC likely reflect general task difficulty as opposed to a
specific difficulty associated with individuating two scenes.
Furthermore, the lack of significant results are unlikely to
reflect insufficient power due to the low number of false alarm
trials, because our results from the demands on temporal
individuation comparison held for all previously significant
ROIs (ts  3.29, P  0.078 for left hemisphere inferior frontal
junction; ts  3.48, Ps  0.048 for all other ROIs, both
corrected for multiple comparisons) even when we equated
trial numbers across all trial types, rather than only across the
conditions being compared.
The second set of control analyses tested whether the dif-
ferences in activity patterns associated with temporal individ-
uation reflected purely stimulus- or response-related effects,
since hit and correct rejection conditions differed on both these
factors. To first test for stimulus-related differences in activity,
we decoded patterns of activity associated with repeated and
nonrepeated stimuli, regardless of participants’ responses. For
this analysis, we collapsed across both repeated stimulus (hits
and misses) and nonrepeated stimulus conditions (correct re-
jections and false alarms) to give ourselves the best chance of
detecting any stimulus-related effects if they did indeed exist.
Because we used all four trial types in this analysis, we
balanced trial numbers across all conditions before decoding to
ensure the differences in trial numbers did not affect the
results. No significant decoding emerged between repeated and
nonrepeated stimulus conditions in any region [ts 2.97, Ps
0.126, corrected for multiple comparisons; see Fig. 5], suggest-
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ing that none of our ROIs exclusively coded for stimulus
properties in this experiment.
We also decoded activity patterns associated with repeated
and nonrepeated responses regardless of the stimulus presen-
tation (hits and false alarms vs. misses and correct rejections)
and found these two conditions could be discriminated in 2 of
the 18 ROIs: the right hemisphere PPA and left hemisphere
sIPS/SPL (ts  3.38, Ps  0.048, corrected; see Fig. 5). The
same decoding performance in these regions did not hold
across both ROI sizes, however, suggesting that the response
coding in these regions was not reliable (ts 2.80, Ps 0.189
for 15-mm ROI cube). Thus the widespread differences in
patterns of activity associated with hit and correct rejection
conditions did not appear to be purely stimulus or response
based, but rather reflected an interaction between these stimu-
lus and decision/response factors that would be necessary to
individuate temporally distinct items.
Although our results were not driven by stimulus and re-
sponse factors individually, one could argue that they reflect a
simple stimulus-response interaction, rather than anything spe-
cific to temporal individuation. To provide further support that
our hit vs. correct rejection comparison reflects temporal indi-
viduation demands, rather than some other sort of stimulus-
response interaction, we decoded miss vs. false alarm trials (we
balanced trial numbers in this comparison as well, like all other
analyses). These are both incorrect trials, so we cannot be sure
of the extent to which each critical item was individuated, but
these trials do differ in terms of the stimulus presented and the
response made. Unlike our key analysis of hit vs. correct
rejection, the analysis of miss vs. false alarm revealed signif-
icant decoding in the bilateral LOC only (ts 3.49, Ps .039,
corrected). Importantly, after averaging over decoding values
in all the ROIs, to increase statistical power and counter the
fact that not all subjects showed every ROI (see Table 1), we
found that the overall decoding across the brain for hits vs.
correct rejections was significantly greater than that found for
misses vs. false alarms [t(22)  2.91, P  0.008, uncorrected
because data were averaged across all ROIs]. Collectively,
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Fig. 4. Results from the main multivariate analyses
and task difficulty control analysis. The hit vs.
correct rejection (CR) comparison reflects differ-
ences in the demands placed on temporal individu-
ation (open bars). The hit vs. miss comparison
identifies the neural consequences associated with
the capacity limits of temporal individuation (solid
bars). The hit vs. false alarm (FA) comparison
reflect reaction time differences as a proxy for task
difficulty-related changes in activity patterns
(shaded bars). Chance performance is indicated by
the dashed lines. *P  0.05 reflects greater than
chance performance (corrected for multiple com-
parisons). Error bars represent SE of the mean.
Region abbreviations are as defined in Table 1.
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these results suggest all significant hit vs. correct rejection
ROIs, with the possible exception of the bilateral LOC, reflect
the specific stimulus-response interaction involved in temporal
individuation. As we elaborate on in the DISCUSSION, we pro-
pose that such interactions are facilitated within a distributed
neural framework or “workspace” in which information can be
shared between lower and higher regions (Baars and Franklin
2003; Dehaene et al. 2003; Sergent and Dehaene 2004).
A final control analysis was conducted to ensure that results
from the demands on temporal individuation analysis did not
simply reflect a data artifact that would produce above chance
decoding across the entire brain. To test this, we decoded
activity patterns in two additional control ROIs that predomi-
nantly respond to auditory information rather than visual in-
formation (left and right primary auditory cortices). These
ROIs were anatomically defined as the superior region of the
temporal lobe (Rademacher et al. 2001). We decoded activity
in these areas for the two main comparisons and the task
difficulty control comparison. If decoding performance in the
temporal individuation analysis did indeed reflect the differen-
tial perceptual demands associated with individuating visual
stimuli across time (and not an artifact in the data, task design,
or analysis), the classifier should be no better than chance at
discriminating between hit and correct rejection conditions in
either of these control regions. Consistent with this prediction,
no significant decoding emerged in either of the auditory ROIs
for any of the classifier comparisons, including the demands on
temporal individuation comparison (ts  2.32, Ps  0.544,
corrected for multiple comparisons; Fig. 6).
Searchlight analysis. We conducted a whole brain search-
light analysis to determine if brain regions other than our ROIs
could discriminate between the different demands placed on
temporal individuation. Consistent with our previous ROI-
based MVPA, the searchlight analysis revealed that wide-
spread parts of the brain show distinct activity patterns for hit
compared with correct rejection trials (Fig. 7). The information
map generated from this analysis included all of our ROIs and
provided confirmatory support for the findings that emerged in
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Fig. 5. Results from the stimulus and response
multivariate control analyses. Format is the same as
Fig. 4. To identify purely stimulus-driven changes
in activity patterns, we compared repeated and non-
repeated stimuli trials, regardless of participants’
responses (hit and miss vs. CR and FA; open bars).
Likewise, to isolate purely response-driven changes
in activity patterns, we contrasted instances where
participants made a repeated and nonrepeated re-
sponse, regardless of the stimulus presentation (hit
and FA vs. CR and miss; solid bars).
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our ROI-based MVPA. In addition to these ROIs, we also
found that large parts of the frontal, parietal, and occipital
cortices were sensitive to the conditions under which temporal
individuation occurred. Consistent with our control ROI anal-
ysis, no voxels in the auditory cortices could be reliably
classified, suggesting that our classification results do not
reflect an artifact of the data analyses. We also performed a
searchlight analysis for the RB comparison but found no
significant classification across the entire brain. This finding
further supports the idea that the processing limitations that
lead to RB modulate the amplitude, rather than the patterns, of
BOLD activity.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was twofold. First, we
aimed to examine whether individuation processes could be
localized to a single neural correlate or if this operation tapped
a widely distributed network of brain areas, as has been
proposed in models of consciousness and encoding (Baars and
Franklin 2003; Dehaene et al. 2003; Sergent and Dehaene
2004). Second, we aimed to pinpoint the neural areas involved
in the behavioral RB deficit. To accomplish these goals, we
employed an RB paradigm and a combination of univariate and
multivariate analysis techniques. In response to the first aim,
we found that activity patterns associated with the perception
of two repeated stimuli (which are more demanding to indi-
viduate) and nonrepeated stimuli (which are relatively easy to
individuate) could be successfully discriminated. Critically,
these two conditions reflected correct trials, meaning that we
can be confident that stimuli were successfully individuated on
these trials, although this process was more demanding for
repeated stimuli. Even though these two conditions could not
be distinguished when univariate BOLD amplitude was com-
pared, our multivariate analyses revealed that these conditions
elicited reliably different spatial patterns of activity in the
majority of our ROIs. This set of regions included both lower-
level perceptual and higher-level attentional/executive regions
that covered parts of the frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices.
Although we cannot be sure of the stage(s) of processing at
which the increased demands associated with temporal indi-
viduation had their impact, our findings nevertheless demon-
strate a measurable difference in BOLD activity that is evoked
by these changes in temporal individuation demands.
For our secondary analysis, to identify the brain area(s)
associated with RB (i.e., a processing limitation associated
with temporal individuation), we compared activity between
conditions in which two repeated stimuli were successfully
detected or not. In contrast to the primary analysis in which we
manipulated the demands on temporal individuation, we found
that this RB analysis did not reliably affect the spatial patterns
of activity in any of our ROIs, but instead modulated the
amplitude of BOLD activity in the left hemisphere premotor
cortex. Together, our findings suggest that a large group of
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cortical regions are sensitive to demands placed on the tempo-
ral individuation process, whereas the processing limitations
associated with this operation that lead to RB specifically
influence the strength of activity in a focal brain region. Our
two key comparisons therefore appear to reflect distinct pro-
cesses: the demand or load associated with constructing an
individuated representation across time, and a specific capacity
limitation associated with individuation.
The differences that emerged for the amplitude and patterns
of BOLD activity resonate with recent findings in the visual
short-term memory literature. Several studies have shown that
increasing the number of items held in memory leads to
sustained, elevated BOLD amplitude in the parietal cortex
(Todd and Marois 2004; Xu and Chun 2006), yet maintaining
these items in memory alters the patterns, but not the ampli-
tude, of activity in early sensory areas (e.g., Emrich et al. 2013;
Serences et al. 2009). Emrich et al. (2013) suggest that changes
in activity patterns in sensory areas reflect the precision of item
representations (see also Ester et al. 2013), whereas changes in
amplitude are associated with the allocation of attention re-
sources to a limited number of items. An analogous explana-
tion fits our findings, where the distributed changes in activity
patterns associated with the demands placed on temporal indi-
viduation could reflect the precision of individuated represen-
tations, whereas the specific changes in amplitude reflected by
RB could arise from processing limitations associated with the
allocation of attentional resources that are necessary to bind an
individuated representation (token) to its identity (type).
Decoding associated with the demands placed on temporal
individuation was only attributed to a general effect of task
difficulty in one ROI (the ACC), because the patterns of
activity in the remaining ROIs did not discriminate between
differences in reaction time. These remaining regions appear to
reflect the demands associated with individuating two tempo-
rally distinct scenes, whereas the ACC appears to code for
more general task-related effects. This latter finding fits well
with the existing literature that suggests that the ACC is
involved in general task conflict and cognitive control (Kerns
et al. 2004).
Differences associated with temporal individuation were
also distinguished from purely stimulus- or response-related
effects, because classifiers could not consistently discriminate
between repeated and nonrepeated stimuli (regardless of par-
ticipants’ responses) or responses (regardless of the physical
stimulus presentation) in any of our “temporal individuation”
regions. This finding suggests that these brain areas code for
the interaction between stimulus and decision/response factors
associated with successfully individuating two temporally dis-
tinct visual items. Of import, this stimulus-response interaction
appears to be specifically related to temporal individuation in
all regions with the possible exception of the bilateral LOC,
since it was only in this area where patterns of activity could
distinguish between miss and false alarm trials. These trials
differ in stimulus and response characteristics but likely do not
differ in the demands they place on temporal individuation.
Moreover, when we collapsed decoding results across all ROIs
for the hit vs. correct rejection comparison and miss vs. false
alarm comparison, we found a significant overall difference
between these two comparisons, suggesting that the informa-
tion reflected by these two comparisons differs across the
brain. In addition, signals associated with hits and correct
rejections were restricted to brain regions that code for visual
information or higher-level abstractions that do not depend on
perceptual modality, and our decoding findings did not extend
to other nonvisual (auditory) areas. Thus activity patterns
associated with the differential demands placed on temporal
individuation did not merely reflect false positives across the
entire brain. Finally, our key individuation results cannot
reflect general positive effects of target detection (e.g., reward,
satisfaction), because both hits and correct rejections represent
correct trials and would presumably have elicited the same
level of reward and satisfaction.
In contrast to the wide set of brain areas that emerged in the
current study, previous research and theoretical models of
object individuation have attributed this operation to a single
brain region (see Jeong and Xu 2013; Xu 2009; Xu and Chun
2006, 2007, 2009). Studies such as those by Xu and colleagues
are common in cognitive neuroscience literature and assume
that any given perceptual or cognitive process will be sup-
ported by a focal set of brain areas. Although this approach is
hypothesis driven, it can be problematic as it limits the under-
lying neural substrates associated with particular processes and
might miss the involvement of a more diffuse network of brain
regions (see Vickery et al. 2011). For example, it was previ-
ously thought that signals associated with reward processes
were represented in specific parts of the basal ganglia and
prefrontal and parietal cortex (Elliott et al. 2000; Kable and
Glimcher 2007; Kahnt et al. 2010; Rushworth and Behrens
2008; Vickery and Jiang 2009). More recently, however, Vick-
ery et al. (2011) used MVPA to show that reward processes are
reflected across the whole brain, suggesting that cognitive
operations (such as temporal individuation, studied here) can
be underpinned by an extensive neural network. Interestingly,
these authors identified only a small subset of areas involved in
reward processing when employing a univariate approach.
The widespread patterns of activity that emerged for tem-
poral individuation are instead in line with existing accounts of
consciousness, such as the “global neuronal workspace” model
(Dehaene et al. 2003; Sergent and Dehaene 2004; see also
Baars and Franklin 2003). According to this framework, con-
scious awareness is underpinned by a distributed network of
“workspace neurons” that communicate via long-range con-
nections in the brain. For a stimulus to be consciously per-
ceived, it must activate this workspace, which then allows
information to be accessed by a wide variety of processes. The
global neuronal workspace model hypothesizes that these neu-
rons are present in both early sensory areas and higher-level
parietal and frontal areas, and information about a given
stimulus is transferred through recurrent communications be-
tween different levels of the cortical hierarchy. In the context
of the present study, these long-range connections provide a
possible avenue in which lower and higher cortical areas
interact during temporal individuation. We hypothesize that
conditions in which it is more demanding to individuate two
distinct object occurrences alter communications within this
distributed workspace, leading to changes in the resulting
patterns of activity in both lower- and higher-level brain areas.
Our findings provide important insights into the neural under-
pinnings of temporal individuation in that we show it is a far
more distributed process in the brain than initially proposed
(e.g., Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2009).
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It is interesting to consider the discrepancy between the
results we report presently and those from prior investigations
into individuation by Xu and colleagues (Jeong and Xu 2013;
Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2006, 2007). These previous studies
implicated the inferior IPS as the sole substrate of object
individuation, which contrasts with the more diffuse group of
brain regions we found in the current work. Even when we
analyzed our data using the same univariate method as Xu and
colleagues, we found that BOLD activity in a smaller group of
ROIs was modulated by the demands placed on temporal
individuation (ACC and superior medial frontal cortex, left
hemisphere DLPFC and left hemisphere LOC, ts  2.18, Ps 
.043, using the uncorrected test as in Xu and colleagues), but
this subset did not include the inferior IPS. Below we consider
several key differences between these previous studies and our
work that could account for this discrepancy.
First is the episodic context in which object individuation
was investigated. In our paradigm, items could only be indi-
viduated using temporal cues, whereas participants in Xu and
colleagues’ studies could only rely on the items’ spatial loca-
tions (see Jeong and Xu 2013; Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2006,
2007). It is unknown how the neural mechanisms associated
with object individuation processes differ between the spatial
and temporal domains, and the types of paradigms used in
these studies and the present study are too dissimilar to make
any strong conclusions regarding how these two operations
might be related. Further research using a single paradigm that
can manipulate spatial and temporal individuation processes
will be useful in informing us about the nature of these two
processes in the brain. Second, Xu and colleagues examined a
different aspect of object individuation from the present study.
In the present study we looked at the brain areas that support
the process of individuation during perception, whereas Xu and
colleagues’ investigations focused on how individuated repre-
sentations are consolidated, stored, and retrieved in visual
short-term memory. An interesting possibility could be that
different groups of brain areas are recruited when individuated
representations are constructed during perception and later
stored in memory.
Could the neural operation associated with temporal indi-
viduation simply reflect other forms of repetition processing in
the brain? Repetition suppression, for instance, is a phenome-
non wherein the presentation of a repeated stimulus leads to a
reduction in neural activity (Desimone 1996; Grill-Spector et
al. 2006; Henson and Rugg 2003; MacKay and Miller 1994).
Like the distributed signals that emerged in response to the
differential demands placed on temporal individuation, repeti-
tion suppression has also been detected extensively throughout
the brain (Gotts et al. 2012). Our findings are unlikely to reflect
repetition suppression for two key reasons, one reflecting
methodology and the other a control analysis. First, the differ-
ential patterns of activity we observed for successfully indi-
viduating repeated and nonrepeated stimuli were present after
gross differences in mean BOLD amplitude were removed
from each condition. Thus the activity patterns that emerged
for temporal individuation specifically reflect differences in
spatial patterns of activity, not gross amplitude. Second, we
were unable to decode purely stimulus-related changes in
activity patterns associated with repeated and nonrepeated
stimuli (hits and misses vs. correct rejections and false alarms)
in any ROI. Rather, the regions that could discriminate be-
tween hits and correct rejections appear to be sensitive to the
conditions under which the correct perceptual representation is
successfully registered for a given stimulus. Our findings can
therefore be distinguished from repetition suppression effects
in the brain.
The present study also provides novel behavioral and fMRI
evidence regarding the locus of RB. Although RB has been
demonstrated for a variety of simple and complex stimuli (see,
for a review, Coltheart 2010), our behavioral findings extend
the generality of RB by providing the first evidence that this
deficit can occur for the perception of scenes. In addition, our
univariate fMRI results provide new insights into the ongoing
debate over whether RB reflects an early (Kanwisher 1987;
Luo and Caramazza 1996) or late (Fagot and Pashler 1995;
Whittlesea and Masson 2005) processing locus. Although the
limited electrophysiological investigations into RB suggest
that this deficit arises between 220 and 350 ms after the
repeated stimulus appears (Koivisto and Revonsuo 2008;
Schendan et al. 1997), the paradigms used in these studies do
not exclusively tap the capacity limits of individuation. To our
knowledge, this study reflects the first neuroimaging work
conducted using RB, where we found that the gross amplitude
of BOLD activity in a higher-level premotor area involved in
processes such as top-down attention and response selection
(e.g., Marois et al. 2006; Schumacher et al. 2003) was influ-
enced by whether participants successfully detected two re-
peated stimuli or not. Contrary to the prominent models of RB,
this result suggests that this deficit has neither a purely per-
ceptual or memory retrieval locus but reflects a mid-level
top-down attentional bottleneck in conscious awareness (see
also Chun 1997).
The direction of amplitude differences for the capacity limits
of temporal individuation might appear counter to what one
would predict, because activity in the left hemisphere premotor
cortex was increased when a repetition was missed, compared
with when it was correctly detected. Similar findings were
noted in the AB literature, however, such that activity in two
occipitotemporal regions were enhanced when two different
letters were missed, relative to when they were detected
(Kranczioch et al. 2005). Because RB is hypothesized to reflect
an inability to bind an individuated token to a repeated type
(Kanwisher 1987; Park and Kanwisher 1994), the enhanced
activity associated with miss trials could reflect maintenance of
the second target’s type representation as the visual system
attempts (but is unable) to register the source of this represen-
tation. Similar to Kanwisher’s original type-token account
(Kanwisher 1987; Park and Kanwisher 1994), this interpreta-
tion suggests that the increased activation that emerged for
miss trials, relative to hit trials, reflects changes in processing
of the second target rather than the first.
The present findings also add to the existing literature on the
relationship between RB and other capacity-limited processes
such as the AB. Behavioral comparisons between these two
phenomena have found similar results to our lag RB experi-
ment, in that they suggest that the AB and RB reflect distinct
processing limitations (Chun 1997; Dux and Marois 2007).
This apparent dissociation is further supported by the present
fMRI findings, because we found different regions were im-
plicated in RB relative to the AB, which has been associated
with activity in parts of the lateral frontal, posterior parietal and
occipitotemporal cortices (Kranczioch et al. 2005; Marcantoni
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et al. 2003; Marois et al. 2004). Although we are limited in
making strong conclusions about the possible neural dissocia-
tion between the AB and RB given that these investigations
differed in paradigm and task, these findings do suggest that
these two phenomena might be dissociable neurally as well as
behaviorally. Our findings point towards the possibility of
exploring the dissociation or overlap in the brain between
different bottlenecks in conscious awareness.
We have provided the first evidence for an extensive set of
brain regions that support the process of temporal individuation
in perception, as well as the neural consequences associated
with the processing limitations that lead to the RB deficit. We
found that varying the demands placed on temporal individu-
ation produced distributed changes in the patterns of activity
across the brain, suggesting that such processes operate within
a widespread neuronal workspace and involve multiple sources
of information (e.g., stimulus, decisional, response). In con-
trast, when the capacity limit of individuation is reached, there
are focal increases in the gross amplitude of BOLD activity,
possibly reflecting changes in the allocation of attentional
resources to processing the second repeated target. These
findings highlight apparent differences in the neural coding of
two distinct processes associated with temporal individuation,
namely, the demands under which individuated representations
are generated and the capacity limits that bottleneck the bind-
ing of these individuated tokens to an identity representation
for conscious report.
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Object individuation and identiﬁcation are 2 key processes involved
in representing visual information in short-term memory (VSTM). In-
dividuation involves the use of spatial and temporal cues to register
an object as a distinct perceptual event relative to other stimuli,
whereas object identiﬁcation involves extraction of featural and
related conceptual properties of a stimulus. Together, individuation
and identiﬁcation provide the “what,” “where,” and “when” of visual
perception. In the current study, we asked whether individuation and
identiﬁcation processes are underpinned by distinct neural sub-
strates, and to what extent brain regions that reﬂect these 2 opera-
tions are consistent across encoding, maintenance, and retrieval
stages of VSTM. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to
identify brain regions that represent the number of objects (individu-
ation) and/or object features (identiﬁcation) in an array. Using uni-
variate and multivariate analyses, we found substantial overlap
between these 2 operations in the brain. Moreover, we show that
regions supporting individuation and identiﬁcation vary across dis-
tinct stages of information processing. Our ﬁndings challenge inﬂu-
ential models of multiple-object encoding in VSTM, which argue that
individuation and identiﬁcation are underpinned by a limited set of
nonoverlapping brain regions.
Keywords: fMRI, multi-voxel pattern analysis, neural object ﬁle theory,
object segmentation, visual short-term memory
Introduction
Many everyday activities, like searching for a stapler on a clut-
tered desk, rely on our ability to simultaneously isolate and
identify multiple visual objects. To complete such a task, an
observer must use spatial and temporal information to register
each object as distinct (object individuation) and bind its fea-
tures into a coherent form (object identiﬁcation; Kahneman
et al. 1992; Chun 1997; Pylyshyn 1989; Xu and Chun 2009). It
is currently unclear how these processes are represented in the
brain. In their “neural object ﬁle theory,” Xu and Chun (2009)
predict that the inferior intra-parietal sulcus (iIPS) plays a key
role in object individuation, whereas the superior intra-parietal
sulcus (sIPS) and lateral occipital complex (LOC) are involved
in object identiﬁcation (Xu 2007; Xu and Chun 2007; Xu 2008,
2009; Jeong and Xu 2013). Here, we test Xu and colleagues’
prediction of a strict functional dissociation between the con-
tributions of these and other regions to object individuation
and object identiﬁcation.
In a pioneering study, Xu (2009) provided evidence for dis-
sociation between object individuation and identiﬁcation
within a single experiment. While undergoing functional mag-
netic resonance (fMRI) imaging, participants were brieﬂy pre-
sented with a sample display consisting of 1 object, 4 identical
objects, or 4 different objects (see Fig. 1). After a short delay, a
single test item appeared centrally, and participants’ task was
to indicate whether the test identity matched 1 of the sample
identities. Xu observed reduced blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) activity in the iIPS for 1-object displays, relative to
both 4-identical-object and 4-different-object displays, which
did not differ from each other. Conversely, the sIPS and LOC
responded similarly for 1-object and 4-identical-object dis-
plays, but both had reduced BOLD activity relative to
4-different-object displays. Consistent with the neural object
ﬁle theory (Xu and Chun 2009), these ﬁndings demonstrated
that iIPS is sensitive to the number of objects in a display re-
quiring individuation, whereas the sIPS and LOC respond to
the number of distinct object identities requiring identiﬁcation.
A potential shortcoming of Xu’s (2009) study, and related
empirical work (Jeong and Xu 2013; e.g., Xu 2007; Xu and
Chun 2007; Xu 2008) upon which the neural object ﬁle theory
is based, is that brain activity was analyzed within occipital and
parietal regions only, thus potentially missing contributions
from other brain regions. Further, these studies employed uni-
variate analyses of the fMRI data, which are less sensitive to
small changes in patterns of BOLD response that can emerge
when activity is analyzed across groups of voxels (Haynes and
Rees, 2006; Kamitani and Tong 2005). Our recent work using
multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) suggests that temporal in-
dividuation—registering objects as distinct perceptual events
based on when they appear in “time”—recruits a broad set of
frontal, parietal, and occipital regions (Naughtin et al. 2014).
Based on this work, we predicted that such widespread net-
works of brain activity might also emerge from MVPA analyses
of fMRI data obtained for displays in which objects must be in-
dividuated and identiﬁed in the “spatial” domain.
Previous work on the neural object ﬁle theory has been also
limited to paradigms with short retention internals (Xu 2009),
meaning that these studies have not been able to examine indi-
viduation and identiﬁcation during distinct visual short-term
memory (VSTM) stages. It is important to consider the role of
different processing stages, given VSTM has been hypothe-
sized to involve encoding, maintenance, and retrieval opera-
tions (e.g., Cohen et al. 1997; Courtney et al. 1997). Although
Jeong and Xu (2013; also see Xu and Chun 2006) did use a
long-delay VSTM paradigm and suggested that the iIPS, sIPS,
and LOC are involved in individuation and identiﬁcation pro-
cesses during the encoding phase and beyond, their contrasts
differed in both the number of objects presented and the
number object identities. Thus, they could not unambiguously
compare individuation and identiﬁcation processes.
Here, we adopted a similar logic and approach to that used
by Xu (2009), but with several important modiﬁcations, to
test whether object individuation and identiﬁcation can be
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dissociated in the brain (as suggested in the neural object ﬁle
theory, Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2009). We analyzed activity
across a broad set of brain regions using both univariate and
MVPA approaches and compared the role of each region
across encoding, maintenance, and retrieval stages of VSTM. In
addition, unlike Xu’s (2009) paradigm, our task required parti-
cipants to remember both the identity and spatial location of
all the objects in the display; this task ensured that both identi-
ﬁcation and individuation operations were engaged. By using
both analytic approaches, we could ﬁrst attempt to conceptually
replicate the original univariate results from Xu (2009) under
different task conditions and also determine whether other
brain regions show evidence of object identiﬁcation or indi-
viduation using the more sensitive MVPA approach.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We recruited 21 volunteers to participate in the experiment (12
females, mean age = 25.7 years, SD = 3.4 years). Data from 1 participant
were excluded due to excessive head motion and from another due to
a technical error that meant behavioral responses were not recorded. A
post hoc power analysis conﬁrmed that a minimum sample size of 10
was sufﬁcient to have an 80% chance of detecting similar effects
(Cohen’s fs > 1.13) to those reported by Xu (2009). Participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave informed consent, and
were ﬁnancially reimbursed for their time ($15/h). The University of
Queensland ethics committee approved the experimental protocol.
Design and Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 8 distinct shapes derived from Xu and Chun
(2006). Each shape was presented in black on a light gray background
(3.1° × 3.1° of visual angle). Stimuli could appear in 1 of 8 dark gray
placeholders (3.4° × 3.4°) arranged in a circular array, with each place-
holder presented 5.3° from ﬁxation. Placeholders were included to
prevent grouping between closely presented objects (see Fig. 1; Xu
2009). The experiment was programed in MATLAB using the Psycho-
physics Toolbox (Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997).
Procedure
We used an STM paradigm, based on that of Xu (2009), to identify
brain areas that selectively code for the number of objects (individu-
ation) and/or number of object features (identiﬁcation; see Fig. 1). This
paradigm had 2 components: a primary VSTM task and a secondary
verbal memory task. Each trial began with the auditory presentation of
2 letters via headphones, and participants were asked to rehearse
these letters throughout the trial. The verbal memory task was in-
cluded to prevent participants from using verbal rehearsal strategies
for the visual stimuli (Todd and Marois 2004). After a brief inter-
stimulus interval, a sample display consisting of 1 object, 4 identical
objects, or 4 different objects was presented for 200 ms. Participants
were instructed to remember the locations and identities of the sample
objects during a subsequent 12.8-s retention interval. We used a slight-
ly longer retention interval than is typically employed in slow
event-related VSTM paradigms (e.g., see Harrison and Tong 2009;
Serences et al. 2009; Emrich et al. 2013) to ensure that we could clearly
distinguish between each stage of VSTM.
A single test shape appeared in 1 of the placeholders after the reten-
tion interval. The participants’ task was to identify whether this test
shape matched or mismatched 1 of the previously presented sample
shapes, both in terms of its identity “and” location. It is important to
note that a correct response on this task required that participants suc-
cessfully individuate and identify each of the sample items, rather than
merely their identity (cf. Xu and Chun 2007; Xu 2009, 2010; Jeong and
Xu 2013). Thus, even though the 4-identical-object displays only con-
tained a single identity, participants still had to individuate where each
object appeared to produce a correct response. Two test letters were
then presented, and participants made the same match/mismatch re-
sponse for these letters, relative to the 2 sample letters presented at the
beginning of the trial. Only response accuracy was emphasized, but
participants had a ﬁxed interval of 2 s in which to make each of their
responses. The test shape and letter matched or mismatched 1 of the
sample items an equal number of times.
Each trial was followed by a 12-s ﬁxation period. This experimental
design allowed us to isolate sources of BOLD activity previously asso-
ciated with encoding, maintenance, and retrieval of the visual informa-
tion (e.g., see Harrison and Tong 2009; Serences et al. 2009; Emrich
et al. 2013). We chose these labels for the different time periods
because previous studies have used them to describe the distinct
phases of activity observed across long retention intervals. A more the-
oretically neutral approach might be to label the stages as “early,”
“middle,” and “late,” but we adopt the former set of labels to be
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the short-term memory paradigm. Each trial began with the auditory presentation of 2 letters, followed by a sample display consisting of
1 object, 4 identical objects, or 4 different objects. After an extended delay, observers identiﬁed whether a single test shape was the same as, or different from, 1 of the sample
shapes, both in terms of its identity and location. The same judgment was also made for 2 subsequent test letters. The secondary auditory memory task was included to prevent
participants from using verbal rehearsal strategies to remember the shape stimuli.
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consistent with prior VSTM studies (e.g., Todd and Marois 2004;
Xu and Chun 2006).
Participants completed 6 practice trials outside the scanner, fol-
lowed by 8 scanning runs of 12 test trials. We only provided feedback
for incorrect responses on practice trials, in which the central ﬁxation
square brieﬂy turned red. Each run contained an equal number of trials
per trial type. Trial types were presented in a randomized order, and
the selection of stimuli and their locations were randomized across
trials. Preliminary pilot testing ensured that participants could com-
plete the task with a high level of accuracy (>80%). We made sure parti-
cipants could perform this task well, as only correct trials were
included in the fMRI analyses.
fMRI Acquisition
We acquired anatomical and functional images using a 3T Siemens
Trio MRI scanner (Erlangen) and a 12-channel head coil. Participants
laid supine in the scanner and viewed the visual display via a rear-
projection mirror. Functional T2*-weighted images were acquired par-
allel to the AC–PC plane using a GRE EPI sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 25
ms, FA = 90°, FOV = 192 × 192, matrix = 64 × 64, in-plane resolution = 3
× 3 mm). Each volume consisted of 33 slices with a thickness of 3 mm
and a 0.3-mm inter-slice gap. In the middle of the session, we collected
a T1-weighted anatomical image using an MPRAGE sequence (TR =
1.9 s, TE = 2.32 ms, FA = 9°, FOV = 192 × 230 × 256, resolution = 1
mm3). We synchronized the stimulus presentation with the acquisition
of functional volumes. Each run consisted of 184 volumes, including
an 8-s dummy ﬁxation block presented at the start of the run.
fMRI Analyses
We conducted preprocessing, univariate analyses, and MVPA with
Brain Voyager QX 2.4 (Brain Innovation) and custom MATLAB code.
We used both univariate and MVPA techniques to test for overall differ-
ences in BOLD amplitude and changes in the spatial patterns of activity
across groups of voxels for each condition, respectively. There were 2
key comparisons of interest: First, to identify regions that reﬂect object
individuation, we compared activity between displays containing 1
object and those containing 4 identical objects. Regions exclusively as-
sociated with this process should be sensitive to the episodic proper-
ties of objects (i.e., the number of objects in the display), but not to
object identity (since this remained constant across the 2 display
types). Second, to isolate regions that support object identiﬁcation, we
compared activity for displays containing 4 identical objects with those
containing 4 different objects. If a given brain region speciﬁcally con-
tributes to object identiﬁcation, it should show a difference in activity
in response to the number of distinct identities present, rather than to
the number of objects per se. These were the same comparisons previ-
ously used by Xu (2009).
Preprocessing
Data preprocessing steps consisted of 3D motion correction (with all
functional images aligned to the ﬁrst image), slice-scan time correction,
high-pass temporal ﬁltering (3 cycles per run), and Talairach space
transformation (Talairach and Tourmoux 1988). We did not apply
spatial smoothing to the data to preserve ﬁne-grained changes in activ-
ity for MVPA (as described in detail later).
Regions of Interest
All regions of interest (ROIs) were deﬁned anatomically using mean
Talairach coordinates from other relevant published studies. We used
coordinates from Xu and Chun (2006) to deﬁne the iIPS, sIPS, and
LOC, which have previously been implicated in object individuation
and identiﬁcation (e.g., Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2009). To explore the
role of other regions, we also isolated a set of frontal, parietal, and oc-
cipital regions involved in higher-level resource-limited processes such
as response selection, decision making, and encoding (Szametitat et al.
2002; Heekeren et al. 2004; Dux et al. 2006; Dux et al. 2009; Tombu
et al. 2011; Naughtin et al. 2014). Talairach coordinates for these
regions were derived from our previous published studies (Dux et al.
2009; Naughtin et al. 2014). Since the sIPS and superior parietal lobule
(SPL) ROIs overlapped in the majority of participants, we averaged the
results across these 2 regions (referred to as sIPS/SPL).
Regions of interest were deﬁned by a 11-mm3 cube for the univari-
ate analyses (we used the same number of voxels in each ROI as Xu
2009) and a 15-mm3 or 21-mm3 cube for MVPA. In both cases, the ROI
cube was centered on the mean Talairach coordinates. We deﬁned
each ROI using a larger number of voxels for MVPA, compared with
the univariate analyses, as it is conventional to use larger ROIs in the
former to provide increased variability across voxels (e.g., Kamitani
and Tong 2005; Harrison and Tong 2009; Gallivan et al. 2011;
Oosterhof et al. 2012). As the sensitivity of MVPA depends upon the
number of voxels included in the analysis, we used 2 different ROI
sizes for MVPA—rather than choosing an arbitrary ROI size—to ensure
the results were reliable, regardless of the number of voxels included
in the classiﬁcation analysis (Spiridon and Kanwisher 2002; Carp et al.
2011; Naughtin et al. 2014). For simplicity, we report the MVPA results
from the 21-mm3 ROIs that were signiﬁcant across both ROI sizes. In
addition to our main experimental ROIs, we also used the left and right
primary auditory cortices as control regions (see also Naughtin et al.
2014). As these areas primarily respond to auditory information rather
than visual information (e.g., pitch; Hyde et al. 2008), they should not
show any evidence of individuation or identiﬁcation. The auditory
cortex control regions were deﬁned in the same way as the other ROIs,
with the ROI cube centered on the superior portion of the temporal
lobe (Rademacher et al. 2001).
Univariate Analysis
The purpose of the univariate analysis was to identify gross changes in
BOLD amplitude that have been hypothesized to reﬂect the processes
of individuation or identiﬁcation. We extracted time courses for each
display condition with percentage signal change at each time point cal-
culated relative 1 volume prior to trial onset. This procedure was per-
formed separately for each ROI and participant. To determine the peak
amplitude for encoding, maintenance, and retrieval, we collapsed time
courses across all display types, participants, and ROIs and selected
the 2 volumes corresponding to the peak at each stage. The time
windows for the encoding, maintenance, and retrieval stages of VSTM
were 4–8 s, 12–16 s, and 18–22 s after sample display onset, respectively
(similar to previous VSTM studies, Todd and Marois 2004; Xu and
Chun 2006; Jeong and Xu 2013).
Multivariate Analyses
Multi-voxel pattern analysis was employed to assess for individuation-
or identiﬁcation-related changes in activity that may be present in the
ensemble patterns of activity of each ROI (Kamitani and Tong 2005;
Haynes and Rees 2006). This type of approach is more sensitive to
small, reliable changes in activity that might not be detected in stand-
ard univariate analyses. We used custom MATLAB software and a
linear support vector machine algorithm (Chang and Lin 2011) for
these analyses. We ran separate classiﬁcation analyses for encoding,
maintenance, and retrieval stages for each ROI; data for each voxel
were averaged across the respective time windows (4–8, 12–16, and
18–22 s after sample display onset). Prior to MVPA, these data samples
were transformed into z-scores and mean-centered to remove any
amplitude differences between conditions (Esterman et al. 2009;
Tamber-Rosenau et al. 2011). To assess classiﬁcation performance, we
used the leave-one-out cross-validation procedure. On each loop, 1 run
was reserved to test the classiﬁer’s generalization performance and the
remaining 7 runs were used to train the classiﬁer. We averaged classiﬁ-
cation performance for each ROI across all cross-validation loops and
compared this accuracy with chance performance (50%) using a
1-sample t-test (P < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected for the number of ROIs
and number of VSTM stages tested).
Results
Behavioral Performance
Performance on the verbal memory task did not differ between
the 3 display types (88.7–90.6% accuracy across all display
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types; F < 1), which is consistent with the idea that auditory
and VSTM systems operate independently of each other
(Baddeley 1992; Smith and Jonides 1998). We used Cowan’s K
formula (Cowan 2001) to estimate participants’ VSTM capacity
for each display type in the visual memory task. As shown in
Figure 2, K estimates signiﬁcantly differed across display types,
F2,36 = 75.21, P < 0.001, h2F ¼ 0:81. Behavioral performance
was close to ceiling for 1 object and 4 identical objects, but par-
ticipants could only hold about 2 objects in memory for the
4-different-object displays.
Univariate Analyses
We ﬁrst tested for gross differences in BOLD amplitude asso-
ciated with individuation and identiﬁcation processes. For
each comparison, we conducted a repeated-measures analysis
of variance with factors of display type (1 object, 4 identical
objects, and 4 different objects) and stage (encoding, mainten-
ance, and retrieval), separately for each ROI. A signiﬁcant
main effect of display type indicates that a given region is con-
sistently modulated by 1 or both of the processes of interest
(i.e., the number of objects—“individuation”; or the number of
object features—“identiﬁcation”) and a signiﬁcant display type
by stage interaction signals that activity associated with the
process(es) of interest varies across different VSTM stages.
Whenever the analysis for a given region yielded a signiﬁcant
interaction, we ran follow-up t-tests at each VSTM stage to iden-
tify the stage(s) at which that region was recruited for the
process(es). We present results from the signiﬁcant regions
according to whether they were modulated by the number of
objects, the number of object features, or both.
Individuation-Related Activity
Areas associated with object individuation showed either an
overall amplitude difference between 1-object versus
4-identical-object displays or an interaction between these 2
display types and stage (see Fig. 3). We found that the left and
right iIPS were showed a signiﬁcant main effect of display
type, Fs2,36 > 4.44, Ps < 0.024, h2Ps . 0:20; and follow-up t-tests
revealed that activity was signiﬁcantly reduced for displays
with 1-object, compared with 4-identical-object displays, ts18 >
2.95, Ps < 0.009. The comparison between 4 identical objects
and 4 different objects was not signiﬁcant, ts18 < 1.08, Ps >
0.294. Consistent with previous work by Xu (2009), we found
a proﬁle in the univariate activity that suggests that the iIPS is
recruited for object individuation and not object identiﬁcation.
Here, we also show, for the ﬁrst time, that the involvement of
these regions in individuation is consistent across all 3 VSTM
stages.
Identiﬁcation-Related Activity
We identiﬁed areas that support object identiﬁcation as those
for which there were signiﬁcant amplitude differences
between 4-identical-object displays and 4-different-object dis-
plays, or an interaction between these 2 display types and
stage (see Fig. 4). The bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) showed a
signiﬁcant main effect of display type, Fs2,36 > 3.62, Ps < 0.040,
h2Ps . 0:17: Follow-up t-tests revealed that this effect was
driven by an enhanced response for 4 different objects versus
4 identical objects, ts18 > 2.40, Ps < 0.027.
Five additional ROIs showed a signiﬁcant display type ×
stage interaction, Fs4,72 > 2.87, Ps < 0.047, hSF s . 0:14 (4 of
which also showed a signiﬁcant effect of display type, Fs2,36 >
5.14, Ps < 0.011, hSF s . 0:22): superior medial frontal cortex
(SMFC), right premotor cortex (PMC), bilateral insula, and left
inferior frontal junction (IFJ). All these regions showed a sig-
niﬁcant difference in activity between 4 identical and 4 differ-
ent objects for the encoding and maintenance time windows,
ts18 > 2.06, Ps < 0.054, and the right insula also showed a
Figure 2. Behavioral estimates of VSTM capacity as a function of the 3 display types.
These estimates were calculated using Cowan’s (2001) K formula. Error bars denote
standard error of the mean.
Figure 3. BOLD time courses during encoding, maintenance, and retrieval stages for
regions that were inﬂuenced by the number of objects in the display (reﬂecting object
individuation). These areas showed a signiﬁcant difference between 1-object and
4-identical-object displays at 1 or more VSTM stages. Separate lines denote display
types, and the shaded gray areas reﬂect the time window used for each stage of
VSTM. Error bars denote standard error of the mean.
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signiﬁcant difference at retrieval, t18 = 3.17, P = 0.005. Unlike
the individuation results, in a task where both identity and loca-
tion information had to be processed, we failed to observe Xu’s
(2009) ﬁnding that object identiﬁcation is restricted to the sIPS
and LOC. Instead, we found a different set of brain regions was
associated with this process, and these regions were active
during the encoding and maintenance timewindows.
Individuation- and Identiﬁcation-Related Activity
In addition to those regions that were modulated either by the
number of objects (individuation) or object features (identiﬁca-
tion), we also found some regions that showed evidence of
both processes: left PMC, right IFJ, and bilateral sIPS/SPL (see
Fig. 5). These 4 regions showed a signiﬁcant interaction
between display type and stage, Fs4,72 > 4.09, Ps < 0.005,
h2F s . 0:19: Follow-up t-tests revealed that all regions showed
a difference between 1 object and 4 identical objects at encod-
ing, ts18 > 2.01, Ps < 0.059. A signiﬁcant difference between
1-object and 4-identical-objects displays was also observed
during maintenance in the bilateral sIPS/SPL regions, ts18 >
2.15, Ps < 0.045, and in the right hemisphere sIPS/SPL during
retrieval, t18 = 2.66, P = 0.016. For the identiﬁcation compari-
son, activity was signiﬁcantly reduced for 4-identical-object
displays versus 4-different-object displays for the left PMC,
right IFJ, and bilateral sIPS/SPL during encoding and mainten-
ance, ts18 > 2.11, Ps < 0.049. Contrary to what Xu and Chun ori-
ginally proposed (Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2009), these ﬁndings
suggest that individuation and identiﬁcation cannot be com-
pletely dissociated in the brain under conditions where iden-
tity and location must be analyzed, as our univariate results
revealed a subset of brain areas that are involved in both
operations.
Multivariate Analyses
Similar to the univariate analyses, we conducted MVPA on data
corresponding to encoding, maintenance, and retrieval stages
of VSTM. In separate analyses, we trained a classiﬁer to dis-
criminate between the same 2 key comparisons used in the
univariate analyses: 1 object versus 4 identical objects for indi-
viduation, and 4 identical objects versus 4 different objects for
identiﬁcation. Classiﬁcation performance for each ROI was
compared with chance (50%) using a one-sample t-test and a
signiﬁcance threshold of P < 0.05, Bonferroni-corrected for the
18 regions tested (i.e., 16 main regions of interest plus 2
control regions) and the 3 VSTM stages (critical P = 0.0009).
Compared with the univariate analyses, the MVPA approach
revealed a more extensive neural overlap between individu-
ation and identiﬁcation processes (see Fig. 6). Six regions dis-
played evidence of either individuation or identiﬁcation
processes. Speciﬁcally, right IFJ, bilateral insula, and left LOC
showed signiﬁcant decoding for the number of objects (ts18 >
4.47, Ps < 0.016 [corrected]), whereas the right DLPFC showed
signiﬁcant decoding for the number of object features
(t18 = 4.78, P = 0.008 [corrected]). For 9 of the sixteen regions—
the left IFJ, left sIPS/SPL, left LOC, ACC, SMFC, and bilaterally
in the PMC and iIPS—classiﬁers could decode activity between
the “number of objects” comparison (1 object vs. 4 identical
objects) and the “number of object features” comparison
(4 identical vs. 4 different objects) in 1 or more VSTM stages,
ts18 > 4.06, Ps < 0.040 (corrected). Of key interest, we found
that activity in the bilateral iIPS, left sIPS/SPL, and left LOC
Figure 4. BOLD time courses during encoding, maintenance, and retrieval periods for regions that were inﬂuenced by the number of object features in the display (reﬂecting object
identiﬁcation). These regions showed a signiﬁcant difference between displays containing 4 identical objects and those with 4 different objects at 1 or more VSTM stages. Separate
lines denote display types, and the shaded gray areas reﬂect the time window used for each stage of VSTM. Error bars denote standard error of the mean.
Cerebral Cortex 5
 at UQ Library on September 14, 2014
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
could be decoded for the 2 comparisons of interest at single
or multiple stages of VSTM, suggesting these regions represent
“both” individuation and identiﬁcation processes, rather than
1 distinct process. In addition, while activity associated with
the number of objects or object features could be decoded
across all VSTM stages in some regions (e.g., bilateral sIPS/
SPL, left PMC, and right LOC), other brain areas were recruited
during speciﬁc stages (e.g., within the left IFJ, the number of
object features presented could be decoded during encoding
and maintenance, but the number of objects per se could be
decoded at retrieval only).
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest an extensive inter-
play between object individuation and identiﬁcation in the
brain and suggest that signals associated with these processes
can be detected across a wide network of regions at each stage
of VSTM (see also Naughtin et al. 2014). These ﬁndings are in-
consistent with the neural object ﬁle theory put forward by Xu
and Chun (2009), which predicts that individuation and identi-
ﬁcation are subserved by a limited set of nonoverlapping brain
regions. Rather, we show that activity is modulated in a distrib-
uted set of common regions when observers are required to
identify and individuate a set of items in a display (novel condi-
tions that are not accounted for in the current conceptualiza-
tion of the neural object ﬁle theory).
One caveat to these conclusions is that the differences we
observed for individuation and identiﬁcation could instead
reﬂect some general, unspeciﬁed effect of task difﬁculty. As we
elaborate on in the section General Discussion, such task difﬁ-
culty effects are a potential issue for any study where there are
behavioral differences between conditions (including the pre-
vious work by Xu and colleagues). It is therefore challenging
to operationalize general, unspeciﬁed effects of task difﬁculty
as a measure that is independent of the manipulated factors.
Nevertheless, as MVPA has the potential to exacerbate such dif-
ﬁculty effects (e.g., see Todd et al. 2013), we addressed this
issue by balancing reaction times across our 2 key comparisons
of interest. Prior to conducting the MVPAs, we equated reac-
tion times between the “number of objects” and “number of
object features” comparisons by removing the slowest trials
from the condition with the longest average reaction time and
the fastest trials from the condition with the shortest average
reaction time, until there was no signiﬁcant reaction time dif-
ference between the conditions, ts14 < 1.56, Ps > 0.141. Data
from 4 participants were removed from these analyses, as we
could not balance their reaction times between conditions for
1 or both comparisons (leaving the sample at n = 15).
Despite the substantial reduction in power due to fewer
trials and subjects included in this analysis, we found 32 of our
original 43 signiﬁcant decoding effects held once reaction time
was equated (see Table 1). The number of objects and/or
object features could no longer be discriminated in the main-
tenance or retrieval periods for the left IFJ, right DLPFC, bilat-
eral PMC, left insula, and right sIPS/SPL (Ps > 0.05, corrected,
across 1 or both ROI sizes). For the encoding period, the
number of objects in the right LOC and the number of object
features in the left PMC could not be reliably discriminated
(Ps > 0.05, corrected, across 1 or both ROI sizes). It is possible
that those effects that were no longer reliable in the reaction
time-balanced analysis might have reﬂected some general
effect of task difﬁculty, rather than the processes of interest. An
alternative explanation is that this control analysis simply had
less power than the main analysis to detect these effects, due
to the reduction in trial numbers and subjects. Although these
reaction time-controlled results raise a degree of doubt about
Figure 5. BOLD time courses during encoding, maintenance, and retrieval periods for regions that were inﬂuenced by both the number of objects (object individuation) and number
of object features (object identiﬁcation). These regions showed signiﬁcant differences between both comparisons of interest at 1 or more VSTM stages. Separate lines denote
display types, and the shaded gray areas reﬂect the time window used for each stage of VSTM. Error bars denote standard error of the mean.
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the role played by some of our ROIs in individuation and iden-
tiﬁcation, the overall results were largely robust to this balan-
cing procedure. Collectively, our ﬁndings demonstrate that
individuation and identiﬁcation processes can be detected in
overlapping substrates that are distributed across the brain.
Control Analysis
We conducted the same MVPA using data from 2 control
regions (left and right auditory cortices) that should not be in-
volved in visual individuation or identiﬁcation. The purpose of
this control analysis was to ensure that the decoding differ-
ences described earlier reﬂect the processes of interest—object
individuation and identiﬁcation—rather than any unantici-
pated artifact of our data, task design, or analyses. As expected,
classiﬁers could not reliably discriminate between the number
of objects in the display (1 object vs. 4 identical objects) and
the number of object features (4 identical objects vs. 4 different
objects) in the left or right auditory cortices at any VSTM stage,
ts18 = 2.64, Ps > 0.855 (corrected). These control results conﬁrm
that the observed differences between the display types within
the experimental ROIs reﬂect processes speciﬁcally associated
with individuating or identifying multiple objects.
General Discussion
The purpose of the current study was twofold: We wanted to
test whether object individuation and identiﬁcation are distinct
processes in the brain and whether the brain regions that
Figure 6. Mean classiﬁcation performance during encoding, maintenance, and retrieval periods across all key regions of interest. Classiﬁers were trained to discriminate between
the 2 key comparisons: 1 object versus 4 identical objects (“number of objects” comparison; object individuation), and 4 identical objects versus 4 different objects (“number of
object features” comparison; object identiﬁcation). Results from each region are displayed on separate plots. Asterisks denote classiﬁcation performance that is signiﬁcantly greater
than chance across both ROI sizes (Bonferroni-corrected for the number of regions and VSTM stages tested). Error bars reﬂect standard error of the mean.
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support these operations vary across different processing
stages of VSTM. Using the same logic and a similar experimen-
tal approach to that previously employed by Xu (2009), we
compared changes in BOLD activity under conditions that dif-
fered in either the number of objects (1 object vs. 4 identical
objects) or the number of object features (4 identical objects
vs. 4 different objects). We used a slow event-related protocol
that allowed us to separate activity reﬂected by encoding,
maintenance, and retrieval VSTM stages. Across both univari-
ate analyses and MVPA, we found evidence for both distinct
and overlapping neural substrates for individuation and identi-
ﬁcation. The overlap between these 2 operations was most ap-
parent in the MVPA results, where 9 ROIs showed evidence of
individuation and identiﬁcation at a single or multiple VSTM
stages. These results suggest that individuation and identiﬁca-
tion have distributed and overlapping neural substrates (see
also Naughtin et al. 2014), and these operations are not re-
stricted to a few process-speciﬁc brain areas, as has previously
been suggested (Xu 2009; Xu and Chun 2009).
The involvement of most brain regions in individuation
and identiﬁcation was variable across VSTM stages, particularly
at retrieval. The timing of the auditory memory response,
however, could account for the absence of individuation- or
identiﬁcation-related activity at the retrieval stage. In other
words, activity associated with the auditory memory re-
sponse could have obscured effects present in the visual
memory response. By contrast, the observed modulations
associated with differences in number of objects or object
features in the display could not simply reﬂect an artifact
of our data, task design, or analysis, as these same compari-
sons yielded no signiﬁcant decoding in 2 auditory control
regions.
Table 1
Mean classiﬁcation performance during encoding, maintenance, and retrieval periods for the main decoding analysis (where reaction time [RT] was not equated) and the task difﬁculty control analysis
(where RTwas equated)
Region of interest VSTM: encoding VSTM: maintenance VSTM: retrieval
Unequal RTs Equal RTs Unequal RTs Equal RTs Unequal RTs Equal RTs
IFJ (L)
1 vs. 4I 57.8 (11) 56.1 (11) 54.9 (10) 56.1 (12) 61.1 (10)* 59.5 (9)
4I vs. 4D 64.1 (12)* 68.8 (15)* 61.1 (11)* 62.9 (12) 56.8 (8) 61.5 (12)
IFJ (R)
1 vs. 4I 61.2 (13) 60.3 (15) 59.4 (10) 59.5 (12) 64.0 (8)* 63.2 (9)*
4I vs. 4D 61.2 (9) 62.1 (12) 62.8 (14) 63.8 (15) 55.6 (10) 64.7 (15)#
ACC (Bi)
1 vs. 4I 55.7 (8) 55.4 (10) 54.4 (8) 55.2 (10) 72.5 (9)* 73.3 (9)*
4I vs. 4D 62.9 (12)* 67.0 (15)* 63.6 (14)* 66.8 (15)* 57.4 (9) 73.1 (11)*
SMFC (Bi)
1 vs. 4I 58.3 (10) 60.0 (12) 49.4 (9) 52.8 (11) 68.6 (14)* 69.2 (12)*
4I vs. 4D 62.2 (11)* 67.2 (9)* 62.9 (13)* 66.6 (13)* 54.2 (7) 67.6 (13)
DLPFC (L)
1 vs. 4I 52.9 (11) 54.5 (11) 55.1 (7) 56.9 (11) 58.6 (8) 55.1 (8)
4I vs. 4D 60.3 (10) 62.6 (14) 64.8 (15) 64.9 (15) 55.3 (8) 60.3 (12)
DLPFC (R)
1 vs. 4I 55.1 (10) 55.5 (11) 57.3 (10) 58.2 (11) 59.7 (11) 60.1 (12)
4I vs. 4D 56.3 (14) 60.3 (14) 62.4 (11)* 65.2 (13) 56.9 (9) 60.7 (10)*
PMC (L)
1 vs. 4I 63.6 (10)* 66.1 (12)* 59.1 (6)* 61.4 (10) 59.7 (10)* 59.7 (11)
4I vs. 4D 61.7 (11)* 61.4 (11) 61.3 (12)* 62.5 (12) 53.3 (11) 62.3 (14)
PMC (R)
1 vs. 4I 62.6 (11)* 63.7 (9)* 57.7 (11) 57.9 (13) 61.7 (12)* 58.5 (14)
4I vs. 4D 60.9 (11)* 64.8 (13)* 62.2 (13)* 64.0 (14)# 57.9 (9) 62.1 (11)
Insula (L)
1 vs. 4I 51.8 (7) 52.3 (12) 52.4 (8) 54.3 (10) 61.0 (11)* 59.2 (10)
4I vs. 4D 58.9 (9) 61.7 (12) 60.4 (9) 63.8 (10) 53.7 (10) 59.5 (14)
Insula (R)
1 vs. 4I 55.0 (8) 54.7 (9) 55.8 (7) 56.9 (10) 65.0 (11)* 63.9 (13)#
4I vs. 4D 55.5 (11) 60.3 (16) 57.6 (11) 62.8 (11)* 56.6 (10) 63.0 (12)*
iIPS (L)
1 vs. 4I 69.8 (10)* 66.2 (12)* 68.3 (8)* 67.2 (9)* 57.3 (9) 57.4 (7)
4I vs. 4D 57.8 (7)* 67.2 (13)* 61.3 (11)* 65.3 (12)* 51.6 (9) 59.8 (14)
iIPS (R)
1 vs. 4I 66.3 (10)* 65.1 (12)* 66.9 (11)* 69.7 (12)* 61.2 (13) 59.4 (13)
4I vs. 4D 56.0 (7) 65.3 (14)* 61.0 (10)* 66.9 (11)* 54.4 (7) 59.0 (12)
sIPS/SPL (L)
1 vs. 4I 67.6 (10)* 67.4 (10)* 64.5 (8)* 63.7 (10)* 63.2 (10)* 61.8 (11)*
4I vs. 4D 62.9 (9)* 68.7 (11)* 64.0 (10)* 66.5 (12)* 54.8 (9) 67.0 (10)*
sIPS/SPL (R)
1 vs. 4I 66.0 (13)* 66.7 (13)* 63.4 (9)* 65.1 (10)* 63.6 (11)* 62.7 (12)
4I vs. 4D 61.3 (11) 67.0 (14)* 62.3 (10) 66.6 (12)* 56.2 (8) 63.6 (11)*
LOC (L)
1 vs. 4I 60.9 (10) 62.4 (10)* 60.1 (9)* 62.8 (8)* 63.5 (9)* 62.2 (11)*
4I vs. 4D 60.0 (12) 64.8 (14) 61.6 (10)* 67.6 (11)* 55.4 (9) 60.6 (13)
LOC (R)
1 vs. 4I 62.7 (11)* 60.1 (12) 66.0 (7)* 66.7 (6)* 67.9 (11)* 67.5 (12)*
4I vs. 4D 55.6 (9) 61.2 (12) 57.2 (13) 58.0 (11) 54.2 (4) 68.8 (11)*
Note: Standard deviations are denoted in the parentheses. Decoding accuracies for each region are displayed separately for the “number of objects” comparison (1 object vs. 4 identical objects [1 vs. 4I])
and the “number of object features” comparison (4 identical objects vs. 4 different objects [4I vs. 4D]). All statistical results are Bonferroni-corrected for the number of regions and VSTM stages tested.
*P< 0.050, #P< 0.082 (marginally signiﬁcant).
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One could argue that data from our main analyses do not
rule out the potential confound of general, unspeciﬁed task
difﬁculty. In fact, such difﬁculty effects are also a possible
issue for the prior studies by Xu and colleagues, and likely any
other study in cognitive neuroscience where performance
differs between conditions (e.g., the standard parametric ma-
nipulation). Similarly, it is equally problematic to interpret
imaging ﬁndings when there is no behavioral difference
between conditions. Here, we ﬁnd complementary differences
in behavior and the brain. In an attempt to rule out the poten-
tial confound of task difﬁculty, we equated reaction times
between our 2 key comparisons, and the results were largely
comparable with those from our main decoding analysis. We
still found activity in a distributed set of brain regions that was
speciﬁcally associated with individuation or identiﬁcation, and
7 of the original 9 regions showed evidence of both processes
(ACC, SMFC, right PMC, bilateral iIPS, left sIPS/SPL, and left
LOC). Thus, any nonspeciﬁc effect of difﬁculty does not
appear to account for the overlap between individuation and
identiﬁcation that we observe.
The large number of common brain regions associated with
individuation and identiﬁcation, either at the same stage or dif-
ferent stages of VSTM, contrasts with theoretical accounts and
fMRI results put forward by Xu and colleagues (Xu and Chun
2006, 2007, 2009; Xu 2009; Jeong and Xu 2013). For example,
Xu (2009) used univariate analyses and found evidence for in-
dividuation tapping only the iIPS and identiﬁcation only the
sIPS and LOC. Within these 3 posterior regions, however, we
found the greatest overlap between individuation and identiﬁ-
cation, particularly during encoding and maintenance stages
of VSTM. These discrepant ﬁndings resonate with seminal
MVPA work by Haxby et al. (2001), who found that decoding
techniques, unlike univariate analyses, reveal overlapping
stimulus representations in the ventral temporal cortex, even
though this cortical area was previously thought to contain
subregions that only responded to a single stimulus category
(i.e., faces and man-made objects such as houses, scissors, and
chairs). Thus, it appears that information pertaining to in-
dividuation and identiﬁcation is reﬂected by more subtle
changes in BOLD activity, which we were able to detect using
MVPA.
There are several other reasons why Xu and colleagues
might not have observed an overlap between individuation
and identiﬁcation. First, in the present study, participants were
required to individuate and identify “each item” within the
sample display. By contrast, Xu (2009) had participants judge
a test shape based upon its identity only, and not its location.
The active involvement of each process in completing the task
could have enhanced neural responses associated with indi-
viduation and identiﬁcation. While we cannot say whether the
same overlap between object individuation and identiﬁcation
would be observed if we used a pure identiﬁcation task (e.g.,
Xu 2009), our ﬁndings do suggest that these processes are re-
ﬂected in common neural substrates in tasks that require parti-
cipants to individuate and identify all objects in the display.
Second, we used a longer memory retention period. Xu
(2009) had participants maintain sample shapes in memory for
only 1 s, and thus, activity associated with each VSTM stage
was collapsed and ﬁner differences at any given stage could
have been temporally smeared. Finally, we analyzed activity in
a wider set of ROIs. This broader approach ensured a more
thorough exploration of individuation and identiﬁcation
processes in the brain and revealed that signals associated with
each of these processes can be detected in a far more distribu-
ted neural network.
Results from our recent fMRI study on “temporal” individu-
ation (Naughtin et al. 2014) are consistent with the current
ﬁndings of involvement of both lower-level perceptual regions
and higher-level executive regions in spatial individuation and
identiﬁcation processes. In the previous study, we used a repe-
tition blindness paradigm in which participants had to detect
the presence of a scene repetition embedded within a rapid
stream of distractors. As participants are typically poorer at in-
dividuating an item when it is preceded by one with the same
identity (Kanwisher 1987; Park and Kanwisher 1994), we hy-
pothesized that it would be more demanding to successfully
individuate 2 temporally distinct scenes when they had the
same identity (repeated), relative to different identities (nonre-
peated). Using MVPA, we found that activity in the same set of
lower- and higher-level regions could discriminate between
correctly identiﬁed repeated and nonrepeated scenes. Thus,
even though our previous investigation (Naughtin et al. 2014)
and the current study employed paradigms that differed in
both task demands and stimulus properties, ﬁndings from
both point to a common distributed network for identiﬁcation
and individuation in the spatial and temporal domains.
We are not the ﬁrst to propose a distributed neural network
as the underlying neural basis for perceptual or cognitive abil-
ities. For example, in their MVPA study, Vickery et al. (2011)
found that reward processes are reﬂected across many brain
regions, yet a smaller, more focal set of regions emerged in the
univariate analysis. In addition, Duncan (2010, 2013) has pro-
posed that a large range of cognitive tasks are underpinned by
a distributed set of frontal and parietal regions, which he refers
to as the “multiple demands” system. These ﬁndings under-
score the importance of exploring the role of distributed brain
regions in any given perceptual or cognitive process.
Conclusion
The present evidence challenges an earlier view that object in-
dividuation and identiﬁcation are subserved by a relatively
small set of distinct brain regions (as suggested by Xu 2009; Xu
and Chun 2009). Both univariate analyses and MVPA sug-
gested that individuation and identiﬁcation are instead re-
ﬂected across a larger group of brain regions and that these
processes have overlapping neural substrates. We propose that
individuation and identiﬁcation might operate within a distrib-
uted neural network in which lower- and higher-level regions
communicate. Our ﬁndings further indicate that earlier work
on the neural bases of object individuation and identiﬁcation
may have been restricted by the number of regions tested and
the sensitivity of the data analysis techniques employed. At the
very least, our data illustrate conditions in which the neural
object ﬁle theory (Xu and Chun 2009) cannot account for how
object individuation and identiﬁcation are represented in the
brain, that is, when the observer must track both the location
and identity of objects. Furthermore, we found involvement of
these distributed regions varied across different processing
stages of VSTM, in a substantial proportion of regions. These
results provide new insights into the nature of the neural sub-
strates that give rise to individuation and identiﬁcation—2 op-
erations that are crucial for a stimulus to reach conscious
awareness and be consolidated in VSTM.
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